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1.1. Imperatives for Judicial reform 
 
The government of Ethiopia has started a program on judicial reform. This initiative 
to reform the judiciary is part of an overall effort to overhaul the justice system 
through a Comprehensive Justice Systems Reform Program (CJSRP).  The program 
aims at examining all the institutions and processes that have a direct impact on the 
administration of justice.  As such it includes within its ambit the law making process, 
legal education, law enforcement agencies, justice information and the judicial 
process.  Ethiopia is relatively a late comer to the idea of judicial reform.  Many other 
countries have already embarked on judicial reform earlier as part of their efforts for 
development.  Efforts to modernize legal process in many countries have, in part, 
been a result of the increasing pressure resulting from the expansion and liberalization 
of the national and international commerce. (Chodosh 2003:866) 
 
Globally, there is a tendency to give the judiciary greater focus than in the past.  This 
renewed interest on judicial reform has been ignited by the increasing recognition that 
good governance is essential for economic growth (Messick, 1999:1)  
 
The relationship between the judiciary and economic development was a subject of 
thorough study by many scholars.  Many discuss this subject within the context of 
enforcement of contracts.  The 16th century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes 
indicated that without a judicial system traders will be hesitant to enter in to contracts 
because of fear of the breach of promises   In his own words “he that perforemth first 
has no assurance the other will perform after because the bonds of words are too weak 
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to bridle men’s ambitions avarice, anger, and other passions without the fear of some 
coercive power”. (Messick, 1999:8). 
 
This basic premise of Hobbes has been revived by 20th century development 
economists.   North argues that “the most important source of both historical 
stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the third world” is non-existence 
of low cost system of enforcing contracts. (North 1990:54)   Williamson likewise 
argues that the absence of a well-functioning judicial system results in a higher 
transaction cost or a “low-performance economy” as the failure of the judiciary to 
enforce contracts will make a disproportionately large number of transactions to take 
place in the spot market where there is less likelihood of breach of contract.  As a 
result, long-term contracts which are needed for a high-performance economy would 
not take place in systems where the judiciary is weak. (Williamson 1995).  
 
Surveys conducted in a number of countries support the arguments of these scholars.  
The survey conducted in Ghana for example has proved that the absence of a sound 
judicial system could result in higher transaction costs by introducing network of 
traders who serve as go-betweens.  Similarly, survey conducted in Peru has shown 
that about a third of those responding have said that they would not change a trusted 
supplier and go to a new one for fear that the new supplier may not honour the terms 
of the contract. (Dakolias 1996; Pinheiro 1996) Likewise a survey in Ecuador 
indicates the unwillingness of businesses to invest in that country because of the 
insecurity of contracts and the long time it takes to enforce them.  Brazilian 
entrepreneurs have also suggested the possibility of a 10% increase in investment if 
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the Brazilian judiciary could give as good services as those in the advanced market 
economies. (Pinheiro 1996)  
 
The relationship between economic development and the judiciary is not limited to 
the enforcement of contracts.  Economic development requires protection of the 
property rights of domestic and foreign investors and the operation of the executive 
branches of government within a predictable framework of rules, in addition to the 
proper and timely enforcement of contracts. (Dakolias 1996)  This point of view 
allocates a more prominent place to the judiciary in economic development as it 
thinks that “the judiciary is in a unique position to support sustainable development 
by holding the other two branches accountable for their decisions underpinning the 
credibility of the overall business and political environment” (The World Bank 
1997:100) 
 
This argument which draws a link between economic development and the rule of law 
was raised by many others earlier.    John Fortescue, Max Weber, Adam Smith have 
somehow examined the impact of the rule of law on economic development. 
(Messick, 1999:7) The 19th century German sociologist Max Weber particularly gave 
a detailed explanation of the relationship between the rule of law, economic 
development and a well functioning judiciary. (Trubek, 1972) Weber analyzed the 
role of legal systems in the emergence of western civilization and emphatically 
stressed the elements in laws that are important for the functioning of a market 
system.  These included “universal rules uniformly applied, which generates 
predictability, and allows planning: a regime of contract law that secures future 
expectations, and property law to protect the fruits of labor” (Trubek, 1972)  Max 
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Weber’s thesis of the role of law in economic development was “the analytical and 
philosophical ‘godfather’ for many of the legal reform exercised in the 1960s”. 
(Ofosu-Amaah, 2002:555)  
 
The empirical findings of Scully who undertook studies in 155 market economies 
strengthen this position.  The research conducted by Scully shows that, “politically 
open societies, which bind themselves to the rule of law, to private property, and to 
market allocation of resources” are three times faster in growth; that the efficiency of 
countries with good institutional frame-work is twice that of those with bad 
institutions; that the efficiency of countries with poor institutions declines 
continuously, as opposed to those with good institutions which have captured all the 
gains of efficiency (Scully 1988:9) 
 
Only well functioning legal systems and judiciaries stimulate technological progress 
and investment.  The ability of the judiciary to enforce contracts properly is 
particularly pronounced in long-term and in highly specialized contracts. Economic 
agents tend to make long-term and highly specialized investments only when they are 
assured that contracts that support their economic activities will be enforced properly. 
This results from the very nature of such economic activities.  Specialized investment 
usually needs assets that are specific for that production and cannot be salvaged for 
other purposes.  This limits the ability of the parties to exit from contracts that support 
such activities.  The parties’ freedom to dispose of the assets used in such production 
lines may also be limited by law. On the other hand, the parties cannot possibly 
foresee and address all the contingencies that can arise during the lifetime of the 
contract. (Makler 1996:4)   In all such cases one or all parties will have the tendency 
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to seek self interest during the implementation of the contract.   A well functioning 
judiciary is necessary to reduce the contractual hazards that may come when the 
parties use their discretion during the life time of long term contracts. (Pinheiro 1996)     
The country studies that have been conducted by Levy and Spiller show that a strong 
and independent judiciary is a necessary condition for sectors with specific 
investment. (Levy and Spiller 1994) Timely and predictable enforcement of contracts 
stimulates economic agents to increase their market in number as well as in 
geographical spread by reducing transaction cost. The proper functioning of courts 
would, therefore, have a market enlargement effect, which in turn brings about 
technological spill over and diffusion of knowledge through the transmission of sound 
marketing, financing and managing practices. (Levy and Spiller 1994; Pinheiro 
1996:10)    By so doing an effective judicial system contributes to the creation of an 
environment that is conducive for free market economies. The performance of the 
judiciaries also affects growth through its impact on the rate at which factors of 
production accumulate.  Higher risk of expropriation or a poor enforcement system 
reduces value of property and the rate of investment which is related to it. (Pinheiro 
1996:11) 
 
The role of the judiciary in societies is related to the nature of the interactions upon 
which they are built.  Life in modern societies depends on innumerable complex, 
impersonal cooperative interactions between individuals who pursue self-seeking 
objectives but operate on incomplete information about the behaviour of other actors.  
This complexity of relationships coupled with the incompleteness of the information 
at the disposal of the economic agents, forces people to rely more on institutional 
framework than used to in traditional societies.  Reliance on effective third party 
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enforcement, therefore, becomes a necessity to get the gains from modern societies 
that are characterized by specialized and interdependent trade.  The reliance on third 
party enforcement would increase with the increment of the complexity and 
specialization of relationships because of the greater need to reduce the degree of 
uncertainty about effective cooperation. (Garcia 1998:1294) 
 
The importance of adjudication is, therefore, higher in modern societies than it is in 
traditional societies.  Personal relationship and interchange is more important in 
traditional societies which are characterized by repeat dealings, cultural homogeneity, 
and self enforcing mechanisms derived from dense social interaction networks. The 
institutional structure of modern societies has made the need for third party 
enforcement at low transaction costs of a greater importance. (Garcia 1998:1294-5) 
Judiciaries must therefore, play a greater role in our times by providing “cost 
effective, impartial, and neutral third party in charge of resolving disputes according 
to generally predictable rules and principles that are publicly available” (Garcia 
1998:1295) 
 
To ensure the confidence which individuals and organizational economic agents in a 
free market economy require the enforcement of claims must be done at low 
transaction costs.  The cost of judicial enforcement is associated with the time and 
resources spent by a party to have his claims enforced through a judicial decision.  
One should not be expected to spend more resources for the enforcement of claims 




Enforcement would become easier only if it is in the interest of the other party to keep 
the terms of the agreement. “Enforcement poses no problem when it is in the interest 
of the other part to live up to the agreement.  But without institutional constraints, 
self-interested behaviour will foreclose complex exchange, because of the uncertainty 
that the other part will find it in his or her interest to live up to the agreement.” (North 
1990:33) The Enforcement mechanism that is in place should therefore, have 
attributes which make breach of contract more to the defaulting party than living up to 
the terms of the contract (North, 1990) 
 
Besides, the legal framework must provide certain protections which include, 
adequate protection of property rights with some guarantees against arbitrary 
alienation, allowing substantial activity, a substantial freedom for the formation of 
companies and adequate rules for the orderly dissolution when the need arises. 
(Sherwood et al: 6) 
    
In her studies about the Central and Eastern European countries Gray argues that a 
legal system which is friendly to a market economy must have four characteristics:  It 
must define property rights, it must have the means to commercialize private property, 
it must set clear rules on how to enter and exit from productive activities and finally, 
it should oversee the market structure and behaviour to promote competition. (Gray 
1993)In other words in market economies the legal system should provide the rules of 





Rule of law partly indicates the people would be in a position to structure their 
economic activities by taking the legal system in to account.  This process would 
definitely require learning what the legal rules say, using these rules to structure 
economic transactions, obtaining compensation or seeking to punish those who break 
the rules and using public institutions such as courts to have the rules enforced. (Hay 
et al, 1996:559) 
Sherwood et all add the following in this connection. 
“In market systems, the legal framework (ideally at least) will establish 
durable property rights which are difficult to alienate arbitrarily and provide 
means to assure those rights are clearly assigned across all property; allow 
substantial activity; substantial freedom for association in forming companies 
and, by allowing for limited liability, both encourage the raising of capital and 
provide for orderly dissolution of associations, firms joint ventures and so on.” 
(Sherwood et al, 1994: 6) 
 
The effectiveness of such a legal system requires an effective conflict resolution and 
enforcement mechanism.  The search for an ideal judicial system is bound to fail in 
light of the differences between legal systems in the world.  Defining an ideal judicial 
system precisely is difficult not only because it involves subjective judgments, but 
also because “the line between a legal system and its judicial system is not self 
evident”. (Pinheiro 1996:3)  The difficulty to come up with an acceptable definition of 
a good judicial system has forced some writers to suggest some other alternatives.  As 
a result the qualities of an effective judicial system have been defined in different 
ways by different scholars.   Sherwood thinks that assured access, predictable 
outcomes, timely outcomes and adequate remedies are the basic elements of an 
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effective judicial system which supports optimal market activity. Sherwood focuses 
more on the results of the judicial process to measure its quality.  Hay et al on the 
other hand argue that the quality of a judicial system can be measured by the 
magnitude to which people use the judiciary as opposed to other methods of conflict 
resolution. (Hay et al, 1996:560)  Williamson gives even a more indirect measurement 
when he says that “the quality of a judiciary can be inferred indirectly: a high-
performance economy (expressed in governance terms) will support more transactions 
in the middle range than will an economy with a problematic judiciary.  Put 
differently, in a low-performance economy the distribution of transactions will be 
more bimodal—with spot-market and hierarchical transactions and fewer middle-
range transactions” (Williamson 1995:181-2) Pinheiro on the other hand argues that 
“low cost access, fairness, and predictable and timely outcomes” are the basic 
properties of a well-functioning judicial system. (Pinheiro 1996) It has to be noted, 
however, that regardless of the approaches to identifying the qualities of an effective 
judicial system, at the end of the day the effectiveness of the justice system will also 
depend on the quality of the laws and contracts they apply.  The fairness, timeliness 
and predictability of the decisions of the courts will depend, to a large extent on how 
sensible, well written the laws are, and the extent of their consistency with other laws 
and business practices. (Pinheiro 1996:3) 
 
On top of that the elements mentioned above require inputs to produce them. 
Amongst other things these outputs would require the existence of impartial and 
competent judiciary, allocation of sufficient resources for the judicial organs, 
balanced procedures, availability of public information, well conceived and clearly 
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written laws, and a defined and broadly understood expectation of what court are to 
do.’’ (Pinheiro 1996) 
 
An effective judicial system forces civic responsibility on all members of a society.  
That provides a platform from which inter-personal relations with strangers can be 
undertaken with some confidence.  Effective judicial arrangements offer every 
individual the opportunity to secure private rights and expect to have them sustained 
in case of conflict or challenge, state interference, invasion, or other attacks.  From the 
perspective of economic activity, impersonal commercial transactions have more 
prospect of flourishing.  Activity need not be confined within social circles, ethnic 
groups, local communities, enlarged firms clans or family connections.  A base for a 
highly sophisticated division of labor across all segments of a society results, which in 
turn leads to high levels of widespread economic activity. (Sherwood et al, 1994:8) 
 
An effective judicial service would understandably require a trade-off between the 
requirements of due process and the need to make the judicial process efficient.  The 
requirements of justice to reach a correct decision which sets an appropriate remedy 
after the proper identification of the law, a thorough determination of the facts, is in 
constant tension with the need to do all these things in a shorter time and less cost 
both to the public and private actors.  The tension between the two could lead to 
imperfect outcomes. (Sherwood et al, 1994:9)  
 
The tension between the quality of justice and efficiency notwithstanding, the impact 
of a poorly functioning judiciary on economic performance of a country should never 
be underestimated.  We have seen earlier that a properly functioning judicial system 
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should give timely, predictable and fair decisions at a relatively low level of cost to 
the system.  A dysfunctional judicial system would have problems in all or some of 
these elements thereby affecting the environment under which the market economy 
would operate. 
 
A malfunctioning judiciary hampers economic growth by stimulating inefficient use 
of resources and technology.  An inefficient judiciary entails high transaction cost and 
high risk thereby distorting resource allocation. The inability to enforce contracts and 
to protect property rights, will also force some economic agents not to pursue some of 
their activities thereby depriving them of an opportunity to specialize and to make use 
of the economies of scale. (Pinheiro 1996:13)  
 
An inefficient judiciary hampers the efforts to maximize efficiency by raising the sum 
of the two costs involved in litigation: ‘error costs’ and ‘direct costs’. An erroneous 
judicial decision raises the social costs (the error costs) by defeating the very purpose 
of the substantive laws which aspire to increase economic efficiency. (Posner 
1974:275) An error cost is incurred when liability is imposed on the wrong party or 
where the right party is rendered liable for the wrong amount. (Cooter and Ulen, 
2000:376)  Besides, delay in the process of litigation raises the direct costs.  
Reduction of delay in the judicial process is obviously the main focus of many 
judicial reform initiatives as it is the most important point that affects efficiency.  The 
very nature of judicial processes requires some degree of delay and therefore, all 
delay is not necessarily an evil.  Delay should become a concern only when it is an 
excessive delay which can only be measured by comparing the costs and benefits of 
various types of delay. (Posner 1974:336)  Delay also raises the error cost because the 
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decay of evidence through time increases the probability of an erroneous decision and 
the application of legal rules to changed set of circumstances is retarded.  “Delay also 
raises error costs by widening the gap between damages and judgments that is 
rendered by the fact that the legal interest rate is lower than the market rate and 
interest is usually allowed not from the date of the event giving rise to the suit but 
only from the date of judgment.” (Posner 1974:337) 
 
1.2. Concept for a Thesis 
 
The title of the thesis is "Judicial Reform in Ethiopia".  This is so chosen to try to 
analyse the theoretical aspects and practical implications of the reform initiatives that 
are being implemented in Ethiopia.  To make the research manageable, however, the 
main focus will be the formal courts in Ethiopia although other aspects will be 
discussed as they indirectly affect the performance of the courts. As aspects of reform 
are very many a choice had to be made as to what the central focus of the research 
should be.  As a result the research has focused only on three aspects of the reform 
program.  The first one relates to the problems on efficiency and how the reform 
program should handle them.  The second one relates to the issue of access to justice, 
its barriers and the possible remedies.  The third one examines the twin concepts of 
independence and accountability and raises some points which should be picked up by 
the reform program.   
 
1.3. Research Decisions 
 
Having designed the theoretical framework under which the reform issues in Ethiopia 
should be addressed, and conceiving various problems questions it was then necessary 
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to plan a research methodology to answer those questions.  Research decisions had to 
be made, methods for data collection adopted and analysis of the data undertaken and 
conclusions arrived. 
 
The judicial reform program in Ethiopia covers all the courts, federal as well as state.  
To arrive at tenable findings and conclusions collection of data that is representative 
enough of many of the courts was necessary.  The Federal Courts are taken as the 
basic source of data for this research.   This choice had to be made because the reform 
program started in the Federal Courts before it was expanded to the State Courts.  
Besides the Federal Courts have a well organized data-base system that generates 
reliable data for several years.  Another important explanation is that many cases that 
are initiated in the state courts join the federal judiciary through the cassation division. 
On top of that the judicial process in Ethiopia is governed by the same procedural 
rules, and the problems they face are very similar.  As a result it is believed that the 
findings in the Federal Courts could be relevant to the State Courts also.   In 
appropriate instances the thesis addresses issues which may be peculiar to the states. 
 
1.4. Relevance of Research 
 
Programs are designed and being implemented at several stages with the intent of 
bringing about change in the justice sector in Ethiopia.  However, there has never 
been a study about the Ethiopian judiciary addressing the basic components of the 
reform program.  Particularly no study has been conducted based on empirical data 
collected from the courts.  This research will therefore be of great relevance to the 
reform programs that are underway in Ethiopia.  Besides it will also contribute to the 
scholarship on judicial reform which will be important to other systems as well.   
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1.5. Research Design 
1.5.1. Literature Research 
 
Having formulated the problem questions, and decided on which areas to focus study 
of relevant literature had to be conducted about Ethiopian judiciary on the one hand 
and literature about the judiciary with a particular emphasis on reform on the other.  
Relevant articles and books were collected from different libraries and through search 
engines.  As a part-time researcher much of the literature was collected from various 
journals using the research engine made available by the university.  I also made a 
couple of stays in Birmingham to identify books and other materials that turned out to 
be relevant.  Many other direct resources and other materials were also collected from 
different libraries in Addis Ababa.   
 
1.5.2. Research Methodology  
 
To answer many of the questions that emerged during the literature review and relate 
them to the Ethiopian context data collection was necessary.  Given the current limits 
on the literature about the Ethiopian judiciary I decided to rely heavily on statistical 
data which is available in the courts.  As part of the court Administration Reform 
Program (CARP), the Federal and many other State Courts have changed their record 
keeping system.  As part of the initial CARP the record keeping system in all the 
Federal Courts is automated.  As this system has been operating for several years now 
much of the data which it generates is used by the courts to manage their day to day 
activities and to prepare reports for other institutions.  Taking the level of its 
reliability and its capacity to generate reports the research has relied on the reports 
generated by this database.  In situations where some questions could not be answered 
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through the reports generated by the database system, interviews with some relevant 
individuals were conducted.  These interviews were however used only for limited 
purposes. 
 
The data-bases uses the Ethiopian fiscal year which starts on July 11 and ends on July 
10.  As the Ethiopian calendar year is 7 years behind the Gregorian calendar and starts 
counting from September 11, the best option available was to use the data as it is but 
convert the years into Gregorian calendar. This explains the reason for using range of 
years in the charts. 
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2. THE JUDICIARY IN ETHIOPIA:  GENERAL 
BACKGROUND 
2.1. Historical Background 
2.1.1. Introduction 
 
Ethiopia is a country with a long history.  It is a country that has always maintained its 
independence.  It was not colonized by the European powers except for a five year 
occupation by Italy.(Bahru Zewde, 1991:160)  As a result unlike many other African 
countries Ethiopia did not have a foreign system of law imposed on it by another 
European power.(Singer, 1970:73)  It was also secluded from the other parts of the 
world for a long period of time as the result of which there was no chance for other 
legal systems to significantly influence the development of its institutions during the 
earlier periods of its history.  The impact of this seclusion is given different 
interpretations.  Some scholars argue that Ethiopia had a well developed legal 
tradition for a long period of time with specific features of its own.(Sedler, 1964 :59)  
Some others contend that Ethiopia did not have a legal system worthy the name until 
recently.(David, 1963 :188)    
 
There is a great shortage of written materials on the history of the Ethiopian legal 
system.  Although a number of books have been written on the history of Ethiopia in 
general, very few of them give a detailed account of the features and development of 
the legal tradition.  From the very scanty work that is available, the following points 
can be taken as points of departure regarding the development of law and its legal 




One important feature of the legal tradition in Ethiopia is the existence of multiple 
customary laws that claimed greater legitimacy than the imperial edicts and the state 
law for many centuries.  Ethiopia existed as an empire for many centuries up to the 
fall of Emperor Haileselassie in 1974 and had state laws beginning from the 19th 
century (Vanderlinden, 1966-1967 at 248).  The customary laws of the different 
ethnic groups, however, existed independently and were in many cases more 
important to the people than the state law. Much of the history of Ethiopia is therefore 
characterized by pluralist legal institutions as a result of which the citizens were 
subjected to different legal norms.  A number of studies conducted on different ethnic 
groups show that in spite of some similarities in some aspects the customary rules are 
distinct and constitute legal systems by their own right. (Shack, 1969)  
 
These customary laws have been an important source of law for a long period of time 
in Ethiopian history. (Vanderlinden, 1968) It must be noted, however, that Ethiopia 
does not have a single indigenous customary law that was uniformly followed by all 
the other ethnic groups.  The customary rules are as diverse as the ethnic groups 
although many of them are not properly studied and documented.    There was no 
single custom that had a uniform application in all parts of the country.  In other 
words there is no such thing as Ethiopian customary law.  Many of the writings in 
Ethiopian history referring to Ethiopian customary law are, therefore, misleading in 
the sense that customs which appear as ‘Ethiopian’ are only customs of one or the 
other ethnic group.  This confusion of some customary laws with Ethiopian state law 
or presentation of some customary law as ‘Ethiopian” customary law, is partly a result 
of the political dominance of the Amhara Core  The Amhara ethnic group has been 
associated with the history of the Ethiopian State which existed for many years.  The 
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Amharas dominated in ruling the monarchical kingdom of Ethiopia. As a result, the 
customary law of the Amharas, the majority of whom are followers of Coptic 
Christianity, was relatively better studied, documented and through time presented 
itself as Ethiopian customary law.  Even if there are many nationalities in Ethiopia, 
participation in political affairs always required some degree of assimilation with 
prevailing values of the Amharas which in turn required, among other things, ability 
to speak the Amharic language and being a follower of the Coptic Christianity. 
(Clapham, 1988)  The Empire’s bureaucratic ruling mechanism was operated by the 
Amhara and the Amharized feudal and tribal leadership which constituted the Amhara 
elite.(Krylow, 1994) At times the customary law of this ethnic group was also 
incorporated into state law thereby giving the semblance that state law gives 
recognition to customary law of all the other ethnic groups in the country.   Some 
studies have indicated that the Codes that were adopted by the Emperor in the 1960s 
during his efforts of modernization reflect customary laws. (Krzeczunowicz, 1963) 
The customary law that was reflected in the Codes is, however, a custom of the 
Amhara ethnic group.  While some rules of the Amhara ethnic group were 
incorporated in the Codes in one way or the other, all other customary rules were 
denied recognition.  
 
Literature on Ethiopian law reflects such misrepresentations, one of which is 
presented below.   
 
There were three types of devices of crime investigation or detection 
under the old procedural law of Ethiopia.  These were known as leba 
shay, Afärsata, and the investigations undertaken by the “market 
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guards”(arada zäbägna) and secret guards (mist’r zäbägna).(Jembere, 
2000:244) 
This author begins by the assumption that there was a single body of law that can be 
characterized as Ethiopian indigenous law.  Based on this wrong premise, he presents 
the Leba Shay1 and the Afärsata2 as indigenous criminal investigation devices under 
the old law of Ethiopia. These devises are indeed indigenous.  Their development as 
well as their application has, however, always been limited to the Amhara ethnic 
group in the northern part of the country. [Fisher, 1971:711-712]  The other ethnic 
groups had their own devices which are in many respects different (Donovan and 
Getachew, 2003)  Such wrong assumptions have negatively affected the development 
of the other indigenous customary institutions, which, in turn, is reflected in the 
administration of justice in the country today.  Any attempt at reform of the justice 
system in Ethiopia must begin from a rectification of the historical mistake of 
attributing a customary law of one ethnic group to all the other ethnic groups in the 
country.   
  
Another important feature in the Ethiopian Legal history is incremental non-
recognition of customary law by the state law on the one hand and the prevalence of 
customary law over state law on the other.  This competition between these two sets 
of rules has been observed since the importing of the Fetha Nagaest (the Law of the 
Kings) as a codified form of law earlier in Ethiopian history. Although there is a 
growing consensus that this is the first influence of foreign legal systems on Ethiopian 
indigenous law the exact time when this legal document was imported into Ethiopia is 
                                                 
1 The Leba shay was a device which uses an intoxicated young boy to identify the suspect of a crime.  
A person on whom the drugged boy lays hands is considered a suspect and taken to court.   
2 The Afärsata was a device by which all the male members of a community will be detained until a 
person is named as a suspect for a crime that has been committed in their locality.   
19 
 
not known.  Some relate the timing to King Zerá Yakob (1434-68), while others 
contend that it was only imported during the reign of Emperor Eyasu (1682-1706). 
(Abba Paulos ,1968:xvii) It is believed to have been there at least since the beginning 
of the 16th Century. (Vanderlinden, 1966-1967).    
 
Many writers indicate that the Fetha Nagast which was given special reverence in 
Ethiopia since its arrival had its origin in another document that written in Arabic by 
an Egyptian who was a follower of Coptic Christianity. (Abba Paulos, 1968)  Except 
for the preface and the annexes, the Fetha Nagast is a translation of this document.  
The second part on the other hand was related to secular matters and had some roman 
influence. (Sand, 1980). The text of the Fetha Nagast was originally drafted in the 
thirteenth Century for the followers of the Coptic Church in Egypt. As a result, its 
content is substantially based on the doctrines of Christianity.  Once it was introduced 
to Ethiopia, the document was translated into Geeze, which was then the language of 
the church,  although there are uncertainties as to when this was done. ( Abba Paulos, 
1968) The doctrinal background of the Fetha Negast facilitated its acceptance by 
Ethiopians who were already Christians long before its arrival.  As a result it was held 
with high esteem.  Not only was it referred to in judicial proceedings at the highest 
level ( Abba Paulos, 1968) but it was also used as a source for the teaching of legal 
science by the Ethiopian schools of the olden days, the churches. (Vanderlinden, 
1967) 
 
The doctrinal basis of this ancient law was, however, irrelevant to the non- Christian 
population in Ethiopia.  The Fetha Neguest was was available only Geez language, a 
liturgical language spoken only by a few people in Ethiopia.    Although this Code is 
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said to be an important source of l aw up to the 20th Century the Amharic version was 
published only in 1965.  As a result it was accessible only to a few people, which had 
some sort of church education. In spite of claims for its sanctity and reverence, the 
Fetha Nagast was rarely applied even by the ordinary courts.  It did not have much of 
an impact in governing social relationships.    “The introduction of the Fetha Nagast 
did not overthrow the customary legal systems of Ethiopians.  It was widely known 
only in Christian Ethiopia, and was never applied in toto even there.” Abba Paulos, 
1968:xxi) So the first imported piece of law which survived for more than 400 years 
did not manage to break the customary rules of the various ethnic groups in Ethiopia.   
 
The conflict between the customary law which people use and the state law which is 
not home grown was also observed in recent developments.  Emperor Haileselassie’s 
attempt to modernize Ethiopia was implemented through the process of codification 
which was spearheaded by foreign experts (Vanderlinden, 1966-1967:257) with little 
involvement of the local elite and no participation of the majority of the population. 
(Singer, 1970:122) The drafters of these Codes obviously did not have adequate 
knowledge of the customs of the different ethnic groups in the country.  That this is so 
can be gathered from some of the comments they provided.  Rene David, the drafter 
of the Civil Code for example explained that the rules on obligations in the CC will 
face no difficulties because “the Ethiopian society of yesterday did not know the 
concept of contract”. (David, 1963:54)   The drafter of the Commercial Code Jean  
Escarra, likewise, stated that “until now there have not been local commercial 
customs in Ethiopia”. (Escarra, 1972:90-91)  Partly departing from the wrong 
understanding of the legal framework that existed long before the Codes, the process 
of codification tried to solve the conflict between the constituents of the pluralist 
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system by adopting a few customary values of one ethnic group and denying legal 
recognition to all the others which made some scholars rightly characterize the 
Ethiopian private law which repeals customary laws as “fantasy law” (Schiller, 
1969:193)   
 
The fusion of administrative and judicial functions is another feature that 
characterizes the greatest part of Ethiopian legal history.  Recorded history shows that 
the Emperor was seen as a source of justice in Ethiopian history.  Thus, adjudication 
of disputes was considered a duty of the Emperor.  The Emperor had judges who 
would hear cases unless the case is very important in which case it would be heard by 
the king himself.  Even when the Emperor travels, as was often the case, he would 
have the Sequela (the tent of justice), where he would hear cases when he encamps, 
close to the main tent. (Sedler, 1967-1968:60)  In the Ethiopian Imperial tradition the 
Emperor was thus considered as the ultimate source of justice which included the 
power to review a decision of other tribunals. (Sedler, 1967-1968:61) This legal 
tradition survived for many centuries and was abolished in 1974 when Emperor 
Haileselassie was deposed.  
 
Ethiopia is undoubtedly a country with a very long history and rich tradition.  
Paradoxically development of many of the legal institutions as we see them today is 
relatively recent.  Until the beginning of the 19th century, the structure of courts and 
the process of litigation was governed mainly by traditional and customary 
arrangements than by formal legal enactments. The formal structure of the courts was 
only introduced into the country in 1942.  Legal education was even introduced into 
the country at a later stage.  The first law school in the country was established in 
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1963 and Ethiopia did not have degree graduates trained in the country until 1966. 
(Vanderlinden, 1966-1967:261)    A few Ethiopians were sent to other countries to 
study law, but many of them were absorbed by the administration and did not practice 
either as judges or barristers. Legal training in Ethiopia was therefore basically 
conducted by the churches for a long period in its history.  The main source for the 
training in law provided by the churches before the establishment of the law schools 
was the Fetha Neguest. (Vanderlinden, 1966-1967: 254) Many of the courts in 
Ethiopia, as a result, were staffed by people who did not have proper legal education 
until recently.  The relatively recent development of modern legal education in 
Ethiopia also affected the availability of literature on the development of the legal 
institutions and the availability of lawyers.  Vanderlinden describes the situation by 
saying that “as far as the legal literature was concerned, the vacuum was total; as for 
lawyers… they were four and came from Continental countries, to wit Russia Italy, 
Greece and Germany”. (Vanderlinden, 1966-1967:256) Beckstrom likewise states that 
as recently as 1974 “the great majority of judges have received education only to the 
fifth grade; and there is a small and relatively informally educated attorney 
population” (Beckstrom, 1974:704) 
 
In the Ethiopian legal structure there are different sources from which the laws 
emanate.  The customary or the unwritten law has been the major source of law for 
centuries (Vanderlinden, 1966-1967).  Many argue that even to date customary laws 
remain to be the primary source of law through which relationships are governed.  
Thus the formal enactments in the 1960s which by explicit legal provisions tried to by 
and large scrap customary law from the Ethiopian legal scenario seem to have very 
little impact.  Studies conducted after the introduction of the new Codes in the 1960s 
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confirmed that attempts to modernize the Ethiopian legal system through imported 
laws have been superseded by customary practices which existed long before the 
Codes themselves and are better comprehended by the people. (Beckstrom, 1973:557) 
Robert Seidman aptly summarized the situation by saying that “Ethiopia is still 
Ethiopia, Professor David’s Code notwithstanding”. (Seidman, 1972) 
 
2.1.2. The Judiciary in Historical Perspective 
 
1. Before 1942 
The organization of courts in the early periods of Ethiopian history is a mixture of 
traditional arrangements and state institutions.  As this period covers many centuries 
of history which affected the administration of justice in Ethiopia, discussion in this 
section will only highlight the basic developments during this period.  Very little is 
known about the earlier periods of Ethiopian legal history both as regards the 
traditional arrangements and the state institutions.  But much of the literature that is 
available demonstrates that both the traditional and state institutions played an 
important part in the administration of justice.  There was very little legislative 
activity in the earlier periods of Ethiopian history.  If there were a few ones, they were 
usually included in religious documents and chronicles of travellers. Neither could 
one find organized presentation of customary law which was prevalent during those 
days. Legislative enactments became more frequent towards the end of the 19th 
century both in qualitative and quantitative terms as a results of which one finds more 
written materials for the period beginning from 1908. This phenomenon is related to 
the first attempt of modernization by Emperor Menilik who issued successive 
legislative enactments which were the early beginnings of the current form of the 
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judiciary (Vanderlinden, 1966).  It is only from this time onwards that formal legal 
enactments emerged as important sources of law.   
 
In earlier periods the most important sources were customary law on the one hand and 
the Fetha Nagast on the other.  Whether or not the Fetha Nagast served as a legal 
instrument or as a document for legal science is disputed.  As this document was 
referred to during judicial processes since the time of Sersa Dangal (1563-1597) in 
civil proceedings and criminal proceedings, some contend that the document served 
“not only as a source of learning of legal science, but also as functioning law”. (Abba 
Paulos, 1968:xxix ). On the other hand in spite of the great influence this document 
had in Ethiopia for many centuries there is no evidence showing its promulgation by 
concerned authorities.  As a result it is sometimes considered as a quasi-official 
source of law in Ethiopia.  (Vanderlinden, 1966) 
 
These differences notwithstanding, there is clear evidence that the Fetha Nagast was 
incorporated into formal legislations since 1908.  In the proclamations establishing the 
Ministry of Justice which was issued in 1908, it is indicated that the “Minster of 
Justice must diligently make supervision to assure that every judgment is made 
according to Fetha Nagast”  (Mahtama-Sellassie, 1942:71).  Incorporation of the 
Fetha Nagast into formal legal instruments continued after Menilik.  Some of these 
showed more direct incorporation as the Regulation issued in connection with 
executions by the then Crown Prince Teferi declared that capital punishment could  be 
imposed only when the Fetha Nagast so prescribes. The Fetha Nagast is also believed 
to have inspired, and used as a justification for, the adoption of the first Penal Code of 
Ethiopia which was enacted in 1930. (Mahtama-Sellassie, 1942) It must be noted, 
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however, that during the early periods the customary law continued to be the major 
source of law even after the acceptance of the Fetha Nagast by the Emperors. The 
customary laws of the different nationalities in Ethiopia are however hardly studied 
and known to date including by those who administer justice. (Aberra, 2000:64)   
 
These different sources of law in Ethiopia were administered by basically two types 
of institutions during this period, the informal courts and the traditional institutions. 
Before 1908, justice was not administered by formally established courts.  Justice is 
said to have been administered by the rulers at the local level.  But there was a 
possibility of appeal to the Emperor.  There was an informal hierarchy which may 
stretch from a village elder at the bottom up to the Emperor’s Zufan Chilot at the 
apex.   (Paul and Clapham, 1971) As primary sources which depict the structure of the 
traditional court system are not available, some authors had to reconstruct the court 
structure from secondary sources.  Stanley Z. Fisher, who tried this reconstruction, 
believes that the traditional court structure of Ethiopia had four tiers.  In his opinion 
the Empire had a chief by the name of a chika shum who undertook the functions of a 
judge at the bottom of its structure.    On top of that one finds the next court official at 
the Woreda (district) level who was given different names in Ethiopian tradition.  This 
official is believed to have entertained appellate cases that come from the chika shum.  
Further avenue for appeal from the decisions of the Woreda court was available to the 
provincial courts and then to the Emperor in his Imperial bench. With the exception of 
the Afe Negus’s Chilot (The Supreme Court), all other courts were under the authority 
of the Regional chiefs.  Thus the judges at the lower levels of the hierarchy were 




At the apex of the court structure there was what was then called the Appellate Court 
of the Chief Justice.  Until 1908 the only judge of the Appellate Court of the Chief 
Justice was the Chief Justice himself.  Judicial power of the Supreme Court of the 
land as well as the administrative responsibility of the court was thus exclusively 
exercised by the chief justice. Apart from these ordinary courts, Ethiopia had also the 
Crown Court which was called the zufan chilot.  This was the court where the 
Emperor himself sat to review civil and criminal judgments rendered by the Supreme 
Court.  Anyone who felt aggrieved by the decisions of the lower courts could petition 
the crown court for review.  
 
Some changes were introduced to this mode of operation when Emperor Menilik 
launched modernization efforts in 1908.  Beginning from 1908, Menilik issued a 
number of legislative enactments the first of which related to the establishment of a 
government structure based on European style.  The reform efforts that were 
conducted by Emperor Menilik in the administration of justice were mainly achieved 
through the Establishment of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior and 
appellate tribunals called Wonbers (literally meaning chairs but denoting judges. 
(Singer, 1970:76)  
 
This initiative by Emperor Menilik affected the administration of justice in a number 
of ways.  First, the year 1908 marked an initiative to centrally control the recruitment 
and assignment of court officials throughout the country.  This was administered 
through the Minister of the Interior who had the power to deploy governors who 
would also double as judges in the provinces.  Unlike the previous period where 
administration of justice was primarily a responsibility of the local chiefs, the 
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adjudication of cases became a responsibility of the administrators whose 
appointment and removal was within the control of the central government. Thus, 
apart from their routine responsibilities of ensuring peace and discharging other 
administrative functions, these appointees carried out adjudicative functions in their 
respective territories. Second an appellate tribunal was established in Addis Ababa to 
hear appeals coming from lower courts.  In this connection the country was made to 
constitute six districts.  Two judges were appointed for each district. Unlike the other 
courts whose judges were assigned by the Minister of the Interior, the judges for this 
tribunal were appointed by the Emperor himself.  After the establishment of these 
tribunals appeals were not anymore directly submitted to the Zufan Chilot.  Third, the 
position of the Afe Negus (mouth of the King) whose earlier responsibility was 
advising the Emperor was changed.  The Afe Negus became the Minister of Justice 
and as such retained the power to decide whether or not any decision rendered by the 
newly established Wonbers deserved further review by the Emperor’s bench. (Singer, 
1970:76)  
 
Side by side with these traditional court structures existed different types of 
customary institutions which administered justice in their respective localities.  
Although thorough studies were not conducted about the majority of the customary 
institutions in Ethiopia, the few studies that have been undertaken demonstrate that 
many ethnic groups had their own traditional institutions whose powers included 
administering justice. (Shack, 1969, Aberra, 2000)  Some of the traditional 
institutions that operated starting from this period not only have elaborate rules for 
organizing the institutions but also procedures for pleadings, trial and appeal.   The 
Kanchi Administration of justice in Tigrai, The Aba Geda system of the Oromo 
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people, The Chiqa Shum of the Amhara people, and the Sanga Nenay of the Kunamas 
are some of the customary institutions that have been instrumental in the 
administration of justice in different ethnic groups in Ethiopia. (Aberra, 2000).   
 
Thus during this period the tribunals which administered justice applied different 
types of rules.  Although the most prominent document which was applied by the 
higher tribunals during this period was the Fetha Nagast,, as it was not readily 
available for many of the judges that were dispensing justice in the country, and there 
were very few other legal enactments which they could refer to in legal proceedings, 
many of them relied on customary rules for guidance to dispose of cases brought to 
them.  Therefore the informally organized judicial institutions were also applying 
customary law no less than the traditional institutions (Sedler, 1967-68)    
 
As noted earlier, in the early periods the concept of separation of powers was not 
clearly seen in the administration of justice in Ethiopia.  At the top the emperor who 
makes the laws had the power to interpret them, give judgments and appoint the 
judges. (Bereket Habte-Sellasie, 1966)  At the lower level the judges in the courts 
were at the same time the governors of the administrative units either at the 
provincial, the district or the local level.  Apart from that, during this period cases at 
all levels were handled by a single judge.  Some Governors of the provinces had 
additional judges of their own choice in their courts, but this was a discretion which 
they exercised when they though feet.   
 
This arrangement continued even after the enactment of the first written Constitution 
of 1931.  This Constitution had 55 Articles 5 of which were about the judiciary.  The 
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Constitution outlined that judges conduct their judicial functions in accordance with 
the law in the name of the Emperor.  It did not provide the procedure for appointment 
of judges nor the powers of the judiciary. It only mentioned that judges would be 
appointed from those who have the experience of judgeship. (Art. 51, Cons, 1931) 
The Emperor was the sovereign in the whole legal framework and as such he had the 
power to appoint and dismiss all officials in the system as well as fix their salaries. 
(Art. 11, Cons, 1931)  Judges therefore were appointed by the Emperor and served at 
his whim.  The process of litigation and the structure of courts was not basically 
changed in spite of the provisions in the first written Constitution. 
 
2.  1942-55  
 
After the liberation of Ethiopia from the Italian occupation some changes were 
introduced to the administration of justice.  A full court system was officially 
established for the first time.  The first proclamation concerning the courts which was 
issued in 1942 established four tier court system namely, The Supreme Imperial 
Court, The High Court, the Awraja (Provincial court) Court, and the Woreda 
(Regional) Court. (Proc. 2. Of 1942, Art. 2) The Supreme Imperial Court was 
composed of the Afe Negus and two judges from the High Court.  The Afe Negus who 
was the president of the Supreme Imperial Court was therefore the only judge who 
was appointed on a permanent basis for the Supreme Court. The other judges were 
nominated to the Supreme Court on an adhoc basis to hear appeals from the High 
Court.  One Supreme Court and one High Court were established for the whole 
country but there were as many provincial and regional courts as the number of 
provinces and districts.  It is important to note that under the new law all the benches 
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were constituted of three judges and could give a decision only if there is a majority 
of the members of the panel.  This was a clear departure from the past where all the 
benches were constituted of one judge.(Aberra, 2000)  Unlike the previous period 
where the provincial courts were staffed by governors deployed by the Ministry of 
Interior, after 1942 all judges that were sent to the provinces were appointed by the 
Emperor.  When judges were not available the governors acted as such. Even in 
situations where there were judges assigned by the Ministry of Justice, the governors 
retained the power to intervene as the presidents of the court. (Singer, 1970:79) 
The number of appeals available was also limited under the new legislation.  Thus, 
litigants dissatisfied with the decision of the court of first instance could make only 
one appeal to the next court.  This meant that cases that started in the Awraja courts 
could not reach the Supreme Court, as the decision of the High Court would be final.  
The new arrangement increased the number of judges sitting to hear a case from one 
to three, but reduced the number of appeals to only one.   
 
It is also interesting to note that the Presidents of the Supreme Court and the High 
Court were given the power to issue Rules of Court with the approval of the Minister 
of Justice with regard to the following matters. 
I. “Regulating the administration of the Court, and the institution, conduct and 
hearing of proceedings therein. 
II. Regulating the admission, conduct and discipline of legal practitioners. 
III. Regulating the selection and duties of assessors 
IV. Regulating the committal of criminal cases from lower courts to higher courts 
V. Regulating the imposition and recovery of fines, the award of imprisonment, in 
default of payment, and the procedure relating to execution and attachment 
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VI. Prescribing forms 
VII. Fixing fees 
VIII. Regulating the general administration of justice. ”. (Art. 20, Proc.2/1942) 
 
The Afe Negus (Reg. 155 of 1943) and the President of the High Court issued Rules of 
Court in 1943 and 1945 respectively for their respective courts on the basis of the 
power given to them under this law.  The rules on court fees which are still 
operational were issued in 1945 by the President of the High Court. (Reg. 176 of 
1945) 
 
The president of the High Court also doubled as the Judicial Advisor of the Emperor.  
He served as the Chairperson of the Consultative Committee which had the duty to 
draft laws under the direction of the Emperor or to review draft of any proposed law.  
“No law shall be submitted to Us [the Emperor] for enactment unless it is 
accompanied by a certificate signed by a majority of the members of the said 
Committee certifying that the law to which the certificate relates is not repugnant to 
natural justice and humanity and is a fit and proper law to be applied without 
discrimination to Ethiopians and foreigners alike”. (Art. 21, Proc. No.2/1942) 
 
In addition to the judges that were appointed by the Emperor every court was given 
the discretion to have two or more assessors.  The assessors were given the right to 
ask any question to a witness and to give their opinion on the facts in issue at the 
conclusion of a hearing.  The opinion of the assessors was not, however, binding on 




Traditional courts were allowed to operate even after the establishment of the regular 
courts to hear and settle minor disputes in any manner ‘traditionally recognized by 
Ethiopian law until such time as regular courts can be established for the hearing of 
such disputes’. (Art. 23, Proc. 2 of 1942) The new proclamation contained no repeal 
provision as regards traditional courts apart from this provision.  One may however 
infer from the provision that the intention of the new arrangement was to make 
dispute resolution by the regular courts the primary mode of dispute settlement.   
 
Side by side with these developments it is important to note that there were some 
endeavours during this period to incorporate the customary law into the central system 
through the establishment of small claims tribunals which were called the Atbia 
Dagna (local judges). (Singer, 1970-1971:312) The Atbia Dagna was given the power 
both to conciliate and to adjudicate matters within its material jurisdiction. (Art.3, Pro. 
No 90, 1947) In civil cases the jurisdiction extended up to claims of 25 Birr and in 
criminal cases where the punishment does not exceed Birr 15. (Art.3, Pro. No 90, 
1947) These small claims tribunals were however abolished when the CPC was 
enacted as their jurisdiction was transferred to the ordinary courts that were newly 
established.  Their jurisdiction in criminal cases, on the other hand, continued after the 
enactment of the CrPC  because the latter recognized their operation as regards ‘minor 
offences of insult, assault, petty damage to property  or petty theft where the value of 
the property stolen does not exceed Birr 5”.(Art. 223, CrPC)  In spite of their potential 
to integrate customary law to the central system these initial attempts were considered 
a total failure by some studies as the people hardly submitted their claims to these 
tribunals.  Other local methods were frequented than these institutions created by the 
central government. (Singer, 1970-1971:320) 
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3. 1955-74  
The adoption of the Revised Constitution in 1955 ushered in a new beginning in the 
development of Ethiopian legal history in general and the administration of justice in 
particular.  Not only did the Revised Constitution enshrine principles that were of 
fundamental importance to the administration of justice, but it also was the landmark 
legal instrument that was followed by many other attempts to modernize by the 
Emperor.  For the first time in Ethiopian history, the new Constitution declared in no 
uncertain terms that judges are independent in the conduct of their judicial functions. 
(Art. 110, Const., 1955) It established one Imperial Supreme Court and indicated that 
other courts will be established by law. (Art. 109, Const., 1945) The Constitution 
declared that judicial power is vested in the courts (Art. 108, Const., 1955).   
 
It must be noted, however, that even if the Constitution contained some values 
including the independence of the judiciary and the separation of powers, these were 
substantially weakened as “law was unable to prevent the intervention of the 
traditional political system”. (Scholler, 2005, 64) The principle of separation of 
powers under the Constitution was in conflict with the provisions which furthered the 
overarching participation of the Emperor at all levels of government activity.  As this 
conflict was resolved by traditional political power, separation of power existed only 
in those areas where the Emperor wanted not to intervene, in areas that are below his 
authority.  Thus, in spite of the declarations that judges shall submit to no other 
authority than the law in Article 110 of the Constitution, judges were considered as 




It should be noted that until the 1950s Ethiopian law was mainly an amorphous mix.  
Although there were statutes here and there, like the Constitution of 1931, the Penal 
Code of 1930, and the Court Proclamation of 1942, the biggest part of relationships 
were governed by customary and traditional arrangements.  “Taking Ethiopia as a 
geographical whole, by far the major de facto source of rules governing social 
relations was found in the various tribal ethnic and religious groupings.”(Beckstrom, 
1973:559) Even at times where regular courts existed, they applied traditional 
procedural and substantive laws side by side with the imperial enactments.  This 
situation continued long after the enactment of the two consecutive Ethiopian 
Constitutions.   
 
After the adoption of the 1955 Constitution on the process of codification to 
modernize the Ethiopian legal system began.  From 1957 up to 1965 six Codes were 
drafted and enacted.  All the Codes were of western origin and there was little space 
for the traditional arrangements.  In fact the general attitude towards customary law 
was negative. (Fisher, 1971:708)  Therefore, the codes did not incorporate much of 
the Ethiopian customary law.  The attitude of the codes towards the customary law 
was sweeping in some cases, and very subtle in others.  The CC of 1960 repealed all 
customary law that was inconsistent with the provisions contained there under.  It 
states thus:  “Unless otherwise expressly provided, all rules whether written or 
customary previously in force concerning matters provided for in this Code shall be 
replaced by this Code and are hereby repealed.” (Art. 3347, CC 1960)  Likewise, the 
CCP of 1965 declared that “all rules, whether written or customary, previously in 
force concerning matters provided for in the Civil Procedure Code of 1965 shall be 




Detailed procedural rules were enacted in the CPC and CrPC which were intended to 
replace the traditional and customary procedures completely.  The previous court 
structure was replaced by a new hierarchy of courts both for civil and criminal 
proceedings.  The canonical and traditional rules were replaced by new rules of 
western origin.  The Commercial Code, the Civil Code, The Maritime Code, and the 
Penal Code were enacted one after the other in a span of a few years.  In the preface to 
the CC of 1960, the Emperor mentioned his intentions for codification.   
The Civil Code has been promulgated by Us at a time when the progress 
achieved by Ethiopia requires the modernization of the legal framework of 
Our Empire’s social structure so as to keep pace with the changing 
circumstances of the world of today.  In order to consolidate the progress 
already achieved and to facilitate yet further growth and development, precise 
and detailed rules must be laid down regarding those problems which do not 
only face the individual citizen but the nation as a whole. The rules contained 
in this Code are in harmony with the well-established legal traditions of Our 
Empire and the principles enshrined in the Revised Constitution granted by Us 
on the occasion of the Silver Jubilee of Our Coronation, and have called as 
well, upon the best systems of law in the world. 
 
…In preparing the Civil Code the Codification Commission convened by Us 
and whose work We have directed has constantly borne in mind the special 
requirements of our Empire and of our beloved subjects and has been inspired 
in its labours by the genius of Ethiopian legal traditions and institutions as 
revealed by the ancient and venerable Fetha Neguest. (Preamble of the CC) 
 
Rene David, the drafter of the CC explains that Ethiopia had no law until the adoption 
of the Codes in the 1960s.  “Only ten years ago there existed in that country neither a 
collection of jurisprudence nor a doctrinal work of the civil law; neither were there 
any laws except some very fragmentary dispositions contained in a law on loan, a law 
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on nationality and an ordinance of prescription” (David, 1963: 188) This opinion was 
shared by some other scholars as there were many others who opposed it.  When 
writing about the civil and common law influence on Ethiopian law in 1967, 
Vanderlinden starts by saying that “the main characteristic of the contemporary 
Ethiopian Legal system is that it does not exist as such”(Vanderlinden, 1966-
1967:250).  In the absence of an already existing law  and legal system in the country, 
the need  for Ethiopian development and modernization “necessitate the adoption of a 
‘ready made” law system; they force the reception of a foreign system of law in such 
a manner as to assure as quickly as possible a minimal security in legal 
relations”.(David, 1963:189) 
The prevailing framework was, therefore, that importing good laws from the west will 
speed up the development of Ethiopia.  It was believed that if the laws are good 
somewhere they will only do well to Ethiopia.  Although this thinking was dominant 
among the ruling elite at that time, many had expressed doubts if this approach will 
indeed modernize Ethiopia. (Beckstrom, 1973) 
 
The drafters of the new Codes attempted to include customary law into the new 
Codes, either by incorporating the customary rules or by allowing people to use their 
custom to regulate some relationships specifically provided in the 
laws.(Krzeczunowicz, 1965)The prevailing attitude was, however, that all customary 
rules, written or unwritten will eventually be replaced by the state law.  René David 
again explains that “Ethiopians do not expect the new Code to be a work of 
consolidation, the methodical and clear statement of actual customary rules.  They 
wish it to be a program envisaging a total transformation of society and they demand 
that for the most part, it set out new rules appropriate for the society they wish to 
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create”. (David, 1963:193) Thus René David took account of customary law “only to 
the extent that they correspond to a profound sentiment of the Ethiopian people, and 
conform to that which is felt by them as being just” (David, 1963:194).  Many of the 
customary rules were thus denied legal recognition as they were deemed to have 
failed this test. 
 
Although the new Codes changed the structure of the courts and the rules for dispute 
resolution, the administration of justice remained primarily the same until 1973.  In 
1973 the first JAC was established. (Proc. No.323, 1973) This new commission had 
the Minister of Justice as its chairperson and the Afe Negus (the President of the 
Supreme Court) as the vice-chairperson and had a total of seven members, namely, 
the Minister of Justice, the Afe Negus, the High Commissioner of Public Service and 
Pension, the President of the High Court, the Attorney General and two other 
members appointed by the Emperor.  The Commission’s powers included the power 
to: 
1.  Select for appointment as judges persons who qualify for judgeship 
2.  Make recommendation for the promotion of judges from the lower courts to the 
higher ones. 
3.  Regulate transfer of judges 
4.  Determine the code of judicial ethics 
5.  Determine the standards of good behaviour and competence 





This ushered in a new era in the administration of justice in Ethiopia. Although the 
power to appoint judges remained with the Emperor, the power to nominate, 
discipline and remove judges’ nomination was given to the JAC.  The independence 
of judges was also declared in no uncertain terms. “Judges shall be completely 
independent in the exercise of their functions, and in the administration of justice they 
shall submit to no other authority other than the law”. (Art. 11(1), Pro. No. 23, 1973) 
The beginning for a new era whereby the tenure of judges was legally guaranteed also 
started after this legislation.  The grounds for removal were clearly provided in the 
law and it was also declared that judges cannot be removed from office except as 
provided by the law.  The president and the Vice-President of the Supreme Court as 
well as the president of the High Court followed a different procedure.  The presidents 
did not have security of office and could be removed under the recommendation of 
the Minister of Justice.  (Art. 8(1), Pro. No. 23, 1973)  
 
It must, however, be noted that all along the Crown Court was retained although it 
was not mentioned in the Revised Constitution of 1955.   The Chilot (the Crown 
Court) was not part of the ordinary courts but the Emperor sat as a judge to review 
decisions of the ordinary courts.  Some scholars argued that the existence of such 
courts was justified as it was inherent in the sovereign character of the Emperor, and 
did not violate the Constitution which provided that judicial power is vested in the 
courts. (Sedler, 1964) 
 




In 1974, there was a change of government in Ethiopia as a result of which the 
Emperor was deposed and the revised Constitution of 1955 was suspended. (Proc. 1, 
1974) 
 
The Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) ruled the country without a 
Constitution for 13 years.  During this period a number of measures which 
undermined the proper administration of justice were taken.  Special Courts were 
established (Proc. 215, 1981) to prosecute suspects under a Special Penal Code (Proc. 
214/81), many of the procedural safeguards that were at the disposal of the ordinary 
courts, like habeas corpus, were suspended.   All rural land was nationalized; (Pro. 47, 
1975) all extra houses were confiscated, private banks, insurance companies and many 
other privately owned enterprises were also nationalized. (Proc.47, 1975    
Nonetheless the PMAC allowed the ordinary courts to function. (Girma, 1982) 
 
The PMAC issued a proclamation for the establishment of a JAC.  The content of this 
legislation was not significantly different from what was enacted by the Emperor 
during his last days.  Many of the Articles of this law were verbatim copies of the 
previous one.  There were, however some changes which are worth noting.   
 
1.  Except in the Supreme Court any other bench would be fully constituted by one 
judge. In the High Court a bench could be constituted by three judges for criminal 
cases where the offence is punishable with death or rigorous imprisonment. (Art.4, 




 2.  The power of the JAC was extended to cover public prosecutors and registrars.  
Before the new legislation, court registrars and public prosecutors were treated the 
same way as the other public servants.   
 
3.  The number of members of the JAC was raised from seven to nine.  The 
Commission had nine members only two of whom, the Presidents of the Supreme 
Court and the High Court, were from the judiciary.  The remaining seven members 
were drawn from different sectors.  The commission, like its predecessor, was chaired 
by the Minister of Justice.  And like its predecessor, the Ministry of justice had the 
power to issue regulations for the new JAC.  The power to appoint judges was vested 
in the President of the country, who was the head of state and the chairman of the 
PMAC. (Proc. 1, 1975)   The power to nominate candidates was shared between the 
Ministry of Justice and the Commission. The power to nominate the President of the 
Supreme Court and the President of the High Courts was given to the Minister of 
Justice while the nomination of other judges remained with the Commission.  The 
content of the new legislation was, therefore, basically the same as the one that was 
issued by the Emperor a year before he was deposed.  The powers which the Emperor 
had as regards appointment or removal of the court presidents were transferred to the 
Chairperson of the PMAC, who was also the head of state  
 
In 1987 the third written Constitution in Ethiopian history was adopted.  This 
Constitution introduced a new arrangement into the legal system. Judicial Authority 
was vested in one Supreme Court, Courts of Administrative and Autonomous Regions 
and other courts established by law.  The Supreme Court was declared to be the 
highest judicial organ and was given the authority to supervise the judicial functions 
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of the other courts in the country. (Art. 100, Const. PDRE) While the appointment and 
removal of judges to the Supreme Court was outlined in the Constitution, the matter 
of all other courts was left to subsidiary legislation.  Under this Constitution the 
President, the Vice Presidents and the judges of the Supreme Court were elected by 
the National Shengo (which was the law making organ) upon presentation by the 
President of the republic. (Art. 23 (4(e)), Const., PDRE)Election of judges to the High 
Court and other lower courts was given to the Shengos of Administrative or 
Autonomous Regions.  The President of the Republic had the power and duty to 
“ensure that the Supreme Court, the office of the Procurator General, the National 
Worker’s Control Committee and the Office of the Auditor General discharge their 
responsibilities”.  The term of office of judges was the same as that of the Shengo 
which elected them which was five years. (Art. 101, Const., PDRE)  The Shengo had 
the power to recall judges elected by it before the term of five years ends. (Art. 100, 
Const., PDRE) 
 
Under Proclamation 9 of 1987, the President of the Republic was given an exclusive 
power to nominate judges of the Supreme Court.  The Ministry of Justice which, 
earlier on, had the power to nominate judges to the Supreme Court and the High Court 
lost this power during this period.  Not only did the President of the Republic have the 
power to nominate judges, but he also had the power to request their removal by the 
parliament if it is in session. (Art. 100, Const., PDRE)  Sub Article 4 of Proclamation 
No. 9/87 went further and gave the President an unlimited power in the appointment 
and removal of judges. It provided that “pending the decision of the National Shengo 
on the recommendation of removal of judges the President of the Republic may 
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suspend or dismiss judges of the Supreme Court and appoint new judges”. (Art. 4, 
Pro. 9, 1987)   
 
Under the PDRE Constitutional framework the President of the Republic had all the 
powers to nominate, to request the removal of, or to remove and replace, Supreme 
Court judges by new ones as he deemed fit.    The tenure of judges which was 
proclaimed to be up to retirement age in 1975 was shortened to five years in 1987.  
The term of the National Shengo was five years and so was the term of office of the 
Supreme Court judges.  When one considers that the President of the Republic had the 
power to remove the Supreme Court judges before the lapse of their term, one can 
easily see the extent of power which the president had over the highest court of the 
land.  Besides, although the power to appoint judges to the Supreme Court was given 
to the National Shengo, the president had powers to appoint new judges to the 
Supreme Court pending the decision of the same.  This obviously circumvented 
whatever limited powers the National Shengo had to appoint judges to the Supreme 
Court.   During this period the legal framework for the judicial independence was 
eroded to the greatest extent.   
 
On the other hand one notices an apparent attempt to decentralize the appointment 
and removal of judges during this period.  The only court whose judges were directly 
appointed and removed by the authorities at the centre was the Supreme Court.  
Judges of all other courts were appointed by the Shengos that were established in the 




In 1991, the government that was in power under the PDRE Constitution was 
overthrown by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Forces (EPRDF); a 
Provisional Government was established which was later on expanded into a 
Transitional Government through a Transitional Period Charter. (Pro. 1, 1991) The 
Constitution of the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was suspended together 
with the institutions established under it including the National Shengo and the 
Shengos of the Regions.  The transitional government that came out with a new 
decentralized arrangement for the organization of courts in Ethiopia removed many of 
the judges that were appointed under the previous regime.  During the transitional 
period two court systems were established. The Central Government established 
Central Courts and the Regions established their own administration of justice, 
including Regional Courts.  In 1994, the Constitution for the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) was ratified by a constituent assembly on the 8th of 
December 1994 and entered in to force on the 21st of August 1995.   
 
2.2. The Current Judicial System 
 
After the adoption of the Constitution of the FDRE in 1994, the judicial organization 
of the country was changed.  Not only did the Constitution introduce a federal system 
of government and a dual form of court system, but it also introduced some basic 
elements to the legal framework for judicial independence.   
 
The FDRE comprises of the Federal Government and the nine member States (Art. 
50(1), Const.) which are enumerated in the Constitution.  Member States of the 
Federation are the States of Tigrai, Afar, Amhara, Oromiya, Benshangul/Gumuz, 
Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, the Gambella people, the Somali People 
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and the Harari People. These states have wide ranging legislative, executive and 
judicial powers vested on them under the Constitution.(Art. 54, Const.)  The powers 
of both the Federal Government and the States as well as concurrent powers of both 
are enumerated in the Constitution.  Any power that is not specifically given 
exclusively to the Federal Government or concurrently to the Federal Government 
and the States is reserved to the States. (Art. 52,  Const.)  While the Constitution in 
principle envisages a dual court system, the only Federal Judicial organ that is 
established by the Constitution is the FSC.  The Constitution allows the Federal 
Government to establish the FHC and the FFIC in any part of the country or in some 
States. Their establishment, however, requires a two-thirds majority vote by the 
parliament.  Pending the establishment of the FHC and the FFIC through this 
procedure, the Constitution has delegated the jurisdiction of the Federal High and 
FFICs to the State Supreme and State High Courts respectively. (Art, 78, Const.). The 
Federal High and the FFICs are however established through an act of parliament that 
was issued subsequent to the adoption of the Constitution. (Pro. 25, 1994)  The 
Federal Parliament has established Federal High and First Instance Courts for Addis 
Ababa, Diredawa and four other States (Benshangul Gumuz, Gambella, the State of 
Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Gambella and Afar) through a two-thirds 
majority vote as prescribed in the Constitution. The Federal Constitution empowers 
the States to establish a Supreme Court, a High Court and a First Instance Court.  The 
States have as a result established these courts through their respective Constitutions 
 
The Constitution of 1994 declares that judicial power is vested in the courts. The FSC 
is vested with supreme federal judicial authority on federal matters whereas the State 
45 
 




2.2.1. The Jurisdiction of Federal and State Courts 
The jurisdiction of the Federal Courts is outlined in the Constitution and the Federal 
Courts Proclamation.  The guiding principle is stipulated under Article 80 of the 
Federal Constitution.  Judicial authority is based on whether matters are federal or 
state.  The FSC is given the highest and final judicial authority over federal matters 
whereas the State Supreme Courts are the highest and final judicial authorities in their 
respective territories on State matters. (Art 80, Const.) As mentioned earlier the 
powers of the Federal Government are restrictively enumerated in the Constitution 
and any power that is not given to the Federal Government is reserved to the States.  
Thus the ambit of federal matters as opposed to State matters will be decided based on 
the division of powers between the Federal Government and the States in the Federal 
Constitution.  The Constitution delineates the powers between the federal and the 
state judiciary based on whether or not the point at issue is federal or state matter.   
 
Although the State Supreme Courts are the highest and final judicial authority in their 
territories, the Constitution makes an important exception to this principle.  The FSC 
“has a power of cassation over any final court decision containing a basic error of 
law” (emphasis added).(Art. (3(a) Const.)  The State Supreme Courts, likewise, have 
cassation powers, but the power is limited to “any final court decision on state matters 
which contains a basic error of law. (Emphasis added). (Art. 3(b), Const.) The FSC’s 
power of cassation, therefore, extends to State matters as the Constitution empowers it 
to review any final decision, whether or not it is rendered by the federal courts. The 
FSC has the power review state matter through its cassation division if it is convinced 
that it contains a basic error of law.  What constitutes a basic error of law is defined 
neither by the Constitution nor by the subsequent acts of parliament.  Its definition 
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and scope remains to be developed by the decisions of the judicial organs. The legal 
arrangement has an impact on the organization and workload of the FSC.   
 
Apart from these general principles regarding the jurisdiction of courts in Ethiopia, 
details are found in the Federal Courts Proclamation.  This proclamation puts the 
general principle as regards jurisdiction of the Federal Courts under its Article 3 
stating that “the Federal Courts shall have jurisdiction over: 
1. cases arising from the Constitution, Federal Laws, and International 
Treaties 
2. Parties specified in Federal Laws 
3. Places specified in the Constitution or Federal Laws”.(Art. 3, Pro. 25, 
1996) 
 
From the basic principle laid down under this Article one would get the impression 
that the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts extends to a wide range of issues arising 
from the Constitution, federal laws and International Treaties.  The general principle 
seems to have been diluted by many exceptions in the Federal Courts Proclamation 
and other Federal laws enacted by the Federal Parliament.  Apart from the FSC which 
has the highest judicial authority over federal judicial matters, the jurisdiction of the 
FHC and FFIC does not necessarily embrace all matters arising from the Constitution, 
Federal laws and International Treaties.  A closer scrutiny of the Federal Courts 
Proclamation reveals that much of what looks to be under the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Courts at first glance falls within the jurisdiction of the State Courts.  As the 
enactment of the Penal Code is within the competence of the Federal Government 
under the Constitution (Article 55(5), Const.), the Federal Courts should have 
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jurisdiction in all criminal cases based on Article 3 of the Federal Courts 
Proclamation 25/96.  Article 4 of the same Proclamation however limits the criminal 
jurisdiction of the Federal Courts to a few categories of offences.  The criminal 
jurisdiction of the Federal Courts is limited to. 
1. Offences against the Constitutional Order or internal security of the State; 
2. Offences against foreign states; 
3. Offences against laws of nations; 
4. Offences against the fiscal and economic interest of the Federal 
Government; 
5. Offences regarding counterfeit currency; 
6. Offences regarding forgery of instruments of the Federal Government; 
7. Offences regarding security and freedom of communication services 
operating within more than one Region or at an international level; 
8. Offences regarding the safety of aviation 
9. Offences regarding foreign nationals 
10. Offences regarding illicit traffic in drugs 
11. Offences falling under jurisdictions of different Regions or jurisdictions of 
both Federal and Regional Courts as well as concurrent offences; 
12.  Offences committed by officials and employees of the Federal 
Government in relation to their official duties. (Art. 4, Pro. 25, 1994) 
 
Although the Penal Code is a federal law, adjudication of criminal cases is not 
necessarily within the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts as their jurisdiction is limited 
to the categories offences listed above.  All other criminal cases are handled by the 




The jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in civil litigation does not extend to all disputes 
that involve federal laws either.  The jurisdiction of the Federal Courts is based on 
two basic criteria, the nature of the dispute and the nature of the parties to a dispute.  
All civil cases that involve the Federal Government or foreign nationals fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Courts regardless of the law that may apply to resolve the 
dispute.  Likewise, disputes between persons permanently residing in different states 
and disputes regarding the liability of officials or employees of the Federal 
Government in connection with their official duties fall under the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Courts. (Art. 4, Pro. 25, 1996)  From the wide range of federal laws which fall 
within the competence of the Federal Government, only the following categories of 
cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts.  
1. Suits involving matters of nationality 
2. Suits regarding business organizations registered or formed under the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Government 
3. Suits relating to negotiable instruments 
4. Suits relating to literary and artistic ownership rights 
5. Suits regarding insurance policies and 
6. Application for habeas corpus. (Art. 4, Pro. 25, 1996) 
 
Thus, although the commercial law is within the competence of the federal 
government, (Art. 55, Const.) jurisdiction of disputes pertaining to its application does 
not necessarily fall under the jurisdiction of the federal courts with the exception of 
items 2 and 3 above or unless there is some other federal legislation that gives them 




From the foregoing, one can gather that the majority of disputes in Ethiopia under the 
current arrangement are handled by the State Courts.  Even in cases where Federal 
Courts have jurisdiction, the State Courts will assume jurisdiction if the event or the 
transaction takes place within the territory of the States. (Art. 78 (2), Const.)  
 
2.2.2. Organization of Courts 
 
Both the Federal and State Courts are organized as a three tier court system, with the 
First Instance Courts at the bottom, the High Courts (sometimes called Zonal Courts 
in the States) in the middle and the Supreme Courts at the apex.   The jurisdiction of 
each court within the hierarchy is determined by federal laws for the Federal Courts 
and state laws for the State Courts.  The FSC has first instance, appellate and 
cassation jurisdictions. (Art.8-10, Proc. 25, 1996) The FHC has appellate and first 
instance jurisdictions, whereas the FFIC has only first instance jurisdiction.  (Art. 11-
15, Proc. 25, 1996) The first instance jurisdiction of the High Court and the First 
Instance Court depends on the seriousness of the offence in criminal cases and on the 
amount in controversy in civil cases.  In civil Cases the FHC has first instance 
jurisdiction if the amount involved is more than 500,000 Birr. (Art. 11(1), Proc. 25, 
1996)  Any claim less than this amount falls within the jurisdiction of the FFIC, 
unless it is less than 5000, in which case it falls within the competence of the 
jurisdiction of the Social Courts. (Art. 14, Proc. 25, 1996)  The FHC hears appeals 
from the FFIC (Art. 13 Proc 25, 1996) and its decision is final if it confirms the 
decision of the lower court.  The FHC also hears appeals from decisions rendered by 
other tribunals with quasi judicial powers.  Thus decisions from the Tax Appeal 
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Commission (Proc233/2001), Labour Board (Proc. 466/2005), and Election Board 
(Proc. 438/2005) are taken on appeal to the FHC.    
 
The First Instance jurisdiction of the FSC is limited to criminal cases where Federal 
Government Officials are charged of criminal offences in connection with their 
official responsibilities, cases involving members of the diplomatic community and 
applications for change of venue (Art. 8 Proc. 25/95).  It’s appellate and cassation 
jurisdictions reflect the division of judicial powers outlined by the Constitution.  It has 
appellate jurisdiction from decisions of the Federal Courts.  Right of appeal is 
automatic from the decisions of the High Court on its first instance jurisdiction.  
Decisions of the High Court on its appellate jurisdiction are, however, final unless the 
court has varied the decision of the lower court and, therefore cannot be seen by the 
appellate division of the FSC.  The FSC, however, can also hear appeals from the 
State Supreme Courts when they decide on federal matters that have been delegated to 
them by the Constitution (Art. 79 Const).  On such matters, the State Supreme Courts 
exercise the jurisdiction of the FHC and the appeal goes to the FSC.  The cassation 
jurisdiction of the FSC extends to all cases, federal or state, in so far as they are final 
and one can show that they contain a fundamental error of law (Art 14 Proc 24/94).   
 
The structure of Courts in Ethiopia can be illustrated by the following diagram, with 







Figure 1: Structure of Courts in Ethiopia 
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The structure of the State Courts is similar to that of the Federal Courts with some 
notable exceptions.  Many of the State Courts have appellate jurisdiction from the 
small claims tribunals which are called Social Courts and operate in all the States 
including Addis Ababa, which is a chartered city.  The requirements for appeal are not 
also exactly the same as that of the Federal Courts.  In some States there in no limit to 
the number of appeals and in some others the power of cassation is exercised at the 
High Court level for cases that start from the Social Courts.  The composition of the 
benches is not the same in all the courts either.  Whereas benches in the FHC are 
constituted by one judge, except in criminal cases that carry more than 15 years of 
imprisonment the State High Courts have benches composed of three judges. (Pro. 30, 




2.2.3. Administration of Courts 
 
The administration of courts in the Federal Government and the States is divided 
between three different institutions, namely; the Supreme Courts, the JACs and the 
Plenum.     
 
1.   The Supreme Courts. 
The administrative authority of the FSC is partly reflected in the Constitution itself.  
The FSC has the Constitutional authority to draw up its own budget and implement it 
when approved by the Federal Parliament. (Art. 79(6), Const.)  The FSC also has the 
power to administer the other Federal Courts in accordance with the law. (Art. 16(1), 
Pro. 25, 1996) The powers of the State Supreme Courts are governed by State 
Constitutions and other laws.  The essence of the laws is, however, the same with the 
Federal Courts. All matters related to the day to day activity of the courts are within 
the competence of the Supreme Courts.  
 
2. The Judicial Administration Commissions (JACs) 
JACs are not established by the Federal Constitution but their existence is envisaged 
and some of the powers are also enumerated in it.  The powers of the JACs to 
nominate judges for appointment (Art. 81, Const.) and to initiate the process for 
removal of judges from office (Art. 79, Const.) are constitutionally recognized 
powers.  The other powers of the JACS emanate from other Federal or State 
subsidiary legislations.  Though the powers of the councils are similar, the 




The Federal Judicial Administration Commission (FJAC) was established in 1996. 
(Pro. 24, 1996) This commission is responsible for the selection of judges except the 
President and the Vice-president of the FSC, the issuance of a Code of Conduct, 
disciplining, fixing the salary and benefits and the transfer of judges.   It also has the 
power to give its opinion on the suitability of judges that are nominated for the State 
High and Supreme Courts. (Art.4, Pro. 24, 1996)The President and the Vice-President 
of the FSC are directly nominated by the Prime Minster and appointed by the House 
of People’s Representatives (the Federal parliament) (Art. 55(13), 74 (6), Const.)  the 
FJAC therefore is not involved in their appointment.  The FJAC has nine members 
and is chaired by the President of the FSC.  The Commission is composed of the 
following members.  
1. The President of the FSC (Chair) 
2. The Vice-President of The FSC 
3. The President of the FHC 
4. The President of the FFIC 
5. The most senior judge of the FSC 
6. A representative from the FHC judges 




3. The Plenum  
The Plenum of the FSC is another body that has some specific responsibilities in the 
administration of justice in Ethiopia.  This is an institution that is entrusted with the 
responsibility to  
1. Deliberate on problems encountered in the administration of justice, 
2. Examine and approve directives and decisions that help to improve the judicial 
practices of the Federal Courts.  
3. Submit proposals to the Parliament for the enactment or repeal of laws 
4. To issue regulations for that are necessary for the proper implementation of its 
duties. 
 
The plenum of the FSC consists of all the Presidents of the Federal Courts, all the 
Presidents of the State Supreme Courts and the Judges of the FSC. The Minister of 
Justice is a nonvoting member of the Plenum. (Art. 34, Pro. 25, 1996)Other 
appropriate institutions may also be invited to participate in the Plenum without 
having the right to vote.  Such an organ does not exist in the State Courts.  
 
2.3. Other Courts 
 
The administration of justice in Ethiopia is not handled by the Regular Courts only.  
There are many other courts and tribunals that involve themselves in the 
administration of justice in a number of ways.  They can be classified into three broad 






2.3.1. Traditional and Religious Dispute Resolution Institutions (TDR) 
 
As mentioned earlier, the TDR existed and have always been competing with the 
formal state law.  In spite of that, much of the traditional law did not have legal 
recognition.  The formal denial of their existence by state law did not make the 
traditional institutions less effective.(Beckstrom, 1973, Bussani, 1996) Recent studies 
under the aegis of the Ministry of Justice have only confirmed that the traditional 
institutions are still intact and in some cases more effective and better accepted by the 
community. (Alula and Getachew, 2008)  At any rate the move for modernization in 
the 1960s has wiped out traditional law from the formal legal regime to a great extent.  
Thus the traditional law existed in fact but did not exist in law.  The approach of the 
FDRE Constitution towards traditional law is different.  The point begins with Article 
39 of the Constitution which gives unconditional right of self determination to what it 
recognizes as nations, nationalities and peoples.  Article 39 reads in part that 
 
1. Every nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to 
self determination including secession. 
2. Every nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia has the right to speak, write 
and develop its own language; to express, to develop and to promote its 
culture and preserve its history. 
3. Every nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia has the right to a full 
measure of self-administration which includes the right to establish 
institutions of government in the territory it inhabits and to equitable 




Besides, the Constitution allows adjudication of family and personal matters based on 
customary law if the parties agree to the process. (Art. 34(5), Const.) Article 78 also 
provides that the Federal and the State Parliaments “can establish or give official 
recognition to religious and customary courts.  Religious and customary courts that 
had state recognition and functioned prior to the adoption of the Constitution shall be 
organized on the basis of recognition accorded to them by this Constitution.”  The 
impact of these changes in the administration of justice will be discussed in greater 
detail in connection with access to justice.  Suffice it to mention at this stage that the 
Constitution recognizes the pluralist nature of the Ethiopian society and gives wider 
room for the customary laws and their institutions. 
 
Sharia courts have had a de facto existence in Ethiopia for a long time.   They became 
de jure in 1942 by the Kadis' Court Proclamation.(Zaki, 1973, 138) This Proclamation 
provided for a two-tier system of Mohammedan Courts— a Kadis' Court and the 
Court of Sharia.  
 
The legal status of the Sharia courts has been questionable as the CC and the CPC 
repealed all laws that are inconsistent with them in the 1960s.  Currently their 
existence is not only explicitly recognized by the Constitution, but the Federal 
Parliament has issued a proclamation in 1999 for the consolidation of the Sharia 
Courts. Administration of the Sharia Courts is under the FJAC (Proc. 188, 1999).  The 
Sharia Court’ jurisdiction relates to marriage and family matters and can be exercised 
if the parties expressly consent to their jurisdiction. (Art. 4, Pro. 188, 1999) The 
Coptic Church also has its own courts which deal with religious matters Orthodox 
Christianity was a state religion under the 1955 Constitution (Art. 19 Const. 1955).   
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2.3.2. Administrative Tribunals 
 
Ethiopia does not have a separate hierarchy of administrative courts as it is usually the 
case in civil law countries.  There are, however, a number of tribunals established by 
the State outside of the regular courts which get involved in the administration of 
justice. Some of these agencies include, the Tax Appeal Commission, The Labour 
board, the Pension Commission and Electoral Board.  The agencies have the 
competence to adjudicate matters that fall within their powers. The number of 
institutions that have quasi-judicial powers is growing in Ethiopia today.  Recently, 
the Federal Parliament has empowered the Housing agency to evict tenants who failed 
to discharge their obligations without any need to go the court of law.  The 
relationship between these tribunals and the regular courts is not well defined.  In 
some cases appeal is allowed to the ordinary courts3 in other cases their decision is 
final4.  The structure of the tribunals is not uniform. Neither is their composition and 
decision making process.  Although these institutions adjudicate matters there is no 
clearly set procedure which they are bound to follow.   
 
2.3.3. Small Claims Tribunals 
 
Small claims tribunals are established in all the States and entertain a sizable number 
of cases every year.   These courts are established by the States to handle minor 
disputes in their localities.  There are thousands of these tribunals operating in 
Ethiopia now.  The jurisdiction of the social courts is limited to relatively small 
amount of money.  The Federal Social Court in Addis Ababa can handle disputes up 
                                                 
3 Appeal is permitted from the decisions of the Labor Board, Tax Appeal Commission, Public Service 
Court and the Election Board. 
4 Decision of the Pension Commission is final 
59 
 
to 5000 Birr whereas the Social Courts in the Amhara State cannot exceed 1500 Birr.  
In the Tigrai state their jurisdiction is not only higher as it goes up to 2500, but they 
are also entrusted to handle disputes relating to marriage that arise within their 
localities regardless of the amount of money involved.  In the Oromiya state, on the 
other hand, they do not have the jurisdiction to entertain marriage disputes but have 
the jurisdiction to handle disputes that are related to land use rights.  Details of how 
these institutions are organized, and the problems they face will be discussed in 





















3. ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN ETHIOPIA 
3.1. Access to Justice 
3.1.1. Introductory Remarks 
 
The brief introduction to the Ethiopian history outlined above shows that there is 
pluralism in the administration of justice.  The country has western styled formal 
courts on the one hand and deeply rooted customary laws and institutions on the 
other.  Any study on access to justice demands a proper understanding of the interface 
between these two elements of the pluralist justice system.  As a bigger part of the 
Ethiopian population resorts to customary institutions for dispute resolution, the 
reform agenda on access to justice will be incomplete if sufficient attention is not 
given to address the place and fate of these institutions.   This chapter will try to 
examine the issue of access to justice from two different perspectives.  The primary 
focus will be the examination of the accessibility of the formal courts which 
administer justice in Ethiopia.  But as accessibility of the formal courts does not 
necessarily imply accessibility of justice to those who resort to the customary 
institutions, the last section will briefly consider the role which these institutions play 
in the administration of justice.  
 
As administration of justice in the formal courts is governed by procedural rules that 
have many features in common with other western countries, examining the literature 
on the issues of access to justice is relevant as far the formal courts are concerned.  
That the literature is relevant does not, however, mean that the problems as well as the 
solutions for access to justice in those countries are in all respects the same as in 
Ethiopia.  The points which this author believes are particularly important for access 
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to justice in connection with the formal courts in Ethiopia will be discussed in the 
sections following the general introductory remarks. 
3.1.2. The Nature of Access to Justice 
 
Addressing the issue of access to the regular courts should be one of the main areas 
for judicial reform in Ethiopia.  To properly identify the problems in access to justice 
and come up with recommendations which would work, it is imperative to understand 
its conceptual basis and the obstacles which hamper its proper implementation.   
 
The primary point of departure for the concept of access to justice is ensuring equality 
before the law.  The recognition of formal equality was, however, found to be 
inadequate as the citizens ability in real life to recognize and make use of their rights 
depended on many factors other than the legal recognition of those rights. (Sackville, 
2004)  Although this problem was noticed at an earlier period, the dominant thinking 
was that the state’s primary obligation is to recognize the natural rights of the 
individuals and to make sure that their rights are not infringed by others. The state, 
therefore, did not have an active role in addressing the actual capacity of individuals 
to make their rights effective.  The state simply remained passive to many of the 
problems which individuals faced to realize their rights recognized by the state. 
(Cappelletti and Garth, 1974)  
“Reliving “Legal Poverty”- the capacity of many people to make full use of 
the law and its institutions- was not the concern of the state.  Justice, like other 
commodities in the laissez-faire system could be purchased only by those who 
could afford its costs, and those who could not were considered the only ones 
responsible for their fate.  Formal, not effective, access to justice- formal, not 




Incorporating the basic rights into formal legal instruments has been an important 
move in terms of protecting the rights of individuals.  This trend has, however, been 
criticized at later stages for failing to ensure effective enjoyment of those rights  It 
was argued that for people who do not have the capacity to enjoy them for economic, 
social or cultural reasons, political and civil rights became empty promises.  Thus, to 
enhance the fundamental importance of these basic rights, some more rights had to be 
advocated within the package of social rights, amongst which is found the right of 
access to justice. (Cappelletti, 1992)  
  
The movement of access to justice was developed primarily as a reaction to the 
formalistic and dogmatic approach which identified law and the legal system only 
with norms to the exclusion of the process, the institutions and the people that are 
involved in the process.   
 
"the access perspective is intended to add, and indeed to give a place of 
honour, to the consumers' perspective, that is, the perspective of the 
addressees- the consumers- of law and justice, hence, to the individuals and 
groups, in a word, to civil society.  Thus pre-eminence, is given to the 
problems to the needs to the aspirations and of course to all those economic 
cultural, psychological, linguistic and racial obstacles which so often make it 
difficult or impossible for so many 'consumers' to have access to the law-
producers, and thus to the law, statutes, judgment and administrative acts to 




The concept of access to justice, therefore, goes beyond formal recognition of rights 
and addresses the problems that hinder the effective implementation of those rights.  
The concept of access to justice embraces the ideal that every person in society should 
have effective means for the protection of the rights and entitlements provided in the 
substantive law. (Sackville, 2004: 86) Access to justice focuses on the effective 
equality of citizens and not just on the symbolic equality which may result from the 
formal recognition of rights. 
 
This understanding of access to justice as a search for a system that ensures effective 
enjoyment of rights gives reform initiatives the perspective to examine the real 
problems in real life and to explore possibilities for addressing these problems.  It 
encourages scholars and reformers of justice systems to recognize that legal 
techniques serve social functions, that courts are not necessarily the only intuitions 
through which disputes may be resolved and to look for some other alternatives.  It 
advocates that procedural rules have an impact on how substantive laws are enforced.  
It examines to what extent, to whose benefit and at what cost substantive laws are 
enforced. (Cappelletti and Garth, 1974)  It also underscores that changing rules does 
not necessarily make results effective.  “The system has the capacity to change a great 
deal at the level of rules without corresponding changes in every day patterns of 
practice or distribution of tangible advantages.  Indeed, rule change may become a 
symbolic substitute for redistribution of advantages.”(Galanter, 1974)  
 
The concept of access to justice demands a new thinking that addresses these 
limitations in making rights effective.  This thinking has a number of advantages for 
reform programs in that it demands the exploration of different types of reform which 
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range from changing the forms of procedure to restructuring the courts. It explores 
possibilities for involving lay persons in the process, possibilities for modifying the 
substantive law to avoid litigation or to ensure speedy disposition and to encourage 
mechanisms for resolution of disputes other than the formal courts.   It also 
underscores that all disputes are not necessarily the same and demands that the 
process must relate and adapt to the type of dispute that is submitted for resolution. 
(Cappelletti and Garth, 1974) 
 
3.1.3. Barriers of Access to Justice 
 
The concept of access to justice as a search for effective enjoyment of rights calls for 
a continuous identification of the reasons that impede the achievement of its goals.  
Much as the aspirations to ensure effective enjoyment of rights by the majority of the 
population is noble, studies indicate that there are many barriers which hinder the 
proper and effective implementation of those rights.  The barriers of access to justice 
can either be subjective or objective depending on their nature.  Objective barriers of 
access to justice refer to those constrains which limit citizen’s ability to make use of 
the formal justice institutions. Subjective barriers of access to justice refer to those 
barriers that relate to the attitudes and knowledge of citizens about the legal system 
and its institutions. (Macdonald, 1990,)  The nature and magnitude of some of these 
barriers will be discussed in the following sections.   
 
A. Economic Barriers 
 
Of all the barriers of access to justice, the economic barriers have attracted the 
greatest attention in access to justice studies.   Economic barriers comprise direct 
institutional  cost (filing fees,  cost of expert, witnesses, court costs) and lawyers fees 
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as well as indirect costs which include costs incidental to the process such as lost 
wages, opportunity cost and expenses for transport and lodging.(Macdonald, 1990: 
301) 
 
Economic disparity between litigants is believed to have an impact on their capability 
to make use of the judicial process.  Marc Galanter has come up with an impressive 
finding on how the ones with better economic resources make better use of the 
judicial process than the have-nots.  Galanter divided litigants into two main 
categories: litigants who resort to the courts occasionally and litigants who get 
involved in similar litigation over time.  He called the first ones one-shotters and the 
later repeat players.(Galanter, 1974)  Galanter explains how repeat players have an 
advantage in the litigation landscape by virtue of their resources, their economy of 
scale, access to specialists and their low start-up costs for any one case.  He also 
explains how the nature of the legal institutions raises the advantages of the repeat 
players.  The passive nature of the legal institutions, in the sense that they must be 
mobilized by the claimant and that once started the burden is on the litigant to proceed 
with his case, augment the advantages of the repeat players.  He argues that the 
assumption that parties are endowed with similar resources, investigative 
opportunities and legal skills does not hold true in reality.  He further states that the 
"broader the delegation to the parties, the greater the advantage conferred on the 
wealthier, more experienced and better organized party"(Galanter, 1974:121)  As the 
institutional resources available for adjudication are far less compared with the 
number of claims, the resulting overload accentuates the advantages of the 




A recent study conducted in the United Kingdom by Lord Woolf has brought to the 
fore similar conclusions.  The report has identified cost as one of the key problems 
barring access to the civil justice system in the United Kingdom.  (Woolf, 1997:709) 
The magnitude of the cost involved in litigation is said to have deterred people from 
defending their claims.  The high cost of litigation, according to this report, affects not 
only individual litigants, but it also affects big corporations and the general public.  
Businesses find it cheaper to pay up than to defend an action regardless of its merits.  
The high cost also affects the public through rising legal aid resources, and the costs 
which consumers have to pay when commercial companies pass on litigation costs to 
them.  Rising litigation cost also affects the people who could have been eligible for 
legal aid.  The higher the cost of litigation, the fewer would be the people who would 
be assisted, making the larger proportion of the population out of the legal aid 
scheme.  According to Lord Woolf, not only was the cost of civil litigation excessive 
and unaffordable, but it was also disproportionate.  The cost of litigation is considered 
proportionate when there is some balance between the result that is obtained and the 
money and time that invested to achieve the result. He observed that the cost of 
litigation in the UK was disproportional, particularly in smaller claims, because the 
cost of litigation exceeded the value that was at issue.  (Woolf, 1997:712) 
 
Another survey conducted in the UK has shown that the adverse effect of litigation 
cost on access to justice is felt more by people having smaller cases.  The study 
conducted by Hazel Genn has confirmed that costs for litigation are disproportionate 
at the lower end of the scale, where the cost of litigation for one side alone is as much 




Previous studies in other countries have likewise indicated that the cost of litigation is 
higher for the smaller cases than the larger ones.  The study conducted as far back as 
1958 in Germany by Kaplan, Von Mehren and Shaefer showed that the ratio of the 
cost of litigation ranged from 4.1% for the larger cases to 54% in the smaller ones.   A 
research about the Italian situation is even more alarming.  While the cost of litigation 
in bigger cases was 8.4%, the cost for a case of less than 1, 600 dollars was between 
51% and 60%  The cost goes up to 170% when the amount in dispute was only 160 
dollars. Another study about Spanish litigation indicated similar pattern, where the 
cost for big cases was 8% and for the small ones it runs up to 80%. (Cappelletti, 1970-
1971:873)  
 
In disputes involving low priced goods, services or credit the cost associated with 
redress are often much higher than the benefits that may be obtained through 
recovery.   Besides, as the redress will be obtained only at some point in the future, 
the value of the recovery needs to be discounted to its current value. Depending on the 
value which one attaches to time, it may be irrational for some claimants to lodge a 
claim for redress if there is a high risk that the claim may not succeed.  The usual 
assumption that claimants engaged in redress are risk averse exacerbates the 
symmetry between the costs that are invested for redress and the value of expected 
recovery. (Finkle and Cohen, 1993) 
 
Other studies have indicated that the cost of litigation can also affect the perception of 
the citizens about the fairness of the justice system.  Ken-ichi Ohbuchi et al have 
proved in an empirical study conducted in Japan that the evaluation of people in the 
judicial system and their perception about the fairness of processes is explained by a 
68 
 
combination of factors one of which is low economic and temporal cost of litigation. 
(Ohbutchi et al, 2005) This study was based on, and confirmed, previous researches 
on litigation.  Research conducted previously found out that the degree of satisfaction 
increases with the perception of fairness of procedures. (Allen and Tyler, 1988) The 
fairness of procedure in turn depends on the level of satisfaction of the disputants 
about the degree of their participation, the respect they experience in the process as 
well as the trustworthiness and neutrality of the third party. (Tyler, 1997:882) 
 
Dispute resolution through the formal court system is an expensive venture in many 
legal systems.  Although governments subsidize the process by covering the salaries 
for judges and other members of the court, by providing buildings and other facilities 
necessary to adjudicate cases brought to court, a great proportion of the other costs are 
covered by the parties themselves in varying degrees.  This high cost which parties 
have to incur to vindicate rights or to defend themselves has become a powerful 
barrier of access to justice for which many legal systems have sought solutions. 
(Cappelletti and Garth, 1974: 11) This barrier of access to justice has been addressed 
in many legal systems depending on the cause for which the cost is primarily 
incurred.   
 
The rules on the recovery of cost that apply in different legal systems have differing 
effects on access to justice.  Reform programs thus have addressed the cost barrier by 
trying to address the financial incentives of the parties in the litigation process. 
 
The two predominant rules on recovery of costs, the American rule and the loser pays 
rule, (sometimes also called the indemnity rule, cost shifting rule, cost following the 
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event, winner-takes it all etc (Rickman, 1995) affect the incentives in litigation in 
different ways.  In those systems that follow the ‘American rule’ of recovery of costs, 
the parties primarily cover their own costs.  In exceptional situations where the losing 
party is obliged to cover the costs, the winning party’s reimbursement of expenses 
does not include the fees paid to the lawyers, which in many legal systems is 
considerable. (Cappelletti and Garth, 1974: 11) Under the loser-pays principle, on the 
other hand, the financial cost of both parties incurred during the litigation process is 
covered by the losing party.  These two different procedural devices on cost provide 
different financial incentives to litigants.  The loser pays principle provides greater 
incentive for optimistic plaintiffs to sue than the American rule.  This happens 
because the party with greater probability to win would expect to have less cost as it 
will be covered by the other side. Under the American rule on the other hand, the 
plaintiff will cover his own cost whether he wins or not, thereby making the pursuit of 
litigation less profitable under the American rule. (Rickman, 1995)  On the other hand 
the loser pays principle creates greater disincentive for plaintiffs with nuisance suits 
from going to court than the American rule. (Rosenberg and Shavell, 1985)  This 
happens because the plaintiff with a weak case, not only would cover his own costs 
but that of the defendant as well.  Besides, as the defendant likewise expects to be 
reimbursed by the plaintiff at the end of the process, he is more likely to defend 
himself as it would not ultimately cost him much. (Rickman, 1995) It must be noted, 
however, that the English rule does not necessarily deter plaintiffs with small value 
from bringing their case to court (assuming that they cover the initial cost) in so far as 
they are confident that they will win the case.  In situations where there is a prospect 
of winning and an assurance that the costs will be covered by the other party, the case 
does not have to be worth the cost for its vindication. (Snyder and Hughes, 1995)  The 
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implications of these rules on the probabilities of settlement by the parties during trial 
are immense.  The incentives to settle which these rules create on the parties have 
been studied in connection with the perception of the parties about the outcome of the 
litigation.  The English rule creates greater range for settlement and greater settlement 
when both parties to the litigation are not optimistic about the outcome of the 
disputes, i.e., when both parties think that they will lose. The American rule on the 
other hand provides greater incentive to settle when both parties have confidence 
about winning the case.  This difference is a result of the basic condition for 
settlement in both rules that the amount which the plaintiff expects to get by going to 
trial should be less than the amount which the defendant expects to pay in the dispute.  
As a result when the litigants are both pessimistic about the outcome they could 
believe that they are likely to have to cover the other’s costs.  This makes the 
defendant expect to pay a bigger amount and the plaintiff to get less at trial.  If both 
parties expect to win, under the English rule they would also expect to be able to 
recover their costs from the other side making settlement less likely under these rules 
relative to the American rules. (Rickman, 1995) 
 
The financial incentive of lawyers during the process of litigation should also be taken 
as an important factor that can potentially contribute to the economic barriers of 
access to justice.  Although the interest of lawyers in litigation includes the pursuit of 
justice, it is not wholly altruistic.  They get financial remuneration during the process 
and as a result have an interest at stake.  Apart from the overall issues of justice, they 
have an interest to further their own financial benefits.  Whether paid by the hour or 
based on the complexity of the case, lawyers do not have the incentive to economize 
in the provision of services.  Instead, lawyers earn more money when litigation is 
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protracted which gives them an incentive to complicate and prolong the process.  This 
desire of the lawyers to earn more money through lengthy judicial processes is 
compounded by the clients’ usual inability to resist the decisions because of lack of 
information about the process. (Zuckerman, 1995,: 64)  
 
The issue of whether or not the cost of civil litigation should be covered by the parties 
to the dispute or by the tax payers has to be addressed by reform programs.  If the tax 
payer bears the cost, it means less cost to the party in dispute.  Although less cost 
means more access to justice, it may also have the adverse effect.  Low costs 
encourage litigation, which, if not paralleled by increment of resources and 
productivity result in congestion and delay in the process which are barriers of access 
to justice by themselves. (Zuckerman, 2001) This delicate balance between access to 
justice and cost of litigation has been resolved in different legal systems in a variety 
of ways.  Some systems, like Spain (Gimenez 2001) and France (Cadiet, 2001), have 
abolished court fees altogether thereby providing free justice to its citizens as far as 
court fees are concerned.  In other legal systems fees which litigants have to pay as 
security at the beginning of the process have been declared by courts as 
unconstitutional. In still other countries the court fee structure has been used as an 
instrument to discipline the process by creating incentive devices for the parties and 
an instrument to control the flow of cases into the courts as in Germany. (Gottwald, 
2001) 
B. Procedural Barriers 
 
As mentioned earlier, the concept of access to justice recognizes that the procedural 
rules have an impact on how, for whose benefit and at what cost substantive laws are 
enforced. As a result, many reform initiatives have focused on procedural issues to 
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address the barriers of access to justice and their undesirable effects. The theoretical 
foundations of access to justice have been changed into reform projects through 
reform of procedural rules. (Cappelletti and Garth, 1974)   
 
Procedural rules affect access to justice in a variety of ways.    The economic barriers 
discussed in the previous section are partly a result of the procedural architecture and 
can be addressed by changing those areas that cause the cost of litigation to rise.  
Studies indicate that the procedural design can result in a denial of access to justice by 
making the process complex, expensive and inefficient.  The study conducted by Lord 
Woolf in England and Wales concluded that the high cost of litigation is a result of 
the excessive adversarial nature of the litigation, which if not controlled by the judges, 
gives the lawyers an incentive to invest more in the process. (Woolf, 1997:710)  The 
civil justice reform Act in the United States attributed the cost and complexity of 
litigation partly to the procedural rules.   On the other hand the German procedure 
controls the financial incentive of lawyers by fixing the time for payment of the fees 
at predetermined intervals.  Besides, lawyers’ fees are fixed by law, lowering their 
incentive to want the litigation to continue.  The rules in England and Wales, on the 
other hand, allow lawyers to be paid by the hour creating an incentive in prolonged 
process. (Gottwald, 1997) 
 
The procedural rules on locus standi are relevant for access to justice, and as a result 
should be a focus of reform.  Traditional procedural rules which were based on 
individualistic conception of litigation were found to be inadequate to address the 
rights of people who were affected by mass wrong doers. Modern societies are 
characterized by an economy where production, labour, exchange and consumption 
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have become mass phenomena. In the light of these developments the individual has 
become powerless to enforce claims which emanate from mass-wrongdoers.   The 
individual lacks the incentive to proceed with his claims, as the claim may be too 
small to bring an action against a powerful defendant.  The procedural rules did not 
provide enough protection for a private individual who lacks the motivation, 
information or economic strength to fight against a powerful defendant.  Even when 
an individual decides to proceed against the mass-wrongdoer, the individual victory 
would not be deterrent enough as it is only a fragment of a bigger whole.  Procedural 
devices had to be devised to remedy the "organizational poverty" which stood on the 
way of access to justice.  New concepts of standing were developed to create an 
"ideological plaintiff" who represents a group, category or class that had the 
organizational poverty.  Although the problem in this regard was felt in all the 
systems, the solutions were not uniform.  What was uniform was the effort to change 
millenary procedural designs so that they would allow individuals or associations in 
cases that could possibly involve thousands of persons. (Cappelletti, 1971:31-32)  
 
Likewise, the roles which legal systems give to their judges or judicial organizations 
have an impact on access to justice.    Excesses of adversarial litigation have been 
attacked in many systems because of their adverse effect on access to justice. Systems 
which leave litigation mainly under the control of the litigants or their lawyers create 
a greater incentive for the parties to prolong the litigation process as a result of which 
costs escalate.  This trend is partly a result of the procedural design and access can be 
enhanced by changing the rules to give more power to the judges in controlling the 
process or creating different tracks for cases depending on the amount or complexity 




Some procedural barriers emerge in connection with the nature of and method used by 
adjudication to resolve disputes.  Although adjudication aims at rectitude of decision, 
it relies on biased information forwarded by the parties to achieve it by ignoring 
suspect decisions preceded by cognitive biases. (Resnik, 2003:183)  The procedural 
barrier also emerges due to the limited nature of the solution which the formal justice 
system provides.  The solution which is provided by formal courts by way of 
judgments may not be the optimal solution in some controversies. (Cappelletti, 1971, 
33)  Procedural design which encourage fighting for one's rights has its limits.  The 
right-wrong solution which courts normally provide may exacerbate conflicts instead 
of resolving them in situations when the disputes arise between people who have 
continuous and repeat relationships. (Menkel-Meadow, 1996:27)  In such cases "a 
conciliatory or co-existential justice could often be much more effective.  It might 
lead to an approximation of positions or solutions in which there is not inevitably a 
winner and a loser, but a reciprocal understanding with a mutual adaptation of 
behaviour". (Cappelletti, 1971:33) The inherent assumption of the adjudication model 
on the relative equality of the combatants who have the resources to engage in combat 
has also given rise to a potential barrier in the process particularly for those who 




Delay in the judicial process affects access to justice in a variety of ways.  Delay in 
proceedings escalates the cost of litigation; thereby putting the have-nots in a 
disadvantaged position as they would be forced to withdraw from the process, or to 
settle for less optimum terms.  Delay affects access to justice by increasing the 
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workload of the institutions, raising the average duration time and the overall backlog 
of cases.  This discourages litigants from using the judicial institutions to vindicate 
their rights. (Macdonald, 1990: 301) Failure to render judgments within a period of 
time, where lapse of time makes the remedy provided thereafter of a little help, makes 
recourse to the judicial process of little or no use to the citizens. In such situations 
delay undermines the practical utility of the judgment regardless of its correctness.   
Procedures which allow delay to erode the utility of a judgment by depriving them of 
any practical utility affect access to justice.  This aspect of delay is referred to as the 
incremental effect of delay to show the decreasing utility of remedies over the course 
of time. (Zuckerman, 1999: 7-8) 
 
Delay affects access to justice by influencing rectitude of decisions.  Delay in the 
process allows evidence to disappear or deteriorate thereby inducing error.   Disputes 
that rely on oral testimony are particularly affected when longer time is allowed to 
elapse before the trial, as the probability of the memories fading increases with time. 
Reform programs that try to give greater access should therefore strive to put in place 
procedural devices that ensure adjudication of disputes when the evidence is fresh. 
(Zukerman, 1999: 7) 
Because of the central role of speed in ensuring access to justice, basic human rights 
instruments have come up with basic standards which states are bound to achieve.  
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that “anyone 
arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or 
other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial 
within a reasonable time or to release”. (Art. 7(3), ICCPR)  The European Convention 
on Human Rights gives the temporal aspect of the process a wider scope by making it 
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applicable both to civil and criminal matters.  It provides that “in the determination of 
his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is 
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law” (Art. 6, ECHR) 
 
D. Subjective Barriers 
 
Subjective barriers of access to justice refer to those barriers that relate to the attitudes 
to and knowledge of citizens about the legal system and its institutions.  Some of the 
impediments to the achievement of equal access to justice include such attributes as 
age, ethnic background, and socio-cultural background, physical or intellectual 
deficiency.   Many a time legal systems are designed with some stereo types in view 
and consider the young, the poor and the disabled not as important aspects of the 
system but as deviations from it.  This creates a psychological barrier towards access 
to justice. (Macdonald, 1990: 299) 
 
An equally significant subjective barrier of access to justice is lack of information and 
knowledge about the legal system and its institutions, which can affect all citizens 
alike.  If the a big percentage of those for whom the systems are designed do not 
know about the existence of the system, or do not have adequate information on how 
to make use of them those systems mean nothing to them even if they are the best in 
terms of their content.  At the heart of this subjective barrier is the truth that 
information is power and that empowerment should begin from reform programs that 
ensure equal access to information. (Macdonald, 1990:300) The subjective barrier of 
access to justice is manifested in either of two ways.  The first is related to the 
knowledge on whether a right exists.  This barrier affects more the disadvantaged 
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groups in society but can affect all citizens depending on the nature of the right.  The 
second relates to the knowledge on how one can have those rights enforced.  The 
knowledge and information base about these two points is low in many societies, 
including in those sections of society that are relatively more educated. (Cappelletti 
and Garth, 1974: 16)  Reform efforts can, therefore, succeed in enhancing access to 
justice if, in addition to those objective barriers, these subjective barriers are taken in 
to account. 
 
3.1.4. Schemes to Enhance Access to Justice 
 
A. Legal Aid 
Ensuring access to justice to citizens requires addressing the barriers that are 
discussed earlier.  One of the significant problems which poor people face in 
vindicating claims is their inability to cover the cost which private lawyers charge for 
their services.  Providing legal aid to those who cannot afford them becomes vital 
particularly in modern societies where procedures have become too complex and 
arcane for the ordinary citizens to understand. (Cappelletti and Garth, 1974:22)  
Introduction of legal aid has been one of the first measures adopted by legal systems 
to address the barriers of access to justice.   This scheme is primarily concerned with 
the availability of legal experts to poor persons to provide legal advice or legal 
representation in or out of courts. (Cappelletti, 1992)   
 
The provision of legal aid by the state to those in need is a recent development in 
access to justice movement.    The basic principle that equality before the law requires 
recognition of the right to counsel was incorporated in many statutory provisions long 
before a duty to provide legal aid to the poor was imposed on the state.  England had 
78 
 
it in 1495, France in 1851, Italy in 1865, and Germany in 1877.  None of these 
systems, however, provided government funding to finance the vindication of rights 
which they recognized in their laws. (Johnson, 2004) Instead, economic barrier of 
access to the legal experts was resolved through what was called the honorific duty of 
the practicing lawyers to provide legal service to the poor without them getting any 
compensation for their services.  Through the pro bono solution, a societal 
responsibility of providing aid to the poor was transferred to the generosity of the 
legal profession.  Through this solution the state recognized the problem of access to 
justice, but did not take any positive obligation towards solving it efficiently.  This 
approach was typical of the political laissez-faire philosophy that was then prevailing.  
Both qualitatively and quantitatively, the honorific duty solution turned out to be 
inadequate to meet the demands of effective representation for the poor.  As a result, 
some other solutions, which included partial compensation from public funds to the 
services provided by lawyers, were introduced in a number of legal systems including 
Germany, England, Holland France and Italy.  These reform programs accepted the 
positive obligation of the state to compensate the private legal aid lawyers for the 
services they provided.  This was the first legal aid model which is called judicare. 
(Cappelletti, 1992:29) 
This positive obligation of the state to pay for the legal aid of the poor was 
implemented through some other models in other jurisdictions.  The primary ones 
were what Mauro Cappelletti calls the staff-attorney model and the mixed model.   
The staff attorney model which was first introduced in the United States of America 
in 1965 provides publicly salaried attorneys to assist, give advice and represent the 
poor instead of compensating the private lawyer for their services. Other legal 
systems opted for a third, mixed model solution, because of the disadvantages that are 
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inherent in the first two models.   The main disadvantage of the judicature model is 
that the private lawyer, in spite of the experience and organization, may not have the 
experience with the special nature of the legal problems of the poor. Besides, the poor 
may not have adequate information about the services provided by the private lawyer 
in addition to the fact that most of the time offices of the private lawyers may not be 
conveniently located.   The staff-attorney model addresses the shortcomings of the 
judicature model, but suffers another shortcoming; that a very large organization of 
publicly funded office for attorneys that is big enough to meet all the demands could 
be established even by the richest of countries. (Cappelletti, 1992:29)  
 
It must be added here that the obligation of the state to provide legal aid to the poor 
was primarily achieved through judicial interpretation of the Constitutional rights of 
equality before the law, fair hearing or due process of law. (Johnson, 2004) The Swiss 
Supreme Court based its arguments on the ‘quality before the law’ principle in the 
Swiss Constitution when it declared that poor people in civil litigation have the right 
to get state appointed counsel in 1937.  The judgments of the German Constitutional 
Court in 1953 and the European Court of Human Rights in 1979, which likewise 
declared the same duty of the state in civil cases, on the other hand, were based on the 
right of fair hearing which was a fundamental right in the basic law of Germany and 
European convention of Human Rights respectively. (Johnson, 2004) The Supreme 
Court of the United States in Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Services of N.C., however, 
arrived at an opposite conclusion in 1981and held that the due process clause in the 
Constitution does not provide the right to counsel in civil cases(Lessiter v. Dep’t of 
Soc. Services of N.C., 452, U.S 18, 31-32 (1981, p. 31-32).  In the United States the 
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due process clause was interpreted to give citizens the right to counsel only in 
criminal cases. (Gedeon v. Wainright) 
 
B. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
 
Alternative dispute resolution refers to those mechanisms that are used to resolve 
disputes without recourse to the institutions of the formal legal system. (Finkle and 
Cohen, 1993, p. 81) Although ADR does not have generally accepted abstract or 
theoretical definition, it has a fundamental premise.  It aspires to resolve the cost of 
resolving disputes and to improve the quality of the final outcome. (Lieberman and 
Henry, 1986:425)  Failing a generally accepted definition, some have preferred to 
provide a working definition for ADR as “a set of practices and techniques that aim 
(1) to permit legal disputes to be resolved outside the courts for the benefit of all 
disputants; (2) to reduce the cost of conventional litigation and the delays to which it 
is ordinarily subject; or (3) to prevent legal disputes that would otherwise likely be 
brought to the courts”. (Lieberman and Henry, 1986:425) ADR, so understood, has 
existed in many societies and has ancient heritage.  Elders, religious or clan leaders 
resolve disputes without necessarily using law or the ordinary courts in many 
traditional societies. There is no recourse to formal state-sanctioned legal systems in 
many customary law situations.  (Finkle and Cohen, 1993:81 )   
 
In those systems where adjudication was the main model for dispute resolution, the 
move towards embracing ADR is a result of the dissatisfaction and lack of confidence 
of the public on the prevailing dispute resolution system. (Lind and Tyler, 1988)  The 
dissatisfaction was mainly a result of the delay and high cost which was associated 
with the dispute resolution process in the courts.  As a result of the recognition by 
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legal authorities that providing people with timely and affordable opportunities to 
resolve problems is one important aspect of dispute resolution behaviour, the ADR 
movement was born in an effort to reduce court congestion, cost and time both to the 
courts and the litigants. (Lind and Tyler, 1988) 
 
There are stronger theoretical attacks on the goals and methods of the adjudication 
model which augment the needs for ADR.  It is argued that the “binary oppositional 
presentation of facts in dispute are not the best way for us to learn the truth; polarized 
debate distorts the truth, leaves out important information, simplifies complexity, and 
obfuscates rather than clarifies”. (Menkel-Meadow, 1996)  This critique is founded on 
the post-modern understanding about knowledge that there is no fixed truth and that 
meanings can only be located provisionally. Those whose responsibility it is to find 
the truth also have their own interests that affect how they see the world.  Related to 
this is the scepticism of post-modern thinking about objectivity and neutrality on 
which the adversarial model is based. (Menkel-Meadow, 1996:15)  This makes 
adjudication inappropriate for dispute resolution in terms of its goal and methods 
raising the need to look for some other alternative ways of dispute resolution.   
 
The limits on the solution which the formal dispute resolution methods provide also 
gives rise to the need for an alternative method which addresses the central problems 
of the formal justice system. The remedies that can be provided and the solutions that 
can be achieved through adjudication are limited because of its binary solution. 
(Menkel-Meadow, 1996:6) Trying to use the two sided style of the adjudication to 
resolve many-sided disputes can be worse than “jamming the proverbial square peg 




The development of ADR can therefore be related to two critiques of the adversary 
model which attack the premises on which it is based.  The first challenge is that the 
conditions for the fulfilment of the ideal of the adversary model cannot be met in 
reality. The adversary system cannot live up to its ideal because parties to the dispute 
will not have equal resources, the self-interested pursuit of profit by lawyers distorts 
their loyalty and zeal and the decision makers are unavoidably affected by bias. 
(Kruse, 2004-2005:391) Contrary to its ideal, the adversary system tolerates results 
that do not go along with its goals.  Instead of truth and justice, the system comes up 
with obfuscation and strategic manipulation.  The lawyer’s training is such that the 
interests of clients are framed into legal issues which may not necessarily capture 
their true wishes.  “Because adjudication narrows the dispute by restricting discussion 
to the legally cognizable issues embedded in a particular incident, a trial may resolve 
the legal case while leaving untouched the underlying relational or structural causes of 
the dispute.” (Wissler, 1995:323) 
 
More profound as a basis for ADR is, however, the second challenge which raises 
issues on the theoretical validity of the ideals of the adversary system.  The basic goal 
of achieving ‘the right result’ at the end of the adversarial process is not achievable as 
there is no single answer to ‘what really happened?’ The search for a system that 
replaces the unitary truth as a goal of dispute resolution is therefore the basis for the 
development of ADR. (Kruse, 2004-2005:393) 
 
The development of ADR is supported by some normative conceptions that elaborate 
the goals, methods and framework under which it operates.  In lieu of the ‘right result’ 
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goal, ‘just harmony’ is forwarded as a viable goal for dispute resolution.  This is a 
new goal against which the operation of procedures in ADR would be measured. 
(Kruse, 2004-2005:393)  Under this system, instead of trying to determine which 
party’s story is factually or normatively correct, the process motivates parties to strive 
to collaborate to overcome conflict. This is achieved in part, like in mediation, by 
helping parties to recognize the perspectives of other disputants instead of focusing on 
their own perspectives of what happened. (Robinson, 2004) Achievement of the just 
harmony goal of ADR is premised on methods that ensure authentic participation of 
the parties in the process as opposed to the strategic manipulation which has so 
characterized the adjudication process. (Kruse, 2004-2005:394)  In these processes 
deliberation is not conducted just for the sake of achieving the ‘right results’ but to 
encourage all to hear and to be heard in the process of dispute resolution by allowing 
transformation of one’s own views as much as trying to transform the views of others. 
(Kruse, 2004-2005:395) Not only will this participatory process allow better results 
by allowing more perspectives of a problem to be examined, but outcomes will also 
be perceived as more legitimate by those who were involved in the process. (Kruse, 
2004-2005:395) Not only will ADR settle disputes, but it will also settle them justly.  
The interest of ADR is not, therefore, just ensuring harmony through settlement as 
there are different factors that may contribute to settlement without necessarily being 
just (Posner, 1973).  
The ADR development does not rule out adjudication as a modality for dispute 
resolution.  It is admitted that some disputes can only be resolved appropriately 
through the adjudication process as opposed to others which have to go through a 
different procedure altogether.  Opinions are split as to which dispute should go to 
adjudication and which ones to other alternatives. (Menkel-Meadow, 1996:42)  In 
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resolving this dilemma some have suggested the theory of ‘appropriate fit’ as a 
solution whereby “the full panoply of methods for resolving disputes would be 
available to resolve contested matters, ranging from formal adjudication to informal 
mediation, and different kinds of deputes would be routed to their most appropriate 
venue”. (Kruse, 2004-2005:394)  
 
ADR has a number of advantages compared to litigation in the ordinary courts.  ADR 
provides a better forum for parties who do not want to strain their future relationship 
by submitting their disputes to the ordinary courts; it also gives the parties an 
opportunity to actively participate in the process of dispute resolution; it addresses the 
privacy concerns of the litigants; and it gives a wider opportunity for parties to 
directly negotiate about their problems. (Dakolias and Ratliff, 1995)  Outcomes are 
likely to be more predictable in ADR as the mediators or the arbitrators are more 
familiar with the subject matter in dispute. ADR can be more advantageous when the 
stakes are high in commercial transactions as it can utilize arbitrators who may have 
specialized knowledge on the nature of the business than judges. (Dakolias and 
Ratliff, 1995)  ADR creates a better forum for presentation of evidence, interests or 
arguments as the rules may be set up by the parties to suit them. The range of possible 
solutions that can be provided to resolve a dispute through ADR is also wider than the 
remedies that can be obtained in the formal court system. (Finkle and Cohen, 1993) 
 
The role of ADR in cutting the costs of litigation is immense.  ADR ensures lower 
cost in litigation in either of two ways.  Some forms of ADR allow non-lawyers to be 
involved in the process and thereby minimize the fees that would have been paid for 
lawyers.  Besides ADR contemplates methods and institutions that are more friendly, 
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allowing self representation by the litigants.  ADR saves costs by avoiding steps in the 
normal procedure which might be used by litigants to wear out the other party. In this 
respect ADR reduces the cost by streamlining procedure through the omission of 
some of its stages. (Carrington, 1996) 
 
Outcomes in some forms of ADR, like mediation, are likely to be implemented more 
easily than adjudicated outcomes as they are based on agreements that are reached by 
the parties.  Besides, ADR provides the probes deep into the causes of the dispute, 
thereby giving the chance for restoring the long-term relationship between the parties.  
ADR has this virtue because, unlike the adjudicatory process, it does not declare one 
party to be “right” and the other “wrong”. (Garth, 1974) The process of ADR, unlike 
adjudication, is not bound by the zero-sum game. The parties to the dispute are not 
limited to the legal definition of their dispute. The solutions which parties in ADR 
come up with can be far more novel than the remedies that can possibly be provided 
in adjudication in courts because the parties can creatively solve the problem that 
gave rise to their disputes. (Lieberman and Henry, 1986)  
 
Empirical Studies conducted in different countries on ADR have proved that some 
forms of ADR are satisfactory to most of the disputants involved. (Tyler, 1997:882) 
Disputants evaluate some forms of ADR more favourably than adjudication with 
regard to the process, outcomes and the role of third party. (Wissler, 1995)  “The 
mediator was seen as warmer, more interested in the dispute, having a better 
understanding of the dispute, more active and more likely to remain neutral than was 
the judge”. (Wissler, 1995:354)  The satisfaction of the participants did not differ 
widely depending on whether or not they have won or lost in the process. (Wissler, 
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1995:338) This is consistent with previous research findings that the degree to which 
people “win” is the least important issue in civil justice.  The process by which their 
dispute is handled is the most important issue to people followed by the fairness of 
outcome. (Lind and Tyler, 1988) 
 
These advantages notwithstanding, some forms of ADR have been criticized by some 
scholars on the grounds that they give heavier emphasis to the interests and desires of 
the disputants thereby undermining the objective quality of decisions reached.  In his 
famous article “Against settlement”, Owen Fess argues that settlement as one mode of 
resolving disputes should be discouraged.  Even if settlement helps in streamlining 
dockets, he argues, it is a “problematic technique” that does not ensure justice.  He 
attacks settlement on the grounds that the imbalance of power between the parties, the 
absence of authoritative consent by the parties and the absence of the foundation for 
the involvement of the judiciary at a later stage provide the grounds for unjust 
outcomes. He argues that: 
The advocates of ADR are led to exalt the idea of settlement more generally 
because they view adjudication as a process to resolve disputes. They act as 
though courts arose to resolve quarrels between neighbours who had reached 
an impasse and turned to a stranger for help.  Courts are seen as an 
institutionalization of the stranger and adjudication is viewed as the process by 
which the stranger exercises power. …..The dispute-resolution story makes 
settlement appear as a perfect substitute for judgment… by trivializing the 
remedial dimensions of a lawsuit, and also by reducing the social function of 
the lawsuit to one of resolving private disputes:  In that story, settlement 
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appears to achieve exactly the same purpose as judgment-peace between the 
parties-but at considerably less expense to society. (Fiss, 1984: 1076) 
 
Some others focus on the ‘process dangers” for parties with unequal bargaining power 
to point out the weaknesses of ADR. (Grillo, 1991) 
 
There are, however, strong points against the critics of ADR.  First, the ADR 
movement does not insist in diverting all claims to alternative forums.  As it argues 
for appropriate fit, it does not necessarily advocate for a non-judicial solution for 
every legal dispute.  Second, settlement of issues does not necessarily foreclose the 
possibility of seeking judicial answers at a later time when serious issues at stake arise 
and cannot be compromised.  Third, the argument that justice can always be attained 
through court judgments is doubtful given the practical unattainably of many of its 
preconditions. (Lieberman and Henry, 1986:433)     
 
C. Small Claims Tribunals 
 
As shown in the previous sections the cost of litigation affects parties with small 
claims more than others.  This situation hinders the enforcement of the rights of those 
people with a relatively small amount of money.  The reform on access to justice has 
to respond to the special needs of this category of people, who are usually also poor.  
Establishment of small claims tribunals for resolving the little “injustices” through 
procedures and devices that fit their demands is a result of the growing concern for 





To attain the avowed objectives of reducing cost and creating an environment that is 
more conducive for the ‘ordinary man’ than the regular courts, a different procedural 
design in the form of small claims tribunals had to be put in place.  Some of the 
measures taken in this direction include using less qualified judges for adjudication, 
limitations on the rights of appeals, restriction or total prohibition on the 
representation by attorneys, reduction in filing fees and not allowing reimbursement 
of lawyer’s fees for the winning party.(Cappelletti and Garth, 1974)  
 
Small claims have proved to be instrumental in promoting greater access to justice to 
the ordinary citizens by reducing distance and providing flexible timing to 
accommodate their convenience.  The procedures for filing claims are less rigid than 
in the ordinary courts and assistance is provided to the parties on how to draw their 
pleadings. The adversarial nature of the litigation process in the courtroom is also 
changed to ensure greater equality between the parties through an increasingly active 
involvement of the judges in the process and by relaxing the rules of evidence and 
allowing discretion to judges to match procedures with the nature of the claims. 
Greater utilization of mediation as a modality for dispute resolution makes these 
tribunals achieve their purposes than the adjudication method.  Studies have proved 
that that one shot litigants do relatively better than the repeat players in small claims 
tribunals which use the conciliation method than in those which use the adjudication 
method. (Cappelletti and Garth, 1974)   
 
Establishment of small claims tribunals is dictated by the proportion of the cost which 
these claims invest relative to the claim sought. As mentioned earlier, the high cost of 
litigation affects people with relatively smaller claims as the cost becomes high 
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compared to the sums sought.  Diverting such disputes to other tribunals that are more 
fit to handle these claims not only helps the formal court system by reducing the 
workload, but it also creates a better forum to those people who would otherwise have 
found it difficult to come to the formal court system because of the cost and other 
impediments. (Finkle and Cohen, 1993) 
 
D. Traditional Dispute Resolution (TDR) Institutions 
 
The role which traditional institutions play in making justice more accessible to 
citizens should be given special focus.  This is particularly imperative in pluralist 
societies where TDR operates side by side with formal dispute resolution institutions.   
 
Legal pluralism primarily denotes a situation where “a category of social relations is 
within the fields of operation of two or more bodies of legal norms” This plurality of 
legal norms has manifested itself in either of two ways in many African countries.  In 
some African countries, the state laws have given recognition and incorporated 
previously existing customary laws into the state law.  In other countries customary 
law operates in spite of the recognition by the state law.  The two varieties of legal 
pluralism are sometimes referred to as state law pluralism and deep legal pluralism 
respectively. (Woodman, 1996)  
 
Attempts to wipe out legal pluralism in many African countries did not become 
practical.  The pluralist feature of many legal systems can be abolished either by 
abolishing the customary law which is competing for legitimacy with the state law or 
by unification of state law. Either of these two paths is impractical either because the 
states in Africa are not strong enough to do away with customary law or non 
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recognition of the customary laws by the state law would only mean continuation of 
deep legal pluralism, continuation of customary law in spite of recognition by state 
law. (Woodman, 1996:163 )  
 
African societies are pluralistic.  In many of these societies indigenous traditional 
relationships coexist with relationships that are governed by state rules.  The main 
issue of access to justice to many newly emerging African states has been on how to 
grapple this pluralism on the one hand and ensure integration on the other. (Bush 
1074-75:1123)  This is particularly true in situations where communities attain 
political unity before attaining social unity.  Under such circumstances, the 
governments should take into account the characteristics of their communities if they 
want to avoid the ineffectiveness of laws aimed at achieving 
integration.(Vanderlinden, 1966-1967) 
 
The operation of customary laws in spite of non- recognition by state law is 
instructive for access to justice initiatives. Studies in many African countries have 
shown that the customary laws of many tribes have continued to operate long after the 
imposition of formal law on these tribes. Traditional court systems have retained their 
structure and continued to provide their services to the local population even in 
situations where governments have established formal courts and denied them legal 
recognition.  The members continue using their traditional rather than the formal 





This persistence of customary arrangements could partly be explained by the nature of 
customary procedures which can be characterized by intelligibility, accessibility, 
simplicity and informality. (Bush, 1974:1126)  Allot aptly summarized the main 
features by saying that in the African customary procedure, 
1) Justice was popular.  The People could understand the machinery …and in 
many places participated directly in judicial proceedings.  2) Justice was local 
and speedy...3) Justice was simple and flexible.  There was no elaborate code 
of procedure or evidence. (Allot, 1965:232) 
 
The impact of pluralism on access to justice is immense.  Access to justice is 
recognized and indeed accepted as an important principle to make the rights of 
citizens effective.  The mechanisms for implementing this principle in pluralist 
societies, however, demand a proper perspective that takes their specific situations in 
to account.  In pluralist societies, pluralist understanding of access to justice is 
imperative to implement an equal access to justice.  This requires, amongst other 
things, recognizing that pluralism in society calls for institutional pluralism.  
Recognition of this pluralism should be supported by an exploration of the range of 
the needs that prevail among the members of the population seeking justice and the 
possible range of institutions that are capable of meeting these needs. (Bush, 
1974:304)  Without this recognition, access to justice would mean “one dimensional 
response that, in the pluralistic context, is unnecessary, unjust, ineffective, or even 
‘totalitarian’” (Bush, 1974:308).  
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3.2. The Constitutional Framework for Access to Justice 
3.2.1. Right of Access to Justice  
 
Access to justice is recognized as one of the fundamental rights in the Constitution.  
Article 37 of the Constitution on the right of access to justice provides that 
1. Everyone has a right to bring a justiciable matter to, and to obtain a decision 
or judgment by a court of law or any other competent body with judicial 
power 
2. The decision or judgment referred to under sub Article one of this Article 
may also be sought by 
a. any association representing the collective or individual interest of its 
members, or 
b. any group or person who is a member of or represents a group with similar 
interests. 
 
This provision recognizes the fundamental right of everyone to seek a remedy from an 
ordinary court of law or some other institution that exercises judicial power on 
matters that are justiciable.   The right of access to justice, as articulated in Article 37 
of the Constitution, envisages both the ordinary courts and other tribunals in playing a 
role where there are justiciable disputes.  This implies that judicial power could be 
entrusted to bodies other than the ordinary courts.  The experience of other legal 
systems in this regard is not uniform.  Some systems allow judicial authority to be 
entrusted to non-judicial agencies.  Others have very explicit provisions prohibiting 
this type of arrangement.  The difference between systems in this regard is explained 
by the historical and legal tradition of every system. (Cappelletti, 1973:681)  The 
Ethiopian constitution on the one hand declares that judicial power at both the Federal 
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and State level is vested in the courts. (Art. 78, Const.) The Amharic version of 
Article 78 is not exactly the same as the English version.  The Amharic version 
includes a word “bicha” which means ‘only’ conveying the idea that only the courts 
can exercise judicial power in Ethiopia.  Article 37 of the Constitution on the other 
hand seems to convey the idea that adjudication of justiciable matters may be handled 
by other duly constituted organs.   An examination of the other provisions of the 
Constitution reveals that it given the power of adjudication to customary and religious 
institutions which are not necessarily part of the ordinary courts mentioned under 
Article 78.  It would therefore be more plausible if one interprets the Ethiopian 
Constitution to have allowed entrusting judicial power to other bodies, which is a 
common practice in Anglo American countries. (Cappelletti, 1972-1973:681) 
 
One can note from the reading of the constitutional provisions quoted above that the 
right of access to justice can be exercised not only by the individual concerned, but 
also by some others on his behalf.  Associations are allowed to seek access to justice 
by representing the collective interest of their members.  They can also seek access to 
justice by representing one of their members.   The right of access to justice can also 
be exercised by a group that has similar interests.  It can also be exercised by a 
member of that group in so far as there is common interest.  These provisions have 
widened the rules in the CPC on representative action (Art. 38, CPC).  Under the rules 
in the CPC representative action is permitted if 
a. several persons have the same interest in a suit and 




The scheme which allows associations to represent private individuals in diffuse 
interests has been encouraged by the access to justice movement as it tends to exploit 
private initiative and zeal rather than relying exclusively on governmental agencies to 
have some rights protected. (Cappelletti, 1992) 
 
3.2.2. Right to Counsel 
 
The right to be represented by counsel in legal proceedings is incorporated as one of 
the fundamental rights in the Constitution.  The Constitution provides that “accused 
persons have the right to be represented by legal counsel of their choice, and, if they 
do not have sufficient means to pay for it and miscarriage of justice would result, to 
be provided with legal counsel at state expense”. (Art. 20 (5), Const.) At first glance 
this gives the impression that in the Ethiopian legal system the state has assumed a 
positive obligation to cover the expenses that are due for poor litigants.  The right to 
counsel is indeed recognized as a fundamental right and the Constitution does not rely 
on what is called the honorific duty of the private lawyers to provide legal services 
without compensation for the poor. The state’s obligation to provide legal counsel 
applies to persons that are charged of criminal offences (Art. 20, Const.), raising 
doubts on whether the same right in civil proceedings has any constitutional 
recognition.  No state legal aid scheme is explicitly envisaged by the Constitution for 
people in civil litigation.   
 
As discussed in Chapter three of this thesis, in other legal systems the obligation of 
the state to provide such services in civil litigation was based on rights to equality, 
right to a fair hearing or due process of law.  The fact that the Constitution has not 
explicitly imposed an obligation on the state to provide legal aid to the poor in civil 
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litigation may, not therefore absolve the sate of assuming the same obligation in civil 
cases based on other constitutional provisions.   
 
3.2.3. Recognition of Customary and Religious Dispute Resolution  
 
The new Ethiopian Constitution is characterized by important pluralist ethos.  As 
mentioned earlier, the predominant attitude in Ethiopia has been replacement of 
customary law by state law through sweeping repeal provisions in many of the Codes 
that were primarily based on western values.  The Constitution has reversed this 
pattern to some extent thereby creating more room for legal pluralism.  "In what may 
be called a major departure from the received constitutional tradition of the country, 
the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia provides the 
framework for the independent validity of non-state or unofficial law such as 
customary and religious laws in some fields of social activity." (Fentaw, 2007)  
 
Article 34(5) of the Constitution declares that the “Constitution shall not the 
adjudication of disputes relating to personal and family matters in accordance with 
religious or customary laws with the consent of the parties to the dispute.”  Article 78 
of the Constitution also provides in part that “Pursuant to Sub Article 5 Article 34 the 
House of People’s Representatives and State Councils can establish or give official 
recognition to religious and customary courts”. 
 
In the previous legal arrangements although customary and religious laws were used 
by a significant part of the population to regulate relationships and to resolve disputes, 
there was no explicit legal recognition of their existence.  Legally speaking many of 
the customary and religious laws did not exist because they were by and large 
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repealed by the CC. (Art. 3347, CC) There were some places to which the state laws 
made a reference to customary and religious laws. The incorporation of customary 
law in the state law was, however, limited.  Not only did the state law recognize 
customary law in limited areas, but its recognition was also limited to the customs of 
some groups.  The customary laws of many of the nationalities in Ethiopia did not 
have any legal recognition.  In marriage relationships for example although the CC 
allowed celebration of marriage to be conducted on the basis of religious or 
customary laws, “marriage produces the same legal effects, whatever the form 
according to which it has been celebrated”. (Art. 625, CC) 
 
The explicit recognition of custom and religion in the Constitution has changed this 
scenario and has given individuals the option to use their customary or religious laws 
if they so wish.  This constitutional provision gives legal recognition to many 
alternative ways of settling disputes which are effectively working in many parts of 
the country.  The Constitution also envisages the recognition or establishment of 
religious courts by Federal or State law making bodies. (Art. 78(5), Const.) Religious 
courts have been established at the Federal and State level.  At the Federal level a 
three-tier Shari 'a court structure, distinct from the ordinary courts is established by 
the Federal Parliament. (Pro. 188, 1996) The jurisdiction of such courts is limited to 
personal matters such as marriage, divorce, maintenance, guardianship and succession 
of wills. (Art. 4(1), Proc. 188, 1999) These courts do not, however, have a 
compulsory jurisdiction even on such claims. Their jurisdiction is dependent on the 
consent by the defendant (Art. 4(2), Proc.188, 1999) which has to be explicitly 
provided lest the cases be transferred to the ordinary court. (Art. 4(3), Proc.188, 1999) 
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3.2.4. Federal Arrangement and the Right to Self Determination 
 
The right of access to justice has also been enhanced by the federal arrangement 
which is a recent development in Ethiopia.  Not only has the federal arrangement 
allowed the states to establish their own court structures, but it has also enabled 
litigants in many parts of the country to use their own languages in court proceedings.  
Earlier on, all the courts throughout the country used only the Amharic language in 
courts and translations had to be provided even when the litigants and the judge spoke 
the local language.  After the adoption of the Constitution, the courts in Tigrai, 
Oromiya, Somali States and the Sidama in the SNNPR use their respective languages 
in court proceedings.  Translations are available to those who do not speak the local 
language.   
 
3.3. Barriers of Access to Justice in Ethiopia 
3.3.1. Delay 
 
No systematic study has been conducted as to how the speed of litigation in the 
Ethiopian courts affects access to justice.  It is clearly articulated that delay reduction 
is one of the main objectives of the judicial reform program which has been 




Table 1 : Average waiting time (in Months) in the Cassation Division of FSC (for all 
cases) 




time for the FSC 
(in months) 
Average Waiting 






2000-1 949 9.47 41.81 1068 
2001-2 1339 5.94 41.93 1383 
2002-3 2060 2.82 40.44 2308 
2003-4 2802 3.55 34.31 2218 
2004-5 2866 3.42 29.22 2757 
2005-6 3625 3.17 14.35 3554 
2006-7 4352 4.35 31.03 4266 
2007-8 5494 3.52 28.64 5482 
Source the FSC database 
Figure 2: Average Disposition time and new cases 
 
 
















While the average waiting time that was needed for a case to exhaust the whole 
system was 41.81 months in 2000-2001, this has been lowered to 28.64 months in the 
year 2007-2008. As the length of the waiting time which constitutes delay in the 
process is an important variable, the overall improvement that has been observed in 
delay reduction can be taken as an important improvement in making justice more 
accessible. The duration time for the cassation division in the FSC is reduced from 
9.47 months in 2000-2001 to 3.52 in 2007-2008. The overall reduction in waiting time 
for the whole system can only be explained through a reduction of waiting time in all 
the courts through which the cases included in this data have passed through.  As the 





courts, the data is an important indication that there is, on the average, an 
improvement in waiting time in the whole legal system.  During the same period one 
notices an increment in the demand for judicial services, indicating that the court has 
become more accessible to a greater number of users. The demand has increased from 
1068 in 2000-2001 to 5482 in 2007-2008.  As observed in the previous chapters, the 
shortening of the waiting time by and large, is related to the reduction in the number 
of appearances during the process.  In the cassation division every additional 
appearance means that the parties have to travel back and forth from the other parts of 
the country as many of the applications for review come from the Regional States’ 
courts. The reduction in the number of appearances in the cassation division which is 
located in Addis Ababa results in a big reduction of cost as it means a reduction in 
accommodation and transportation expenses. 
 
The data shows that the waiting time in judicial services is inversely related to the 
demand for judicial services which indicates accessibility of the justice system.  This 
is consistent with studies that have been conducted in other legal systems.  More 
people are likely to go to a court system which disposes cases in a shorter period of 
time than to a court that takes relatively longer.  The reform initiatives should 
therefore maintain the pattern of reducing the average duration time to enhance access 
to justice to the courts at all levels.  
 
The impact of delay on access to justice is more pronounced in criminal proceedings.  
Partly because of the delay in processing criminal cases in the courts there is a high 
degree of attrition rate in criminal cases which is reflected in the termination of many 
criminal cases for reasons other than final judgment. This has caused a low conviction 






Table 2 : Disposal of Criminal Cases in the FFIC (One Month) 
 
 











Acquittal Conviction Other 
Abnet 177 1 78 3 26 30 4 32 3 
Kera 264 11 151 4 23 24 16 35  
Menagesha 268 1 53 2 88 50 33 13 28 
Paulos 198  72 3 22 18 3 52 28 
Akaki 406 9 238 6 23 19 3 79 29 
Arada 585 2 169 7 38 59 45 54 211 
Yeka 416  135 1 92 39 29 22 98 
Lideta 869 4 311  206 117 59 139 33 
total 3183 28 1207 26 518 356 192 426 430 
%  0.9% 38% 0.8% 16.27% 11% 6% 13.4% 13.5% 































Out of a total of 31803 cases that were disposed in one month only 618 (19.4%) 
reached the trial stage.  54.27% of the cases were terminated because either the 
defendant or the witnesses were not available.  In all these cases the victims of crimes 
did not see justice being done.  Although the role of other factors cannot be ruled out, 
delay plays an important rule in frustrating the whole process. In pilot benches where 
criminal cases were processed in a shorter period of time not only did many more 
cases reach the trial stage and were examined on the merits, but the conviction rate 
also increased.  
 
Given these empirical data the usual complaint by victims of crime that the justice 
system is not accessible is understandable.  Partly because of the delay in processing 





The costs which parties are made to shoulder because of the delays in the courts can 
only be reduced by addressing the basic reasons for delay.  The reform initiatives 
which address the problems of delay would therefore have a positive impact on access 
to justice.  The dimension of court efficiency is therefore directly related to its 
accessibility.   
 
The number of lawyers in Ethiopia is very small.  As a result, many litigants represent 
themselves during litigation.  The impact of this state of affairs on access to justice is 
understandably negative.  Their unavailability, on the other hand, means, however, 
that litigants do not have to pay lawyer’s fees.  The prime problem in Ethiopia is not 
that lawyers are too expensive, but that they are not available.  
 
Neither are court fees a big barrier of access to justice.  Not only are the fees 
relatively small, but litigants can also proceed without having to pay the fees if they 
can prove that they do not have the means to do so.  The process to get the exemption 
is relatively easy and cheap.  Courts are generally lenient in weighing the evidence 
adduced to show that the claimant does not have sufficient means to pay the fees.  
 
Apart from the direct cost which litigants pay to the courts and attorneys, there are 
indirect costs in the litigation process which can greatly hamper accessibility of the 
justice system.  The greatest barrier of access to justice is the cost which parties have 
to incur to travel to the court site. As this cost is the same for all the parties regardless 
of the amount in controversy it affects the litigants with small claims more than the 
ones with relatively higher claims.  All claims that are above 5000 Birr, which, in 
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many cases, are handled by the regular courts, go through the same procedure at all 
levels.  In all the state Courts, the First Instance Courts have the competence to 
entertain cases if the dispute is worth less than Birr 10, 000.  Any claim more than 
Birr 10, 000 falls under the jurisdiction of the High Courts of the states.  For such 
claims the parties as well as their witnesses have to travel to the place where the High 
Court seats which in many cases is located in the urban centres.  The parties should 
likewise cover these costs if they opt to go on appeal to the next court. Not only does 
this cause inconvenience to the parties but it also means additional cost to cover 
transportation and other related expenses. 
 
Table 3 : Average Cost for a single trip to the High Court in Debreberhan 
 
Place where the 
first instance 























Mehalmeda 150 50.70 105 105 782.10 1042.80 
Merhabete 135 56.35 105 105 799.05 1040 
Ataye 145 54.45 105 105 793.35 1057.8 
Minjar 265 99.50 105 105 928.50 1238 
Berekt 380 142.50 105 105 1057.50 1410 
Source: Semen Showa High Court. 
Based on a modest assessment of costs that was made by Northern Showa High Court 
in the Amhara Regional State, a litigant who travels from one of the outlying villages 
to the High Court spends between Birr 260.70 and 352.50 to attend a single court 
hearing.  A litigant spends as much for each witness when witnesses have to be heard 
by the court.  A litigant would spend between Birr 1042 and 1058 if the process is 
finalized in a single appearance after having heard witnesses.  The process usually 
takes longer and the cost keeps rising depending on the number of appearances and 
the number of witnesses.  The costs indicated here are not dependent on the amount of 
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the claim.  The proportion of the cost to the claim would, therefore, be higher to small 
claims as the number of appearances increases.  Given that the jurisdiction of the first 
instance courts is less than Birr 10,000, the cost to go to the higher courts on appeal 
can easily constitute a big percentage of the original claim even without including the 
cost for witnesses.  Many a litigant can be discouraged from going on appeal to the 
next court because of the expenses which have to be covered upfront by the litigant.  
A party that wants to continue on appeal to the Supreme Court would even have to 
incur a lot more expenses to vindicate rights as the next hierarchy of courts is located 
at farther than the High Courts.     
 
To minimize the impact of cost on access to justice many courts in Ethiopia are using 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) as one possible way out. The FSC 
uses video link and E-filing for users who come either on appeal or on cassation from 
the State Courts.  It also provides information to these litigants via Interactive Voice 
Response (IVR) system which is attached to its database.    The High Court in 
Northern Showa which uses video link to hear appeals from the first instance courts 
within its territory has reported that it has succeeded in reducing the costs which 
parties had to incur to travel to the court. This technology saves money and time to 
the litigants and needs to be expanded to the other courts. 
3.3.3. Legal Aid in Ethiopia  
One of the barriers of access to justice is the problem which people face in getting 
legal advice and representation.  The solution sought for this barrier of access to 
justice is the legal aid scheme which takes different forms.   As mentioned earlier, the 
state has a positive obligation to provide legal aid. In criminal cases legal aid scheme 
is implemented through the public defence services which are established within the 





provision of legal aid services.  The requirements for getting legal aid under the 
Constitution are that the defendant in criminal cases has no sufficient means to get his 
own counsel and the likelihood that injustice would result if the process continues 
without the defendant having an attorney.  A person is not automatically entitled to 
get the services of legal aid by virtue of his being without sufficient means.  If it is 
understood that injustice would not follow even if the defendant proceeds without any 
legal assistance, legal aid would not be provided.  The issue of whether or not 
injustice would result in any case is left for the decision of judges.  
Table 4 : Legal Aid Service at the FHC 
Year 2001-2 2002-3 2003-4 2004-5  2005-6 2006-7 2007-8 
Number of  new 
legal aid cases 
137 161 240 196 252 287 230 
Legal aid 
beneficiaries 
720 625 643 904 707 876 889 
New criminal 
cases in the FHC 
2075 
 
4105 5018 2964 2962 4262 4873 
Source. The Public Defender’s Office, FSC 
Compared with the number of cases filed to the courts every year the number of 
people who get legal aid service is low.  In 2001-2002 only 6% of those that appeared 
in criminal proceedings in the Federal High Court got legal aid from government 
funding.  The figure merely increased to 8% in 2007-2008. Data which shows the 
number of defendants in criminal proceedings who were represented by counsel at 
their own expense is not available. Data is however available in regarding people who 
have been convicted. A survey that was conducted in sampled prisons in the Amhara 
State indicates that a big percentage of the prisoners (31%) were convicted by the 
courts without having proper legal representation. Of those prisoners that had 




















2005 2006 2007  
1. Amhara 
Region  
17,214,056 81 95 101 92 0.5 750 4.4 
2. Oromiya  27,158,471 468 712 505 562 2.07 889 3.3 
3. SNNPR  15,042,531 379 192 192 254 1.69 394 2.6 
4. Afar 1,411,092 8 9 10 9 0.06 51 3.6 
5. Somali  4,439,147 14 17 17 16 0.36 173 3.9 
6.   Harari 183,344 19  20 21 20 11 19 10.4 
15 Tigray  4,314,456 49 48 43 47 1.04 192 4.5 
8 Federal (Addis 
Ababa 
2,738,248 786 813 837 812 30 117 4.3 
9 Benshangul 
Gumuz 
670,847 8 6 6 7 1.1 64 9.5 





































Legal aid is constrained by the small number of attorneys in the country.  As could be 
discerned from the figures the proportion of private lawyers to the total population is 
very small in all the Regional States.  The private lawyers who could provide legal 
services are mainly concentrated in Addis Ababa which accounts for a small 
percentage of the total population.  Of the lawyers that are practicing, 44.6% of them 
serve in Addis Ababa.  The remaining 55.4% of them are distributed unevenly 
throughout the country where 96.3 % of the population lives.  The ratio of lawyers per 
100,000 inhabitants for the whole population is only 2.49 indicating that there is much 
to be done in this field.5 For some of the states it is even less. The ratio is less than 
one for the Amhara , Afar and Somali States.  Given this ratio, people can hardly get 
representation.  Leaving the poor litigants aside, even those who can afford to have 
lawyers may not get the required legal counsel because of the unavailability of private 
lawyers in many parts of the country.  One notices that in all the States other than 
Addis Ababa and the Harari State there are more judges than lawyers.  This will have 
                                                 
5 The highest figure in Europe for 2004 was 319 and the lowest was 6.4.  For England and Wales the 
corresponding figure was 200.7.  European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, Report on 
European judicial systems- Edition 2006 (2004) data: an overview 
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a negative effect on the reform initiatives to enhance access to justice.  In some of the 
States where the ratio is too small the availability of lawyers is offset by the 
dominance of the TDRs which may not need the presence of lawyers at all.  
 
When attorneys are available the level of their training is usually low.  Of those 
registered as attorneys in the Federal Ministry of Justice and the Amhara State some 
of them do not have formal legal education at all.  In the Amhara State 35% of the 
attorneys do not have any formal legal training.  The figure for such attorneys at the 
federal level is 11.5%.  This affects the quality of representation which individual 
litigants can get from the market.   
 
Table 6 : Professional qualification of attorney 
s 
Qualification Federal Amhara 
PhD 4 0 
LLM 47 0 
LLB 358 13 
Diploma in law 283 21 
Certificate in law 29 18 
No formal legal education 94 43 
Total 808 95 
  Source. Ministry of Justice Archives 
Partly because of the paucity of attorneys and other economic constraints of many 
litigants there have recently been some attempts by NGOs to feel in the lacuna.  Apart 
from the legal aid services provided by paid private attorneys and public defenders 
legal aid is also being provided by some NGOs both at the Federal and State level.  
Unlike the legal aid provided by the government, the legal aid that is provided by the 





which operates both at the federal and state level provides legal aid to women both in 
civil and criminal cases.  Besides, unlike the legal aid provided by the government 
which can be obtained by the indigent only after commencement of the criminal 
proceedings in the courts, EWLA provides legal advice to the needy even before 
formal charges are brought to court.  Such initiatives are important in feeling in a felt 
gap in the provision of legal aid to litigants in the judicial process, particularly in 
those areas where attorneys are not operating in sufficient number.  
Table 7 : Free legal aid provided by EWLA in Addis Ababa (Jan-Dec, 2007) 
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468 191 188 16 4 88 1 
Employment 
Disputes 
21 82 17 6 - 22 - 
Succession 140 78 12 - - 50 - 
Rape 119 117 - - - - 2 
Murder 49 19      
Bodily harm 87 87 1     
Abduction 4 3      
Others 463       




3.4.  Traditional Dispute Resolution  
 
Under this section the t, the role of TDR mechanisms which by and large operate in 
many parts of Ethiopia despite non-recognition by the state law will be examined.  
This discussion will show that the concern on access to justice cannot be attained by 
addressing the problems of the formal courts alone as the majority of the Ethiopian 
population get their justice administered by their customary institutions also.  
 
In spite of the introduction of the regular courts into Ethiopia, studies indicate that 
people use the TDR arrangements more often than the ordinary courts.  In spite of 
attempts to integrate the legal system by doing away with the traditional substantive 
and procedural rules, pluralism is the hallmark of the Ethiopian legal system today.   
On the one hand, there is an imported adversarial western style formal procedure 
whose operation is limited to the formal courts.  On the other hand, the local justice 
administered by traditional procedural rules is not legally recognized but is more 
vibrant and has greater legitimacy than the formal procedures.  As has been observed 
in other African countries, there is a sharp contrast between the features of these two 
constituent elements of the pluralist system (Bush, 1974-1975:1135) in Ethiopia. 
 
In the Somali State, only a small percentage of cases is handled by the ordinary 
courts.  A majority of the cases are submitted to the TDR mechanisms and resolved 
by them.  The majority of the Somali people use the TDR more than the regular courts 
because of speed, cost and the nature of the remedies they get from the system. 
(Mohammed and Zewdie, 2008 )  In Korahai Zone, which has a population of 
242,276 only 6 criminal cases and 57 civil cases were opened in one year in the 
ordinary courts.  All other disputes were submitted to the TDR mechanisms that are 
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available in the community.  Not only do the TDR handle civil cases, but they also 
handle criminal matters.  The Ethiopian law does not envisage the involvement of 
TDR in the resolution of criminal cases in any one of the States.  It is reported that in 
the Somali State they handle criminal cases and solve them.  Out of a total of 215 
criminal cases that have been reported to and investigated by the police in one year, 
criminal proceedings were initiated in the High Court only in six of them.  The other 
209 cases, which were within the jurisdiction of the High Court, were resolved 
through the traditional arrangements TDR. (Mohammed and Zewdie, 2008)  
 
In the High Court of Warder, a Zonal administration with a population of 324,308 
people, less than 20 cases were handled in 2002 in the High Court.  In Gijiga Zone, 
which is believed to use the regular courts more than the other Zones, the High Court 
handled only 72 civil cases and 42 criminal cases in one year.  Given the population 
of the Zone to be around 813,200, it is explained that the majority of cases are 
handled through the traditional arrangements although it is the urban center of the 
Somali State.  At times judges in the courts send criminal cases, of which they are 
seized, to the traditional arrangements. (Mohammed and Zewdie, 2008 )    
 
Dispute resolution is handled in the Somali State through two different institutions, 
the sharia and the xeer.  The sharia is based on the Islamic sharia law and uses sharia 
scholars as judges.  The xeer, on the other hand is a traditional clan institution that 
handles all other cases that do not fall under the jurisdiction of the sharia courts.  
Although not written, the xeer system has well developed substantive and procedural 
rules which are enforced by the xeergeegti, which act both as a law making and a 
judicial institution.   The Somalis also have another system which is called odayaal, a 
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system which operates by inviting elders for a particular dispute between individuals 
in a clan or members of different clans.  Interestingly enough once convened the 
odayaal decides on the basis of an already existing xeer.  If no rule exists in the xeer 
to cover the issue in the dispute, a decision is rendered through compromise and 
negotiation.  The decision that has been so given however becomes part of the xeer 
for future cases of a similar nature. ( Mohammed and Zewdie, 2008 )  
 
In the Afar State more than 95% of the disputes in the State are handled through the 
TDR systems.  The regular courts handle disputes that arise between non-Afar 
residents in the State.  The customary law of the Afar people, called the mada, is an 
unwritten law that is orally transmitted from one generation to the next.  The mada is 
applied to a specific dispute through the makaban, a clan chief who sits to resolve 
disputes arising within the members of his clan.  If the dispute involves different clans 
there are procedures through which a makaban is selected from a neutral clan and 
handle the dispute.  The only limit to the makaban’s jurisdiction is the Sharia law 
which reserves some disputes to be handled by Islamic law.  Anything that is not 
within the jurisdiction of the Sharia Courts is handled by the Makaban.  The makaban 
thus entertains matters both of civil and criminal nature.  (Getachew and Shimelis, 
2008) 
 
The Afar people have an elaborate procedural customary law on dispute resolution.  
Dispute resolution is handled through the maro which is conducted under the shade of 
a tree. This system has pleading, hearing, judgment, appeal procedures and 
enforcement mechanisms.  It also has procedures on the organization of dispute 
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resolution and appointment of the elders who serve in the systems. (Getachew and 
Shimelis, 2008)   
 
In the Afar state there have been incidents where the prosecution offices terminated 
criminal proceeding on first degree murder charges on the grounds that the case has 
been settled by TDR means.  The prosecution office cites Article 42(1)) of the CrPC 
to terminate the prosecution, but this provision gives the prosecution a discretion not 
to institute criminal proceedings “where the prosecution is barred by limitation or the 
offence is made the subject of pardon or amnesty”.  This provision does not justify the 
action taken by the prosecution. The reason for not instituting the charges is in actual 
fact their belief that the conflict between the clans will not come to an end unless it is 
solved through the customary means. (Getachew and Shimelis, 2008)  
 
Likewise the Nuer people in Gambella State have a TDR through which they handle 
disputes that arise in their localities.  Settling disputes among the Nuer involves a 
process of negotiation which includes uncovering all the facts and reaching at a 
decision on how to meet the obligations that may arise.  Settlement of disputes takes 
the form of discussion between different groups where each side has its full say rather 
than an authoritative pronouncement of a single authority. (Dereje, 2008)  "It is the 
rule of such gatherings that everything a man has in his heart against others must be 
revealed and no bitterness kept secret." (Pritchard, 1956:109)  An opinion is given by 
an influential person using not a form of an authoritative judgment but that of 
persuasion after a case is fully talked out by the parties and a consensus is reached. 




The degree of participation is higher in TDR as many of them allow the members of 
the public to air their views on how a specific dispute should be disposed of.  They are 
in many ways cheaper than the regular courts and a lot faster.  It is interesting to note, 
however, that in the Gambella State going to the Neur customary institutions costs 
slightly higher than going to the ordinary courts.  In spite of that people still prefer 
customary arrangements to the formal court structure because of the holistic approach 
to dispute resolution, in the sense that it addresses the root causes of conflict in 
addition to giving the people an authentic forum for participation. (Dereje , 2008) The 
main concern of such institutions is more on restoring the social relationships that are 
damaged by disputes more than rendering judgment in a particular case.   
  
These studies confirm that the attempts to ensure procedural integration through a 
single formal system of imported procedure have failed.  The Ethiopian experience 
indicates the existence of some of the potential dangers of the model of integration 
which have been predicted earlier by some scholars. Robert Bush observed that 
“instead of bringing the bulk of the population into a regular and unified national 
court system, the program of integration might succeed in driving them to extralegal 
sources of authority”.(Bush, 1974-1975:1146) 
 
It should be mentioned here that there are some aspects of the TDR which give rise to 
legitimate concerns.  Some of them prohibit women from participating in the 
customary institutions.  In some others, the amount of compensation that is awarded 
depends on whether the victim is a man or a woman.  A woman is entitled only to 
50% of what a man gets in some TDR.  Women are allowed to give testimony only 
when a man is not available to do so.  These and some other similar problems raise 
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concerns about the satisfaction of minimum human rights standards for civil as well 
as criminal proceedings in the TDR. (Alula and Getachew, 2008:70-1)  
 
Some aspects of the customary laws may not be compatible with the minimum 
standards set in the Constitution.  But they are not incompatible in all respects either.  
Regardless of the issue of their compatibility with the state laws people still go to 
their customary arrangements and are happy with the type of justice they get.  These 
customary institutions play a significant role in ensuring harmony and peace in their 
respective communities.  In many cases the justice they render is accepted better by 
the community than the justice provided by the state courts.  On the other hand the 
state law does not give recognition to their activities in some areas formally.  In the 
criminal justice system for example the only institution that is legally empowered to 
handle intentional homicide cases are the formal courts at the Federal or State level.  
Customary institutions are not allowed to involve themselves in such matters.  In 
actual fact however, police officers, prosecutors and courts do refer such cases to 
customary institutions and accept the outcomes when one has been reached by them. 
 
Under such circumstances there are two main issues which access to justice must 
address in Ethiopia.  On the one hand concerns over the constitutionality of some 
aspects of TDR are legitimate and must be addressed.   On the other hand a total 
abrogation of customary arrangements does not necessarily ensure the prevalence of 
the state law over the customary law.  The Fetha Neguest which was introduced in the 
16th Century did not abrogate the customary laws which it tried to replace.  The repeal 
provisions of the Civil Code did not make people shift to the new rules in the Civil 
Code.  In spite of changes in the laws, people’s lives do not seem to be affected in any 
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significant way.  Any reform initiative that tries to make justice accessible to the 
majority of the Ethiopian people must address these issues.  Given the resource 
constraints in the country, it may take many more years to extend the formal justice 
system to the village level.  Even if the constraints are surmounted, the formal justice 
system will remain to be inappropriate to solve many of the disputes that arise at the 
village level.  The TDR will, therefore, remain to be the main avenues for access to 
justice for the majority of the population.   
 
   
 
3.5. Concluding Remarks 
 
The initiatives to enhance access to justice in Ethiopia are bound to face serious 
challenges.  On the positive side there is a new constitution which sets new 
perspectives to access to justice.  Paramount in this respect is the constitutional 
recognition of customary and religious dispute resolution systems which used to 
operate on the ground without any legal basis.  Equally important is the recognition of 
the right of access to justice as one fundamental right in the Constitution.  The 
improvement in the waiting time in many of the courts is also an important 
development in terms of ensuring better access to justice.  So are the initiatives to use 
ICT in the Ethiopian courts which will have tangible result in terms of reducing the 
hardships and expenses which people face if when they travel to the court sites. 
 
But there are equally important challenges which will have to be reckoned by the 
reform program.  First comes the dilemma which the legal system faces in having 
imported complex rules of procedure from the west which seem to face difficulties in 
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penetrating the bigger part of the country.  For historical reasons legally trained 
people are not available in sufficient numbers.  In spite of recent efforts to raise the 
number, the proportion of judges to the population is still very low.  More worrisome 
is the number of lawyers which is even less than the number of judges.  This situation 
puts a limit to the service which the formal courts can provide to have rights enforced.   
This is compensated by dispute resolution systems which provide speedy and cheaper 
justice but face some problems.  On the one hand the power given to these tribunals 
by law is still limited.  On the other hand the substantive and the procedurals aspects 
of these systems may, in some cases, not be consistent with the minimum standards 
provided in the Constitution and some International Conventions of which Ethiopia is 
a party.  The access to justice initiatives must give wider recognition to the customary 
institutions but at the same time ensure that they do not discriminate against women 












4. EFFICIENCY OF THE COURTS IN ETHIOPIA 
4.1. Efficiency in the Judiciary 
4.1.1. Introduction 
 
The problem of efficiency in litigation is partly related to procedural rules that are in 
place in the system.  As a result discussion on judicial efficiency should begin with a 
proper understanding of the basic procedural design that is in place.  In light of this, 
the salient features of the Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes will be discussed in the 
first part of this chapter.  This overview of the rules will be followed by a discussion 
of some aspects of litigation in the courts.  This research will attempt to examine the 
efficiency of the courts in Ethiopia based on the data that has been collected from the 
courts and other relevant institutions.   The Federal Courts in Ethiopia have a database 
system that keeps a proper record which will be used by this research to see the 
pattern of efficiency in the courts.  For the other courts, this research will depend on 
data provided in their annual reports.  Analysis of the rules and the practice in the 
courts and the difference between the two will show the areas that demand 
intervention to improve the efficiency in the administration of justice.  It is believed 
that this approach will give a proper understanding of the process and will help in 
developing viable solutions to the problems faced by the courts.  Description of the 
legal process is deemed important to show the gap between the law and the practice. 
This paper argues that the rules in the Codes are based on principles which try to 
strike a balance between the desire to ensure rectitude of decision, on the one, hand 
and the minimization of cost and delay on the other. If the Codes were properly 
applied, they could have helped to mitigate the problems which have characterized the 
litigation process in Ethiopia.  This, however, leads to another question. Why have the 
courts not applied the rules in the Codes for close to half a century after their 
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enactment?  Were the rules meant to be applied when the Codes were adopted given 
the human resource capabilities and the institutional setup, the cultural background at 
that time?  Is Ethiopia ready for the rules as they appear in the Codes?  This chapter 
will address some of these issues based on empirical data collected over a number of 
years.  The discussion in this chapter will, however, be limited to the regular courts 
although, as noted earlier, the customary courts also play an important role in the 
administration of justice. 
 
Discussion of efficiency problems and solutions in Ethiopia will, however, be 
preceded by presentation of general issues regarding efficiency and the experiences of 
other legal systems.  The process of adjudication in the formal courts in Ethiopia is 
governed by rules that were borrowed from western countries.  The experiences of 
these countries is therefore relevant for Ethiopia although there are wide social, 
economic and historical differences between Ethiopia and these countries.  That their 
experiences are relevant does not mean, however, the problems the systems face and 
the solutions that should be sought are the same in all respects.   
 
 
4.1.2. Nature of Judicial Efficiency 
 
This part of the thesis will primarily focus on efficiency as one important component 
of judicial reform.  Ensuring efficiency through reform programs requires a 
compromise between equally important values that may sometimes be conflicting. 
Different aspects of procedural justice must be balanced to attain an efficiency level 
that meets the demands of citizens.  These competing elements are accuracy, 
timeliness and cost for the process incurred both by the government and the parties to 
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litigation. Attaining an optimum level of efficiency requires a trade off between these 
elements. (Miller, 1997:906)     
 
Rectitude of decisions is one of the most important objectives that should be attained 
by any legal system.  Bentham explained that the purpose of procedure is rectitude of 
decision signifying the correct application of the law to facts that are established as 
true.  He further added that the rectitude of decision so understood should be obtained 
without unnecessary delay, vexation or expense. (Bowring, 1843) That rectitude of 
decision is one objective which any legal system must strive to achieve has been 
stressed by many other authors since.( Jolowicz, 2003)  As a result, efforts have been 
made to design procedures which would attain the achievement of this ideal.  The 
ability of procedures to arrive at the truth has even been considered as one factor to 
assess whether or not procedures are just. Procedures which do not attempt to give 
citizens what is due to them cannot be considered just. (Zuckerman, 1994:355)  
 
Although the principle that rectitude of decisions is important in legal systems is 
accepted, whether or not any particular decision is correct cannot easily be 
determined.  The general criterion for just outcomes can be formulated but this does 
not ease the problem of knowing whether or not any specific judgment conforms to 
the objective truth.  Adrian Zuckerman gives the criterion for a just outcome by 
saying that it is “one which gives the parties what is theirs.  An unjust or incorrect 
result is one which does not achieve this end, which does not correctly apply the law 
or does not accurately determine the facts.  An unjust judgment is one where the 
plaintiff’s rightful claim is denied or the defendant’s rightful defence is rejected”. 




There is no other mechanism for testing whether or not a judgment in any particular 
case conforms to the objective truth other than the procedure that is put in place.  This 
procedure cannot, however, guarantee that errors will not occur. (Zuckerman, 
1994:355) As has been observed by Rawls, even if the criterion of justice in any legal 
procedure is external to the procedure, the procedure itself cannot always guarantee 
that there will be a perfect correspondence between the individual decisions and the 
criterion. (Rawls, 1972:85-86) 
 
Legal systems aspire to attain accuracy in judicial proceedings because it adds value 
to the system. "First greater accuracy is a means of achieving deterrence, in addition 
to raising sanctions or enforcement efforts.  Second, when deterrence is achieved 
through enhanced accuracy rather than by using alternatives, sanctions are imposed 
less often, which is a benefit to the extent that sanctions are socially costly.  Third, 
increasing accuracy may increase the precision with which behaviour is controlled”. 
(Kaplow, 1994:348) 
 
Any system of procedure which aspires to achieve justice should, however, take other 
elements in to account, namely the temporal aspect of the process and the resources 
which it requires to attain accuracy.  Rectitude of decisions cannot be an exclusive 
yardstick against which efficiency should be measured.  The desire to achieve 
accurate results must balance with the need to give judgments within a reasonable 
time at a reasonable cost. (Zuckerman, 1994:360) The temporal aspect of litigation is 
important because of its impact on the accuracy of results.  Delay can undermine 
accuracy by increasing the risk of error or by reducing the utility of the judgment 
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rendered at the end of the process. Delay increases the risk of error by allowing the 
deterioration or disappearance of evidence. In addition if the process is delayed for 
too long a point can be reached beyond which the practical utility of a remedy for a 
plaintiff will be undermined at an accelerating rate.  There could even be situations 
where the judgment becomes of no value to the plaintiff after a certain point. Delay 
adversely affects the defendant in a number of ways.  It can weaken opportunities for 
proving his defence.  Besides, a pending suit that lasts too long affects the emotional, 
economic and social interests of a defendant. Under such circumstances even if the 
result is accurate one can hardly say that justice was rendered. (Zuckerman, 1994:360) 
“Accordingly a decision may be unjust not because it is incorrect in law or in fact but 
because it comes too late to put things right. It is this idea that is conveyed by the 
aphorism ‘justice delayed is justice denied” (Zuckerman, 1994:361) 
 
Apart from its effect on litigants, delay can also have far reaching negative 
implications on a country’s economy.  As delay increases costs of litigation, it can 
lead to inefficient private behaviour intended to minimize costs. In some systems it 
has resulted in distrust of the system by the public and the private sector.  Inefficiency 
leads to reliance on individual reputation and family instead of impersonal 
relationships that are socially and economically beneficial. (Buscaglia and Ulen, 
1997) This implies that although efficiency imperatives demand that an accurate 
result should be attained, achieving the most accurate results cannot be a realistic goal 
of procedure because that demands investment of resources, including time, which 
may rob the process of its utility. On the other hand, although procedure must aspire 
to secure timely judgments so as to make the process of value to the litigants, there is 
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no absolute standard to measure what is reasonable level of expediency that could be 
applied to all disputes. (Zuckerman, 1994) 
 
Greater accuracy comes at a cost. (Kaplow, 1994:307)  The law and economics 
literature considers litigation as a trade-off between different types of costs.  The first 
cost is a cost of procedure and the second one is cost of error.  The cost of procedure 
consists of the investment to arrive at accurate results.  The error cost, on the other 
hand, emanates from an erroneous decision.  A system becomes efficient when it 
minimizes the sum of these two costs. (Miller, 1994:905)   A system of litigation that 
renders decisions too fast has a smaller cost of procedure but is very unlikely to 
achieve accurate results.   If the fact finder makes an error, this constitutes an error in 
the substance of the dispute, therefore fails in its primary obligation of finding the 
truth.  On the other hand, a system that invests too much on procedure will have a 
higher probability of arriving at the truth.   Thus an elaborate procedure that allows 
admission of all evidence, where all witnesses are examined, evidence is not excluded 
on grounds of relevance etc, will probably render correct decisions. But, this comes at 
an additional cost. Besides, additional cost on procedure avoids error cost only up to a 
certain point.  After a certain stage of investment, the marginal return to procedural 
expenditure starts to decline. Additional spending after this point will not make the 
system efficient as the reduction in error cost will not be proportional to the additional 
investment on procedure. (Miller, 1994:908) 
 
There are important lessons from this theory for improving efficiency.  First, some 
degree of delay is necessary in the process of litigation lest the cost of error becomes 
too high. Time induces error not only when the process is delayed but also when it is 
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hurried.  A judgment runs a high risk of error if it does not give enough time for the 
collection of evidence or the preparation of arguments. (Miller, 1994:908)   
Procedural reform that reduces duration may reduce the cost for the parties and for the 
system, but one must also consider how much this reform compromises the other 
obligation of the courts to discover the truth.  Second, efforts to raise the quality of 
justice by increasing investment in litigation either by the parties or by the 
government raise the quality of justice by reducing the probability of error, but every 
additional investment will not be matched by an equal amount in reduction of error 
cost after a certain point.  Third, efficiency can be attained by possibly reducing the 
procedural cost without any trade-off in the accuracy of the results in some cases.  
This happens in situations where the cost of error is higher than the optimum cost.  
Systems that have high procedural costs and high error costs fall under this category. 
(Miller, 1997:909) Many rules of Civil and Criminal procedure as well as rules on 
evidence try to strike a balance between efficiency and accuracy. (Kaplow, 1994:308)   
 
4.1.3. Factors Affecting Efficiency 
 
A. Legal Tradition and Procedural Design 
 
Considerable literature on procedural reform ascribes the failures in judicial efficiency 
to the legal tradition and to the procedural design which results from it.  Although 
much of the reform that is under way in this century by and large focuses on 
procedural issues, that procedural design is an important factor for delay and an area 
for concern was witnessed earlier.   Earlier in history, civil proceedings took a long 
time to dispose in Europe where "civil proceedings lasting for several decades were 
not unusual". (Cappelletti, 1970-1971:847)  This state of affairs in civil litigation was 
attributed to the basic features of the jus commune, the then prevailing civil procedure 
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that was common in Europe.  In spite of some variations, the jus commune had some 
distinct features which caused unbearable delay in civil proceedings in those days.  
Under the jus commune, procedural acts had to be reduced to writing.  This procedure 
discouraged any direct contact between the parties and the fact finder. Testimony had 
to be taken by someone other than the judge.  The judge had to base his decision on 
the written record and not on his personal observation.  The evaluation of evidence 
and the system of proof in the jus commune was a mathematical one established by 
law.  In the evaluation of evidence counting and not weighing was the rule.  Finally 
the jus commune was characterized by a segmented unfolding of the proceedings. 
(Cappelletti, 1970-1971:850)  "Since the judge did not intervene and direct the 
proceedings, the parties, or rather, their attorneys, were the uncontrolled masters of 
the conduct of the case.  Hence abuses, dilatory tactics, and the postponements were 
the usual plague". (Cappelletti, 1970-1971:850) 
 
Beginning from the French Revolution in 1789, this system was gradually dismantled 
and replaced by a new system with different sets of rules.  The 'orality' movement 
brought a breakthrough in procedural theories and practices.  This reform revaluated 
the jus commune and replaced its features with the new ideals. First, Immediacy, 
which allows direct, personal and open relationship between the adjudicating organ 
and the parties, the witnesses, and the other sources of proof, became the rule. 
Second, free and critical evaluation of evidence on the basis of direct observation of 
the adjudicator in open court was introduced.  Third, hearing was concentrated in a 
single or in a few closely spaced oral sessions before the court preceded by a careful 




Procedural Codes with these basic ideals were adopted in different countries in 
Europe. , Germany and Austria adopted the codes in 1877 and 1895 respectively.  The 
Austrian Code of Civil Procedure was more innovative because it gave greater 
emphasis to a more active role of the judge in speeding up the process and in 
furthering the effective equality of the parties.  The impact of these procedural 
changes on the speed of litigation in those countries that implemented these new 
ideals and other countries that followed their model was powerful.  Germany 
registered an impressive improvement in the disposition of civil cases after the 
adoption the Code.  Austria likewise declared that the proceedings became simpler, 
less expensive, quicker and more accessible to the poor after the adoption of the new 
procedure code (Cappelletti, 1970-1971:856). 
 
The prevailing mode of litigation in the United States was attacked as far back as 
1906.  In an often quoted address to the American Bar Association entitled the causes 
of popular dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, Roscoe Pound 
challenged the Anglo-American adversarial litigation which he called the "sporting 
theory of justice".  Pound raised serious concerns about the process of adversarial 
litigation, the role of the judge, the degree of autonomy accorded to litigants and the 
continuity of proceedings, among many other things. (Pound, 1956:14-15) Procedural 
design is once again under attack in many countries in this century.  The complexity, 
high cost of litigation and delay in civil proceedings in the UK has been attributed by 
and large to the procedural design which allows excessive adversarial combat and 
denies judges the power to control the process (Woolf, 1997:710).  Germany, which 
some praise as having a better design of procedural rules (Langbein, 1985:823) has 
revisited some aspects of its procedure to enhance the efficiency of the judicial 
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process. The reform of 2001 in Germany is aimed at streaming procedure at the first 
instance and lowering the workload of the appellate courts with the end result of 
making the process more efficient. (Gottwald, 1997) 
 
B. Managerial style 
 
The contribution of managerial style of judges in the process of litigation can better be 
understood if one examines the nature of the role of the courts on the one hand and 
the parties and their lawyers on the other.  Based on this, systems are divided between 
adversarial and inquisitorial legal traditions. Both systems accept the adversarial and 
contradictory nature of the claim they deal with, but they follow a different process in 
resolving them. (Jacob, 1986:155)   Both systems assume that "the opposing parties 
are in controversy, in conflict, in combat about the disputes between them, but they 
employ essentially different ways for the adjudication, resolution, or other disposal of 
disputes.  These ways derive, from fundamentally different conceptual criteria and 
perhaps also different political and social tenets of what civil procedure is about and 
how it should operate". (Jacob, 1986:156)  In the adversarial system, the decision on 
how to pursue the litigation is basically left to the parties as disputes are considered 
the private concern of the parties. As a result, the adversary system assumes that the 
parties are in the best position on how to control and conduct their own cases and 
discourages any intervention or direction of the courts.  The adversarial system is 
anchored on the belief that truth will come out when the opposing parties come 
forward with their own versions and when they challenge the accuracy of the other 
side. (Weigend, 2003:158)  The inquisitorial system on the other hand begins from the 
assumption that, once a dispute is brought to court, there is a public interest, which the 




The impact of this difference on the managerial role of the judges in ensuring the 
efficient unfolding of proceedings is immense.  The typical adversarial system gives 
the court only a passive role in managing the process.  The court is expected to act 
like an 'umpire' where it ensures the observance of the rules when the gladiators fight, 
and to declare which one has won the contest.  As a result the court does not have any 
power to frame the issues in the dispute. It does not have investigative powers of its 
own, cannot examine or cross-examine witnesses or the parties, and does not have the 
power to call witnesses not named by the parties. (Jacob, 1985:156)   In the 
inquisitorial system, on the other hand, the court has extensive powers in shaping the 
process right from the beginning.  The responsibility to gather and sift evidence is 
given to the court, rather than to the party's lawyers. (Langbein, 1985)  
 
Many countries in the common law world that share the adversarial legal tradition 
have been afflicted by a common problem which resulted not so much from the 
content of court decisions but from the process leading to court decisions.  The 
common law system which is characterized by an unfettered adversarial system, 
whereby parties retain the power to control the progress and cost of litigation has 
resulted in "cost, delay and complexity". (Woolf, 1997:709) 
 
The development of case management in adversarial systems has given the judges the 
power to control fact gathering.  This has however, only brought about a change from 
adversary control to judicial control of fact gathering, which is different from the 
judicial conduct of fact gathering observed in some continental systems. (Langbein, 
1985)  The recent developments in the UK show similar directions.  Greater 
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managerial involvement of judges in the process is necessary for an efficient process 
of justice.  Managerial judging must be balanced with party autonomy to curb the 




As seen earlier, the optimum level of efficiency assumes that there will be some level 
of investment below which the cost of error would keep on rising.  The quality of 
procedures is positively correlated with rectitude of decisions.  This happens because 
the degree of accuracy in decisions is dependent on the quality of the procedures 
which are available to process the facts and the law.  As a result, putting in place 
procedural designs which aspire to achieve the correct decisions increases the 
likelihood of attaining rectitude of decisions (Zuckerman, 1999) 
 
As the quality of the procedure is some extent dependent on the resources which a 
system is prepared to invest on it, one can likely expect low procedural quality and 
lower level of rectitude if a system suffers from inadequate resources. (Zuckerman, 
1994:360)  
 
The availability of resources to the courts is an important factor that affects their 
efficiency. Reform proposals recommend that more resources be allocated to the 
courts to avoid backlog and reduce delay.   Adding the resources to the courts reduces 
delay in the short run.  The long run effect of such additional resources may not, 
however, necessarily be reduction in delay, because cheaper adjudication will invite 
more people to the litigation arena.  If a system becomes very cheap for the plaintiffs, 
it is very likely that more of them will bring new cases, which will raise the workload 
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of the court and eventually bring the performance of the court to its previous position. 
(Miller, 1997:911-912)  
 
Even if the positive relationship between efficiency and resources is accepted any 
system does not have a boundless obligation to provide the most accurate procedure 
regardless of its cost.  In so far as a system cannot afford a limitless investment in the 
administration of justice it must achieve a compromise whereby the resources are 
affordable but the procedure at the same time is good enough to achieve a reasonable 
level of accuracy. (Zuckerman, 1994:355) 
 
4.1.4. Measuring Judicial Efficiency 
 
To make judicial efficiency one important component of reform initiatives, it is 
imperative to develop some mechanisms for measuring it.  Many a time judicial 
efficiency is measured by taking some variables in to account, the commonest of 
which is measuring the average time it takes to dispose of cases.  Although measuring 
average duration time is necessary, it does not show the whole picture unless it is 
supported by additional measurements that give information about the level of 
backlog of the court, the workload per head, and the resources that are at the disposal 
of the court. 
  
Quantitative measurement of judicial efficiency is made difficult by the unavailability 
of data in court systems.  In situations where direct data is not available, Clark and 
Merryman have developed a model that can give an estimate of the average duration 
time in a court system. (Clark and Merryman, 1976-1977:75) This model, which is 
called the duration of litigation index, has been used to measure the efficiency of 
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some legal systems. (Chase, 1988:41-87) The index is based on the following 
formula: 
 
Pt = number of cases pending in the relevant court or court system at the 
beginning of the year t; 
 F = number of new cases filed during the year; 
 J = number of cases decided with a final judgment 
 W = number of cases withdrawn or dismissed during year t 
D = the “duration of litigation index,” an estimate of the number of years 
likely to be required to dispose of a newly filed case in the year t +1. 
 
    D =    Pt +F       1
             J +W 
 
In systems where direct data is not available to measure the mean or median duration 
of cases directly, this formula has great utility.  It is basically a ratio between the total 
number of cases that have been pending in any given period of time, which is 
composed of the ending inventory of the previous year (Pt) and cases initiated within 
the given period (F) to cases disposed off within that period of time either through a 
final judgment (J) or terminated by any other means (W).  As far as this model is 
considered, the manner through which the case has been disposed off does not really 
make a difference.  Therefore, if segregated data is not available for judgments and 
for other dispositions, the formula can still be of help to obtain the average duration. 
(Doane, 1976-1977:100)  The figure obtained through this formula gives the average 
time that one should expect to wait before a new case in the subsequent period of time 
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is disposed of.  This formula assumes that cases will be considered in order of the 
time of their filing. (Clark and d Merryman, 1976-1977:75) 
 
The average duration time is affected by the variables in the formula.  Thus, the 
volume of cases carried over from the previous period affects the average duration 
of cases, as does the number of cases that are filed within a given period of time.  
Increment in either of these two variables can possibly give rise to the average 
duration, if it is not matched by a proportional increment in the disposition within 
the same period of time.  The demand for judicial services is manifested through 
the cases that are carried over from the previous period and the number of cases 
that are newly filed during the year (Pt+F). Performance within the same period, 
(J+W) indicates the supply side in the judicial process.  A backlog which may in 
turn increase the duration time is unavoidable if the supply is lower than the 
demand.  This proportion between the cases opened in a year and the number of 
cases decided within the same year indicates the clearance rate.  The proportion 
between the number of cases disposed (J+W) and the number of cases filed within 
a given period of time (F) is particularly important as the beginning inventory of 
the next period (Pt) is determined by this proportion.  If the number of cases 
disposed in a given period is less than the number of cases filed within the same 
period the Pt of the next period (say next year) will be higher than the Pt of the 
previous period.  If this trend continues, this will affect the overall workload of the 
courts by increasing the backlog of the courts and eventually increases the waiting 
time. (Buscaglia and Ulen, 1997) Reform efforts to enhance efficiency should try 
to understand the reasons for an increase in the demand for judicial services as 
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much as trying to understand the reasons for decrease in the performance which 




4.2. Salient Features of Civil Proceedings in Ethiopia 
Civil proceedings in Ethiopia are governed by the CPC which was enacted in 1965.  
The CPC is the only Code that was drafted by an Ethiopian during the codification 
process in the 1960s but it is heavily influenced by the Civil Procedure Act of India. 
(Vanderlinden 1967-1968:257). In spite of some major changes in the administration 
of justice since its enactment, the CPC remains the most important piece of legislation 
governing civil litigation.  Although Federal and State courts are established 
following the new constitution in 1994, the same CPC is still by and large the 
governing law for civil litigation.  Some States have enacted new legislation as 
regards the administration of civil justice as it is within their powers to do so under 
the new constitutional set up.   The amendments, however, mainly relate to the 
structure of the courts and their jurisdiction and not to the rules that govern the 
process.  As a result, there are similarities in the process of civil litigation in all the 
courts.  The problems they face are also similar in many respects and so should, more 
or less, be the solutions. 
 
In the Ethiopian context civil litigation includes disputes in commercial matters, 
labour relationships and administrative matters.  Unlike many other civil law systems, 
(Gimenez 2001) Ethiopia does not have a separate court structure that exclusively 
deals with administrative matters.  The procedural rules allow the institution of civil 
action against the state or a government department (Art. 21, CPC).  Therefore, unless 
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there is another administrative act that excludes jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, 
disputes that involve the administration or its agencies are adjudicated by the ordinary 
courts.    Regardless of the subject matter in dispute, or the nature of the parties in 
dispute, the rules of CPC apply in so far as the dispute is submitted to the ordinary 
courts.  Thus, the rules in the Code apply to labour disputes, commercial disputes, 
marriage disputes, contractual disputes etc.  They are equally applicable whether the 
dispute is between government agencies, companies or individuals. Civil litigation 
can thus be defined as any litigation in the ordinary courts other than criminal 
proceedings.  
 
4.2.1. Commencement  
 
Civil litigation in Ethiopia begins when a court is seized of a matter through a 
statement of claim submitted by a claimant to a court of law. (Art. 213, CPC)  The 
first stage in civil proceedings consists of the exchange of pleadings between the 
parties and submission of the same together with the list of witnesses and the written 
document to the court.  The early stage of proceedings is characterized by the concept 
of fact pleading. (Art. 80, CPC) In fact pleading, the plaintiff states only the material 
facts on which his claim is based and the defendant answers by stating the allegations 
which he denies or other facts on which he relies for his defences. Fact pleading 
enhances the possibility for speedy disposition of cases by allowing an early 
identification of facts on which there is a difference between the parties, helps in 
limiting the permissible range of evidence that can be brought to trial, and gives the 
other party time to prepare in advance as he knows the facts which he is expected to 
answer. (Jolowicz, 2000:35)Fact pleading is limited to the statement of the facts only 
and forbids the inclusion of the evidence or the conclusions which legally follow from 
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the pleaded facts. Based on this principle, the CPC requires the plaintiff to state in his 
claim, in a concise form, only the material facts on which he relies for his claim and 
the remedy or relief sought from the defendant.  The plaintiff is allowed neither to 
elaborate the evidence nor to build his legal arguments in pleadings. (Art. 92, CPC)  
The plaintiff is duty bound to attach to his pleading the full name and address of 
witnesses to be called at the hearing and the purpose for which they are to be called, 
the list of documents on which he relies specifying in whose possession they are to be 
found, and the original and a copy of any document upon which he sues, that is in his 
possession. (Art. 223, CPC)   The statement of defence follows a similar pattern to 
that of the statement of claim. (Art. 234 (2), CPC)  Thus the statement of defence 
“shall contain and contain only a statement in a concise form of the material facts” 
(Art. 80 (2), CPC) on which the defendant relies for his defence.  The list of witnesses 
or documents that will be relied upon as evidence must be attached to the statement of 
defence.  General denial of the facts alleged by the plaintiff in his statement of claim 
is not sufficient; denials must therefore always be specific to the grounds in the 
statement of claim. (Art. 83, CPC)  If any allegation of fact is not specifically denied 
by the defendant in his statement of defence, it is deemed to have been admitted. (Art. 
235 (2), CPC)   
 
While these rules impose an obligation on the parties to disclose evidence at the 
earliest possible stage, the degree of disclosure is limited in two respects.  The parties 
disclose only the evidence which they will use during the trial, and this minimizes the 
cost which results from unlimited disclosure in some other systems (Davis, 2006).  
Second, the parties disclose evidence only if it is in their possession.  If it is not in 
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their possession, mention of the person who possesses those documents satisfies the 
requirement in the rules.   
 
The obligation of the parties to follow the rules on pleadings is sanctioned by the rules 
of procedure.  The primary sanction is rejection of the pleadings at an early stage 
during the process.  While the rejection of the pleadings at an early stage may have 
the effect of ensuring that only cases that deserve the courts’ time and resources 
proceed to trial, thorough examination of the grounds for rejection and their effects 
shows its limitations. While the statement of claim and the statement of defence can 
be rejected if they fail to disclose the evidence upon which they are based, only the 
statement of claim can be rejected for failing to disclose a cause of action.  The 
statement of defence cannot be rejected on the grounds that it does not show sufficient 
grounds of defence.  In addition, rejection of the pleading does not have the same 
effect on the plaintiff and the defendant.  While the rejection of the statement of claim 
by the registrar or the court brings the process to a halt then and there (Art. 232 CPC), 
rejection of the statement of defence does not have this effect.  When the statement of 
defence is rejected, the case proceeds to trial in spite of such rejection. (Art. 238(2), 
CPC) Besides the court retains the discretion to proceed to trial even when the 
defendant admits all the facts alleged in the statement of claim.(Art. 235, CPC) These 
rules on pleadings are relaxed further by another rule which allows the plaintiff to 
request the amendment of pleadings anytime before judgment.(Art. 91, CPC) These 
rules on the one hand indicate that rejection of claims on procedural grounds is 
accepted in the system.  This indicates the desire to balance the rights of claimants 
with the resources that are available, as advocated in other legal systems that have 
seen some changes in the justice on the merits philosophy. (Zuckerman, 1999:17). It 
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also indicates that although the procedural design is primarily adversarial and the 
system leaves the gathering of evidence to the parties, the court is not limited by the 
pleadings of the parties.  This is particularly clear from the discretion given to the 
court to proceed to trial even when the defendant admits the claim.  One can argue 
that the Code gives this power to the judges to enhance the possibilities of discovering 
the truth.  On the other hand limitations on the powers of the judges to strike out 
defences that do not disclose reasonable grounds of success will affect the workload 
and thereby the efficiency of courts by allowing groundless cases to proceed to trial.   
 
Once the exchange of the pleadings is concluded, the court declares the pleading stage 
closed and adjourns the case for trial. (Art. 240, CPC)  As intimated earlier, the case 
will be adjourned for trial even if the statement of defence which was submitted by 
the defendant or his counsel is rejected or even when the defence does not have 
reasonable chance of success.  The first stage in civil proceedings, therefore, mainly 
consists of the exchange of written pleadings between the parties and discovery of 
evidence.  A party that fails to disclose evidence at this stage is not allowed to do so at 
any other subsequent stage (Art. 137, CPC). This preparatory stage gives the judge an 
adequate chance to have a good knowledge of the facts well before the case comes for 
trial.   
 
4.2.2. The Trial 
 
The trial of suit in civil litigation is divided into two main parts. The first part of the 
trial is called the first hearing. The second and the main part of the trial relates to the 




After conclusion of the pleading stage, the case is adjourned for the first hearing, 
which is the first part of the trial.   The judge to whom the case is sent will have had 
the occasion to see the pleadings, the list of witnesses and the points on which they 
will testify as well as the annexed documentary evidence of both sides when he sits 
for the first hearing.  At the first hearing the judge gets involved extensively in 
shaping the process by examining the parties or their pleaders and can give judgment 
on any point that is admitted by either party. (Art. 242, CPC)   During this stage, the 
court will also rule on preliminary objections that may have been raised in the 
pleadings or during the first hearing. (Art. 245, CPC)   Once decision is given on the 
preliminary objections, the court will ascertain on what material propositions of fact 
or law the parties are at variance and will frame the issues on which the appropriate 
decision of the case depends. (Art. 247, CPC)   If the court thinks that some issues 
cannot properly be framed without the examination of persons that are not before it, 
or without the examination of documents that are in the possession of anyone else, it 
has the power to summon the person and examine him or her or to order the 
production of the document by the person in whose possession the document is to be 
found. (Art. 249, CPC)  The court can, on its own initiative, order the production of a 
written evidence or the summoning of any person to appear before it at this stage even 
if the name of the person or the document is  mentioned neither in the statement of 
claim nor in the statement of defence.  After framing the issues, the judge can 
pronounce judgment without going to trial if the finding on the issues is sufficient, 
and he is convinced that no further argument or evidence than the parties can adduce 





The power to frame the issues for decision, therefore, primarily rests on the courts and 
not on the parties in the Ethiopian civil justice system.  This scheme reduces cost for 
the state and the parties by limiting the evidence that goes to trial.  It also puts the 
judge in a better position to properly manage the case, including encouraging the 
parties to settle, as he has a good knowledge of the case and the issues on which the 
parties are at variance.  As the rules give the judge powers to rely on additional 
information the search for truth is also not limited by the evidence brought by the 
parties.  Much as the law gives the judges wide powers to control the process, there 
are some limitations which need to be examined concerning the first stage.  Once the 
judge is convinced that there are issues between the parties, the trial continues 
regardless of the prospect of winning of either the plaintiff or the defendant.  The 
judges cannot give a summary judgment on the merits when they believe that one of 
the parties does not have a prospect of winning.  Summary judgment can be given 
only when the plaintiff starts a claim under a different track which will be discussed 
in the following section. This arrangement may give non meritorious cases the chance 
to proceed to trial which may affect the workload of the court and the cost for 
litigants. 
 
The second stage of the trial, the hearing of suit and the examination of witnesses, 
(Arts. 257-273, CPC) is the most important stage where the parties present their 
evidence and arguments in open court in a continuous and concentrated fashion.  The 
presentation and examination of the evidence primarily rests on the parties. (Art. 259, 
CPC)  The parties are the ones who conduct the examination of their witnesses and 




As in the first hearing, the court retains an important role in shaping the process 
during the trial.  First, the judge can put to a witness called by either side any question 
at any time which in his opinion appears necessary to determine the suit properly. 
(Art. 262, CPC)   Unlike the parties whose examination of witnesses is limited in 
time, the court can even recall a witness who has already been examined and ask such 
questions as ‘it thinks fit’ (Art. 266, CPC) Second, if the court finds calling a person 
not called by either party to the dispute as a witness necessary, it can at any time call 
such person to give evidence or to produce documents in his possession.  Any person 
who is in the court room during the hearing can also be asked to give testimony or to 
produce documents under his possession then and there. (Art. 264 (1& 2), CPC) 
 
The judge in civil litigation, envisaged by the rules, therefore plays an active role in 
civil litigation both in terms of discovering the truth and ensuring the efficient 
unfolding of the process. 
 
4.2.3. Special Proceedings 
The rules in the CPC do not mainly make any differentiation between cases as regards 
the rules that should be followed.  There is mainly one track through which all cases 
are processed regardless of the value, nature or complexity of the case that is before 
the judges.  The preparatory and the trial stages mentioned in the preceding section 
will therefore apply to all cases, except when they fall under the following two 
categories. 
I. Summary Procedure 
 
Summary procedure allows judges to give judgment on the merits without necessarily 
going through a full blown trial as mentioned in the preceding section. This procedure 
is available only to a plaintiff who seeks to recover a debt or a liquidated claim in 
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money payable by the defendant.  Summary procedure is particularly available when 
the claim arises from 
“a) a contract, expressed or implied, such as on a bill of exchange, promissory 
note, or cheque, or other simple contract debt; or 
b) A bond or contract written for payment of a liquidated amount of money; or  
c) A guaranty where the claim against the principal is in respect of a debt or 
liquidated amount only”. (Art. 284, CPC) 
 
This procedure can be initiated by endorsing the statement of claim as “Summary 
Procedure” to be accompanied by an affidavit where the plaintiff, or his pleader, will 
swear that the facts in the pleading are verified and state that in his belief the 
defendant does not have any defence to the suit. The decision whether to follow the 
ordinary procedure or the summary procedure, is however, left at the discretion of the 
plaintiff and the court cannot put a case into a summary track if the plaintiff takes the 
other option.   
 
Summary procedure entitles the plaintiff to a decree to an amount specified in the 
statement of claim without going through the normal process of exchange of 
pleadings, first hearing, examination of witnesses and presentation of arguments 
unless the court grants the defendant leave to defend.  In summary proceedings, 
although the court has to serve a summons on the defendant upon the filing of a 
statement of claim and an affidavit.(Art. 285, CPC)  defence can be filed only if the 
court grants leave to do so. Leave to defend can be granted if the defendant shows 
cause to that effect.   Should the defendant fail to apply for leave within the time fixed 
in the summons, the plaintiff will be entitled to a decree ‘for an amount not exceeding 
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the sum claimed in the statement of claim together with interest, if any, and costs 
against the defendant’. (Art. 285 (2), CPC)   The plaintiff will equally be entitled to a 
judgment if the application for leave to defendant is rejected.  The application of the 
defendant for leave is scrutinized very strictly and the court may go to the extent of 
demanding the defendant to appear in court and be examined on oath. (Art. 286, CPC)  
The court may also request the defendant to produce documents or books or deeds to 
see to it that there is indeed a defence to the claim.  The court therefore engages in an 
examination of the contents of the defence before granting leave to the defendant.  .   
 
Summary proceedings are important devices to ensure proportionality of procedure.  
In Ethiopia, the scope of summary procedure is limited.  First, summary procedure 
can be requested by the plaintiff against the defendant and not by a defendant against 
a plaintiff.  Second, even for plaintiffs summary procedure can be requested only for 
those grounds that are enumerated under the rules.  Cases that fall outside these rules 
follow the normal procedure even when the case is simple.  Third, summary 
procedure can be used only when the plaintiff applies to that effect.  The court cannot 
use this procedure on its own motion.  These factors limit the advantages which this 
procedure could have provided in ensuring greater procedural economy. 
 
II. Accelerated Procedure 
 
Accelerated procedure is intended to provide remedies in a much shorter span of time 
than the ordinary or the summary procedure.  The basic feature of this procedure is 
that the court gives its decisions in principle based on the application provided by the 
applicant. (Art. 303, CPC)  Unless specifically provided by law, the obligation to 
notify and serve summons to appear is dispensed with in this procedure.  Unless the 
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court on its own motion requires production of additional evidence it gives its 
decision solely based on the application of the plaintiff.  This track is available for a 
number of actions which, by their very nature require a speedy response from the 
judicial organs.  It is specifically available for commercial matters such as calling of 
meetings, (Art. 307, CPC) appointment of directors, trustees or liquidators (Art. 308, 
CPC), application to set aside resolutions (Art. 309, CPC), application for the 
expulsion of a partner or dismissal of a manager (Art. 310, CPC), dissolution of 
partnership or body corporate (Art. 311, CPC), and amalgamation of endowments 
(Art. 312, CPC).  Such a process can only be initiated within 15 days after the fact on 
which the application is based unless there is another time limit for specific types of 
actions (Art. 301 (1), CPC).  If the action is not brought to court within the specified 
period of time these cases also follow the normal procedure. 
 
4.2.4. Judgments  
 
Trials are conducted by judges at all levels and every judgment in civil litigation must 
be given in writing by a judge.  The judgment must disclose the findings of fact and 
findings of law of the court.  It must contain the points for determination, the decision 
given on every point and the reasons for such decision. (Art. 182 (1), CPC)   If a 
judgment is given at first instance it should also include a concise statement of the 
case in addition to these elements.  Much as the court may have called witnesses on 
its own and examined witnesses called by the parties, it cannot give judgment on any 





4.2.5. Alternative Dispute Resolution 
 
The advantage of ADR in the process of litigation has been mentioned in the 
preceding chapter. The legal system in Ethiopia encourages the use of alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms before or during litigation.  Both the CC of 1960 and 
the CPC of 1965 have rules on compromise, conciliation (mediation) and arbitration.  
Out of the 22 titles of the CC of 1960 one is devoted to ADR.  The use of alternative 
methods of dispute resolution is however optional.  Neither the defendant nor the 
plaintiff will therefore be obliged to try any of the alternative means of dispute 
resolution that are outlined by the law.  There are a few exceptions to this general 
rule, one of which is submission to arbitration of disputes arising out of marriage 
relationships. (Art. 725, CC)  The CPC particularly mentions that during the process 
the judge can attempt to reconcile the parties as a result of which the parties may 
reach ‘a compromise agreement’ on all or some of the issues and bring the suit to an 
end.  If a compromise agreement is reached in court the court will record the 
agreement and give a judgment accordingly.  Such compromise agreement can also be 
reached out of court by parties in which case the plaintiff will have to withdraw his 
case from the court.  (Art. 264 & 269, CPC) 
 
4.2.6. Review of judgments and decrees  
 
There are a number of interests which a system of appeal tries to balance in all 
systems.  On the one hand it is a system that tries to reduce the risk of error by 
allowing revision of the matter by another court.  On the other hand it also tries to 
ensure uniform application of the law.  These aims fulfil the personal interest of the 
litigants on the one hand and public interests on the other. While appeal may reduce 
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the risk of error it also raises the cost and delay which may undermine the utility of 
the whole process.  This conflict between these interests is particularly pronounced in 
civil law systems that allow broader right of appeal to litigants in the form of a 
rehearing. (Zuckerman)  
 
Judicial reform in Ethiopia should address the issue of whether or not the appellate 
process in place strikes the right balance between these interests.  To facilitate the 
evaluation of this issue the main features of the system need to be seen first.  
 
Under the Ethiopian law there are a number of possibilities of having proceedings 
reviewed.  First, proceedings can be reviewed by the court which rendered the 
decision.  Second, there is an avenue of appeal.  And third, review by cassation is 
available for cases that have exhausted all other remedies. 
 
The CPC empowers the court of rendition to correct procedural irregularities that arise 
from non-compliance with the rules provided for in the Code.  The rule provides that, 
unless otherwise expressly provided by law or directed by the court where 
irregularities arise from non-compliance with any provision of this Code or 
regulations made there under, the court may of its own motion or on the 
application of either party, set aside such proceedings either wholly or in part 
as irregular, or amend them or make, on such terms as it thinks fit, such other 
order as may be appropriate. (Art. 207, CPC) 
 
This rule does not allow courts to review their own judgments or decisions in so far as 
those decisions and judgments relate to final disposition of facts or law.  It, however, 
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gives the courts a power to rectify procedural errors that are made in the process.  
Based on this rule any irregularity which results from non-observance of the rules of 
procedure should be corrected by the court which made the irregularity and not by the 
appellate courts.  The procedural law actually denies the right of appeal on such 
grounds unless an application was made to the court which committed the 
irregularities. (Art. 211, CPC) The rule on appeals emphatically denies a right to 
appeal if remedies that are available in the lower courts have not been exhausted by 
providing that “where an appeal lies from a judgment or order, but remedy under this 
Code is available in the court which gave such judgment or made such order, no 
appeal may be lodged unless such remedy has been exhausted”. (Art. 320 (2), CPC)  
This is designed to reduce the risk of error without the cost and delay which appellate 
processes require.   Nevertheless many judges in Ethiopia do not allow correction of 
any irregularity because they believe that any error can only be corrected by an 
appellate court.  Therefore in spite of this rule litigants take their cases to the appellate 
courts to have irregularities rectified.6   
 
The second avenue that is available for correction of error is the appellate process.  
The appeal system in Ethiopia gives heed to the interests of error correction and cost 
minimization.  On the one hand it encourages the correction of error by the court of 
rendition thereby economizing on procedural costs.  This can be discerned from the 
rules which require the parties to exhaust local remedies before they use the right of 
appeal.    As mentioned earlier, appellate review is not available to litigants in a civil 
dispute if a remedy is available in the lower courts.  The party to a dispute is expected 
to exhaust the avenues that are at his disposal in the court that gave the original 
                                                 
6 Interview with judges in the Federal and First Instance Courts 
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decision.  It is also not available if it relates to an interlocutory matter which has to 
wait for the final judgment. (Art. 220, CPC)  Second, even when parties go on appeal, 
they are not entitled to get a full rehearing by the court of appeal as the system allows 
the court to dismiss cases, if there is not sufficient reason for intervention in the 
decisions of the lower court. A court of appeal can dismiss an appeal without 
necessarily hearing the respondent if it agrees with the judgment of the lower court. 
(Art. 337, CPC)  Appellate courts in Ethiopia therefore make some screening of cases 
that should go for the full hearing on appeal. This system gives the parties the right to 
have their cases considered without necessarily incurring the costs of the full retrial of 
the case.  The system also ensures economy of procedure by limiting introduction of 
evidence at the appellate process.  Parties are not allowed to introduce new evidence 
at the appellate level.  The appellant can ask for production of additional evidence on 
appeal only if he can prove to the satisfaction of the appellate court that the lower 
court has refused to take evidence which should have been admitted. (Art. 345, CPC)   
Besides, the process tries to reduce delay which may result from the appellate process 
by recognizing the finality of the judgment given by the lower courts.  The fact that 
appellate process has been started does not therefore stop the process of execution of 
the first judgment. (Art. 332, CPC) 
 
On the other hand one observes a number of features in the system of appeal which 
may add to the delay and cost without necessarily having a proportional return in the 
reduction of risk of error.   First the right of appeal is available to all cases regardless 
of the amount involved in the dispute.  Either of the litigants who is dissatisfied with 
the decision of a court has the right to lodge an appeal to a higher court. (Art. 320, 
CPC)  Apart from the factors mentioned above the system does not compare the value 
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of any individual case to the resources that may be deployed in the process of appeal.  
The process of appeal will proceed even if the monetary value of the case is small 
relative to the cost and the delay.  A case can reach the highest court of the land even 
if the amount in litigation is not considerable in comparison with the resources that 
will be spent both by the parties and the judicial system to process it.  In short, the 
system does not incorporate the principle of proportionality, a principle which ensures 
that the “procedure adopted for resolving a given dispute should be proportionate to 
the value, importance, and complexity of the dispute”. (Zuckerman, 1999: 48)) 
Second, the court fee that is paid to the appellate courts is less by 50% from the courts 
of first instance, and if there is a second appeal it is still 50% less than the first appeal.  
Third, although the appellate courts have the power to dismiss cases that do not have a 
prospect of success, this can be done only after having heard the appellant.   The 
judges cannot dismiss the appeal by just examining the documents.  A date of first 
hearing must be fixed to hear the appellant in all situations. (Art. 338, CPC) These 
elements of the appellate process can create an incentive for parties to go on appeal 
just to prolong the process.  
 
The third avenue for revision of judgments is cassation.  The cassation division is a 
mechanism for correcting fundamental errors of law. (Art. 79, Const.)  Cases that get 
a full hearing of the cassation division are screened by a bench of three who may or 
may not get involved in the final hearing of the cases.  This helps the court from 
getting inundated by cases that come from the lower courts.  On the other hand 
however, the process of cassation follows the same procedure as the appellate process.  
Like in the appellate division, there are no limits on the type of cases that can come to 
the cassation division.  Anyone can come to the cassation division in the FSC from a 
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final decision of some other court.  Thus cases which started in some small claims 
tribunals can come to the cassation division claiming that there is a fundamental error 
of law in the decision of those tribunals. In the cassation divisions of some of the state 
courts, petitions from the small claims tribunals constitute up to 30% of the 
workload.7  Of the civil cases that were filed to the cassation division of the FSC in 
2006, 22.4% of them were initiated in small claims tribunals in the Oromiya State.  
People who petition to the cassation division do not pay court fees, which may 
encourage litigants to lodge complaints and increase the workload which will in the 




As discussed in the previous chapter the cost structure in a legal system affects the 
pace of litigation through its impact on the incentive of the parties, as well as their 
lawyers in the process of litigation.  Consideration of the legal framework that affects 
the cost of civil litigation is, therefore, important.  Interests to use the cost structure in 
Ethiopia will, however, be limited because of two basic factors.  Firstly the fees which 
plaintiffs have to pay when they submit their statements of claim are so small that it is 
very unlikely that they will deter frivolous litigation which court fees are intended to 
prevent.  Secondly the impact of lawyer’s fees minimized as many litigants appear 
without any representation. Studies have indicated that the overall cost of litigation in 
Ethiopia constitutes only 15% of the total cost.  Compared with many other systems 
this is relatively low. (World Bank, 2009)  
                                                 
7 Oromiya SC has this problem, but this problem is also faced in other States. In the FSC a big number 
of cases that were initiated in the small tribunal courts come to the cassation division.  In the year 
2006-2007, 775 cases which started in the small claims tribunals in Oromiya were opened in to the 
Cassation division of the FSC.  That constitutes 22.36% of the civil cases that were initiated in that 
year in the same division. 
151 
 
A. Court Fees 
 
Civil litigation can be initiated by a plaintiff only after paying the appropriate court 
fees. The statement of claim of the plaintiff will not be processed unless the court fees 
are paid beforehand. (Art. 215(1), CPC)  Court fees must likewise be paid by the 
defendant if the defence contains a counter claim. (Art. 215(2), CPC)  The fees for 
civil cases were fixed in 1952 by a Legal Notice issued by the President of the then 
High Court (Legal Notice 177, 1943).  These rules have not been revised since. The 
Legal Notice puts the principle and has an annex that shows the amount that should be 
paid by showing the ranges between 1 and 100, 000 Ethiopian Birr.  The fees that are 
paid are not that high and form only a small percentage of the amount in litigation 
particularly when the amount in litigation increases.  Although this encourages access 
to justice, it may also encourage litigation in the courts. 
   Table 8 : Court fee structure 
















10 50 100 250 500 100 100 
Fee per 
unit 
0.50 2.50 4.00 9.00 15 1.5 1 
 
Although the amount that is paid to court increases with the amount in dispute, the 
percentage of the amount paid decreases as the amount in dispute increases.  As the 
law charges a flat rate for disputes falling within the same category the percentage 
will not be the same for every dispute within that category.  The pattern can however 
be seen by taking some figures in any of the categories.   
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Table 9 : Rate of court fees 
Amount in 
dispute 
100 1000 2000 5000 10000 50000 100,000 200,000 1,000,000 
Court fee 5 50 90 210 410 1850 3350 4850 12,850 
Percent 5% 5% 4.5% 4.2% 4.1% 3.7% 3.35% 2.42% 1.128% 
 
The court fee becomes a very small percentage as the amount in controversy 
increases.  People having a small amount in dispute pay a bigger percentage compared 
to those with a bigger amount.  Although court fees are just one type of cost in the 
process of litigation, they can also be used as an instrument to discipline the litigation 
process.  Appellants pay only 50% of the amount that is paid in the first court.  The 
cost structure indicated above applies only for cases that can be assessed in monetary 
terms.  For all the other cases the plaintiff pays a fixed sum of 25 Birr, which is in 
many cases too insignificant to deter people with frivolous litigation. 
 
Although payment of the required court fee by the plaintiff is a basic prerequisite for 
the initiation of civil litigation.  The CPC has a scheme for people who cannot afford 
to pay the required amount at the beginning of the process.  For purposes of civil 
litigation, anyone who does not have sufficient means to cover the whole or part of 
the prescribed court fees is deemed to be a pauper (Art. 467 (2), CPC).  The court 
issues a certificate of a pauper (Art. 143, CPC), after hearing the evidence of both 
parties in this regard (Art. 472, CPC).  After the issuance of such a certificate the 
plaintiff is “not liable to pay the whole or part of the court fee or other fees or charges 
in proceedings connected with the suit, as the court may direct” (Art. 473, CPC).  
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B. Attorney Fees 
 
Attorney fees which in many cases constitute a bigger part of the cost in civil 
litigation when the parties are represented are not fixed by law.  The Licensing and 
Registration Proclamation leaves the cost for attorney services to the agreement of 
both parties. (Pro. 166, 2000)  The legislation that fixed a minimum and a maximum 
amount for attorney fees in 1942 was repealed by this proclamation leavening the 
scheme completely at the discretion of the parties.  On the other hand both the CPC 
and the CC have legal provisions which empower the courts to check that the attorney 
fees are within reasonable limits.  The CPC allows the court to reduce any item in the 
bill of costs which it thinks is excessive. (Art. 464 (2(a)), CPC) The court is also 
empowered to reduce the remuneration in contracts relating to the hiring of 
intellectual work, when the amount agreed between the parties “is excessive as to be 
contrary to the etiquette of the profession of the person hiring out his work”.  (Art. 
2635, CC) 
 
During the process of civil litigation there are some other costs which either the 
plaintiff or the defendant must cover to proceed in the process.  The plaintiff may be 
asked to post a bond as a security for the damages the other party may sustain as a 
result of the litigation.  This is a discretionary power which, if exercised, can bar the 
party from proceeding with his claims any further. (Cappelletti, 1972-1973) 
C.  Allocation of Cost. 
The allocation of the costs incurred during litigation is at the discretion of the courts.  
The relevant rule in the procedure provides that  
unless otherwise expressly provided, the costs of and incident to all suits shall be in 
the discretion of the court and the court shall have full power to decide by whom or 
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out of what property and to what extent such costs are to be paid and to give all 
necessary directions to this effect. 
 
From the reading of this rule it is clear that the court has full discretion as to who 
should bear the cost of litigation.  The fact that a party loses in litigation does not 
necessarily imply that he will cover the costs of the other party.  On the other hand, a 
winning party may, by a court order, be required to pay the expenses of the losing 
party.  As usually happens in the courts, both parties may also cover their own 
expenses.  The bearer of costs therefore is not known until the court gives its final 
order as to costs.  This affects the incentive structure for litigation. 
 
4.3. Salient Features of Criminal Proceedings in Ethiopia 
The process in the criminal justice system in Ethiopia is primarily governed by the 
CrPC that was adopted in 1961.  This is the first comprehensive legislation that was 
enacted to regulate criminal proceedings in Ethiopia.  This law was enacted as part of 
the efforts undertaken to modernize the country in the 1960s. Unlike the substantive 
Codes enacted during this period, which were drafted by experts from continental 
Europe, the CrPC was finally drafted by Sir Charles Mathew, the then advisor to the 
Minister of Justice.   Because of this background in the drafting process the Code is 
influenced more by the common law tradition than by the continental one. 
(Vanderlinden,1966-1967:257).  Initially the responsibility of drafting the Code was 
given to an eminent scholar of comparative law and procedure Jean Graven.  Jean 
Graven submitted the first draft containing 1014 Articles in 1955.  Graven’s Avant-
Projet was given to the then legal advisor of the Ministry of Justice Sir Charles 
Mathew for examination and preparation of a CrPC. (Jembere, 2000) the final draft 
adopted by the parliament eventually turned out to be completely different from the 
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initial draft that was submitted by Jean Graven.  Stanley Fisher describes the process 
in the following words. 
 
The history of criminal Procedure is, in a way, the history of a gradual 
discarding of Prof. Graven’s initial drafting works….The major alteration of 
the draft occurred when…it was decided that provisions dealing with judicial 
organization, jurisdiction evidence etc., shall be continued in a separate Code. 
The second factor which led to the partial abandonment of Prof. Graven’s 
draft was the decision, reached apparently in late 1958, to abandon the initial 
project of an evenly “mixed” continental-common law procedure for an 
overall design more substantially adversary and thus less continental…In 
October 1958, the Commission agreed to give Prof. Graven’s avant-porjet to 
Sir Charles Mathew for examination and proposed amendment. (Fisher, 
1969:xii)  
 
The CrPC, which is now in force, was finally enacted on November 25, 1961 having 
224 Articles with an overall flavor of the common law system and some concepts 
from the inquisitorial system. 
   
The CrPC regulates police investigation, prosecution, trial and the appellate processes 
of criminal proceedings at all levels of the judicial arena.  Proceedings involving 
young offenders and petty offences are also regulated by this Code.   
 
In the following few pages the basic features of the CrPC will be highlighted to 
facilitate the proper understanding of the efficiency problems in the process.  Reform 
of CrPC s is one of the avenues which has been taken to address the problems of 
undue delay, backlog and other problems in other legal systems.  Changes in criminal 
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procedure have been implemented in Chile and Italy to address the problems which 
these countries had in the administration of the criminal justice system (Marafioti,).   
4.3.1. Police Investigation 
 
The CrPC places the power to investigate crimes in the police institutions, which in 
practical terms conduct investigation without much supervision by the public 
prosecution.  Its implementation notwithstanding, the Code gives the public 
prosecutor the power to give “the necessary orders and instructions to the police and 
ensure that the police carry out their duties in accordance with law” (Art. 8, CrPC).  
Although this provision does not go as far as placing criminal investigation 
completely under the control of the public prosecution, it provides for sufficient 
functional relationship between the police institutions and the prosecution department. 
  
In the process of investigation the police have the power of arrest, search and seizure, 
which in principle requires court warrant to perform. (Art. 59, CrPC)  Thus judges 
play an important pre-trial role by examining the legality of arrest, search and seizure. 
With the exception of evidence obtained under coercion, which the Constitution says, 
is not admissible as evidence, (Art 19, Const) however, there is no exclusionary rule 
in place in the CrPC. 
 
Unlike in ordinary criminal cases where police has the duty to investigate when it 
receives complaints (Art. 22, CrPC), cases that involve young persons should be 
immediately taken before the nearest court. (Art. 172 CrPC)  In such cases the 
complaint is made to and recorded by the court and not by the police.  Ordinary police 
investigation is dispensed with at the beginning of the process and can only be 
conducted when the court gives instructions as to when and how it should be done.  
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(Art. 172, CrPC)  Likewise, the public or private prosecutor is entitled to directly 
apply to court to summon the accused to appear in cases of petty offences (Art. 167, 
CrPC).  This provision incorporates the concept of summary process in matters 
dealing with petty offences.  Thus anyone who believes himself to have been a victim 
of a petty offence has a direct access to a criminal division of the courts to have the 
case heard.  This is a simplified process, which does not need the rigorous process of 




Once the police report is sent to it, the prosecution authority has an obligation to 
institute charges against the suspect.  (Art. 40(1), CrPC) The CrPC does not give the 
prosecution the discretion to prosecute as is the case in some systems.   Non-
prosecution in provable offences is, therefore, not allowed.  Some studies about 
countries have indicated that the absence of this discretion to prosecute has 
contributed to the increment of cases in the judicial process and the resulting delays. 
(Pizzi and Marafioti, 1992)  Because the prosecutor has the obligation to prosecute 
cases, cases have to come to court even in situations where the public prosecutor 
thinks that there are good reasons for not proceeding with the case.  In such cases the 
only possibility is to bring the case to court and then ask the court to drop it.  (Art. 
122, CrPC) The Ethiopian prosecutor therefore has neither the discretion to decline to 
file charges nor the power to drop charges that are already pending in court.  On the 
other hand the prosecutor has the obligation not to institute proceedings against the 
accused where 




B. where the case cannot be tried in the absence of the accused, and there is 
no possibility of finding the accused 
C. the prosecution is barred by limitation or has been a subject of amnesty or 
pardon 
D. The public prosecutor is so instructed by the Minister of Justice on 
grounds of public interest.  (Art. 42CrPC) 
 
Refusal to institute proceedings on the grounds mentioned above, however, must be 
made in writing and shall clearly record the reasons for the refusal. (Art. 43 CrPC) 
Many a time prosecutors press charges even where the likelihood of getting 
conviction is low because they find it easier so to do than to write the explanation for 
dropping the charges. (MoJ , 2005).  Besides, the decision of the prosecutor to drop 
charges is subject to judicial scrutiny through the application of the victim of the 
crime or his representative (Art. 44(2), CrPC).. This situation affects the scenario in 
criminal justice by raising the incoming cases to the courts as the prosecutors feel that 
they have to frame charges on any case that is reported to them by the police 
 
There is no preliminary hearing for charges that are brought by the prosecutor, which 
means that the court has to set a date for trial for every case regardless of its strength 
on the merits.  There is a process for compulsory preliminary hearing in homicide and 
aggravated robbery cases, but even in these cases the court’s responsibility is limited 
to taking the testimony of the witnesses before the date of the trial. (Art. 80, CrPC)  In 
all other cases this pre-trial procedure is optional. The purpose of this pre-trial 
procedure is to have the deposition of the witnesses of the prosecutor recorded in the 
court of preliminary inquiry in the presence of the accused.  During this preliminary 
hearing the court writes down the statement of the accused if he wishes to make a 
statement.  The accused is also allowed to cross-examine the witnesses of the 
159 
 
prosecution at this stage.  The judge is allowed to call additional witnesses at this 
stage if he thinks that their “testimony is in the interest of justice” (Art. 87, CrPC) The 
deposition of the witnesses taken during this pre-trial stage can be read during trial 
and put in evidence if “the witness is dead or insane, cannot be found, is so ill as not 
to be able to attend the trail or is absent from the” Ethiopian territory. (Art. 144 (1), 
CrPC)  If the deposition relates to a testimony of an expert, however, it can be read 
and put in evidence even if the expert is not called as a witness by the prosecutor. Art. 
144(2) CrPC) At any rate no such pre-trial proceedings are conducted in Ethiopia 
even in those cases where it is compulsory to conduct them.   
 
4.3.3. The Trial 
 
The CrPC envisages a continuous and concentrated trial where both the public 
prosecutor and the accused produce their witnesses on the same day and conduct the 
examination and cross-examination in an adversarial fashion. (Art. 94(1), 123 & 124, 
CrPC)  As has been mentioned and will be confirmed by the data collected from the 
courts, the main reason for the delay, congestion, ineffectiveness of the criminal 
justice system in Ethiopia relates to this fact: the fact that the evidence that is gathered 
by the prosecutor and the accused is not produced, and trial not conducted, following 
the procedures provided by law.   The trial which can only be adjourned to the 
following day if it cannot be completed in one day, (Art. 94 (1), CrPC) is mainly a 
forum where both parties examine their witnesses, cross-examine the other’s and 
make oral presentation of their cases by way of opening statements and closing 




The primary responsibility of presenting the facts and legal arguments to the court as 
they see them rests on the parties to the litigation.  However, during the trial the judge 
may ask a witness any question at any time if it “appears necessary for the just 
decision of the case”. (Art 136(4), CrPC)  The court cannot examine the accused as 
such, but can put to him questions that will help clarify the statements if the accused 
decides to make a statement.  Furthermore, the court in criminal proceedings can, “at 
any time before giving judgment call any witness whose testimony it thinks is 
necessary in the interest of justice”. (Art. 143 (1), CrPC) The Code thus envisages not 
a passive judge that only rules on motions and gives a final verdict at the end of the 
process, but an active judge that plays an important role in discovering the truth.   
 
The criminal justice system has no plea-bargaining procedure.  The only exception to 
this scheme of arrangement is the Anti-Corruption legislation, which allows dropping 
of charges against a person in return for the testimony which the person gives in court 
against others. (EACC proc. 90/97) If the accused pleads guilty at the beginning of the 
trial, the court is not bound by it and may require production of evidence by the 
prosecutor.  The defendant cannot, therefore, bring the judicial process to an end by 
pleading guilty. Whether or not a judgment of conviction should be given based on 
the guilty plea of the accused is at the discretion of the court.  Even if the accused 
pleads guilty and the court’s decision is based on that plea, it does not necessarily 
result in mitigation of sentence against the accused.  Partly because of this, not so 
many people plead guilty in the courts.   
 
Judges handle all criminal cases in Ethiopia and the system does not give any place 
for the participation of a jury or lay judges.    An important feature for the system is 
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the permission of the victims of crime to join their claims for civil compensation with 
the criminal action by the prosecutor against the defendant. (Art. 154, CrPC)  Under 
the CC of 1960, which was highly influenced by the French jurisprudence, a criminal 
act is a source of tort liability at the same time (Art. 2030, CC) and as a result 
conviction for crimes can automatically result in the award of compensation to the 
victim of the crime without the need to open a file for civil proceedings. In spite of 




Both sides to the criminal process can appeal to the higher courts against a judgment 
of the lower courts.   For the accused the right of appeal is constitutionally 
recognized. Under the Constitution accused persons convicted of an offence have the 
right of appeal to a higher tribunal established by law. (Art. 20, Const).   The accused 
or the public prosecutor can go on appeal almost on every ground except on 
interlocutory matters. (Art. 184, CrPC) Appeal is possible on conviction or acquittal 
as well as on the sentences passed by the court. (Art. 185, CrPC)  The courts of appeal 
have wide powers to review the facts and the application of the law.  Except in the 
Federal Courts, there is no limit to the number of appeals in criminal proceedings.  In 
the federal courts, second appeal is not allowed unless the first decision has been 
reversed or varied. (Art. 9(2), Proc. 25, 1996)   Although the option to go on appeal in 
criminal cases is broad, as will be seen in the subsequent sections, the number of 
cases that are submitted to the appellate courts in criminal cases every year are very 




4.4. Pace of Litigation in Ethiopia 
 
The following sections will focus on the pace of litigation in Ethiopia.  The data is 
collected from the FSC, the FHC and the FFIC in Addis Ababa.  The pattern, is 
however, believed to give a general picture of the courts in the other parts of the 
country as well.  The FFIC has many branches within Addis Ababa.  Among these 
branches the Lideta branch is picked for purposes of this work.  Not only is the Lideta 
Branch the biggest of all the branches, the data is also more organized and was readily 
accessible than in the others.   
 
The FFIC handles both civil and criminal matters in a bench having only one judge.  
The number of benches in this court is therefore the same as the number of judges.  
The court does not have an appellate jurisdiction.  All cases for this court are therefore 
initiated in its first instance jurisdiction.   
 
Judges in the FFIC are appointed usually after a few years of experience as assistant 
judges within the court system.  The number of judges in the court has not been 
uniform throughout the years.  The number of civil benches is usually higher than the 
benches which handle criminal cases.  
Table 10 : Number of judges in FFICL 
 2001-2 2002-3 2003-4 2004-5 2005-6 2006-7 2007-8 
Civil 14 11 12 11 10 10 11 
Criminal 9 9 8 7 6 7 8 
 
The judges in the FHC are usually appointed after having served in the FFIC or in 
other State Courts.  They are more experienced than the judges in the FFIC.  The 
benches are composed of three judges in criminal cases where the defendant is 
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charged with a crime that carries an imprisonment of 15 years or more.  All other 
cases are handled by benches with one judge.  The FHC has two benches that are 
composed of three judges.   
 
The FSC has two appellate benches, one civil and one criminal.  Both benches are 
composed of three judges.  The cassation division in the FSC, on the other hand, hears 
cases in a bench of five.  Cases in the cassation division are screened by a bench of 
three judges before they are heard by the full bench. (Proc. 25/94) 
 
Table 11: Number of judges in the Federal Courts 
 
Court Year 
2001-2 2002-3 2003-4 2004-5 2005-6 2006-7 2007-8 
FSC 13 13 15 15 15 18 25 
FHC 35 38 39 39 39 42 53 
FFIC 70 70 52 46 52 56 53 
Total 118 121 106 100 106 117 131 




4.4.1. Pace of Litigation in Civil Cases 
 
In this section a brief consideration of statistical figures for civil litigation is in order.  
Empirical data will be the basis for our discussion of the pattern of litigation in 
general, the problem areas in the process and the possible ways out.  Some statistical 
facts will be discussed in this part to show the general situation of civil litigation in 
the Federal Courts. 
  
Table 12.  Number of civil cases opened (F) in the Federal Courts 
 
Court Jurisdiction 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 07-08 
FSC First I 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 
Appeal 309 422 469 460 469 829 786 
Cassation 1091 1454 1749 2297 2887 3436 4185 
Total 1400 1880 2218 2757 3556 4265 4971 
FHC First I 261 388 455 414 428 584 621 
Appeal 1854 2859 3502 3294 3139 3169 4118 
Total 2115 3247 3957 3708 3567 3753 4739 
FFICL 6384 5630 6188 8333 10640 11979 14246 
Total 9899 10757 12363 14798 17761 19997 23956 
Source. FSC 



















The number of civil cases submitted to the Federal Courts has increased in all the 
courts over the period for which data is given.  The highest increment is observed in 
the FSC, particularly in the Cassation division.  This is a result of the nature of its 
jurisdiction.  While the appellate cases come mainly from federal matters, the 
cassation division is open to all final decisions.  Besides, petitioners to the cassation 
division do not pay court fees while people who come to the appellate division pay 
50% of the court fee paid in the lower courts.  The trend for greater demand of 
judicial services is likely to increase in the future, as the population grows and the 
economic interaction increases.  As the model adopted by Clark and Merryman 
indicates, increase in the number of newly opened files is one of the factors which 
increase the duration time, if it is not accompanied by an equal amount of disposition 
within that year.   
 
Not only has the demand for judicial services increased over the years but so also has 
the productivity of the courts.  There is a variation between the productivity of the 
courts (J+W) relative to the number of newly opened files which indicates the 
clearance rate (CR) of each court. The beginning inventory in the FSC has increased 
from 929 in 2001-2002 to 1672 in 2007-2008 signalling a relative increment in the 
beginning inventory (Pt) for each year. With some exceptions the clearance rate for 
the FSC was less than 100% indicating that it had problems to meet the rising 
demands for its services.  If the clearance rate is not improved, there is a higher risk 
for backlog in the FSC. 
 
The clearance rate in the FHC and FFICL has been more than 100% for many years 





beginning inventory was reduced from 2826 to 2125 and from 9833 to 3978 in the 
FHC and FFICL respectively between 2001 and 2008 (Table 6).  
  
Average duration time of cases which, for purposes of this research, indicates the time 
span between initiation of a case and its disposition in a court is an important 
indicator of judicial efficiency. 
 
Table 13: Performance of the Federal courts in Civil Cases 
Year FSC FHC FFICL 
Pt F J+W CR% Pt F J+W CR% Pt F J+W CR% 
01-2 929 1400 1748 124.8% 2826 2115 524 
 
24.8% 9833 6381 7584 118.80% 
02-3 584 1880 1852 98.5% 4417 3247 3368 103.7% 8633 5620 8905 158.17% 
03-4 609 2218 2182 98.4% 4296 3957 3522 89% 5358 6115 8042 131% 
04-5 642 2757 2365 85.8% 4731 3708 3417 95.1% 3564 8334 9496 114% 
05-6 1024 3556 3036 85.4% 5022 3567 5082 142.5% 3847 10640 12963 122% 
06-7 1534 4265 4125 96.7% 3507 3753 5735 152.8% 4150 11979 15760 133.% 
07-8 1672 4971 5173 104% 2125 4739 5459 115.1% 3978 14247 18241 128% 
 
Figure 6: Total Filed Vs Total Disposed in FSC, FHC and FFICL 














































































Figure 7: Clearance Rates for Federal Courts 
 
 
Table 14 : Average waiting time for disposed civil cases, July 2001-June 2006 
 




6mths-1yr 1-3 yrs 3-6 
yrs 
>6 yrs Total Average duration 
(months) 
FSC First instance     3    1 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 
Appeal  526 427 779 356 169 45 144 2446 9.9 
















FHC First instance 149 101 365 269 537 263 95 1719 20.7 
Appeal 1311 619 2049 3696 5085 1174 200 14134 15.3 













































Sourse  FSC 
Figure 8 Average waiting time for disposed civil cases, July 2001-June 2006 
 


























The figure in this table gives a general pattern of the duration within which civil cases 
were disposed in the Federal Courts.  The FSC, the FHC and FFICL have disposed a 
total of 66,237 civil cases in five years.8  Out of the total of 11, 183 cases that were 
decided by the FSC, 91.9% of them were decided within one year after the date of 
opening. The average duration in months for the FSC for this period was 4.8.  The 
average duration within the FSC differs according to the type of jurisdiction of the 
court.  Cases that were submitted on appeal took longer than those submitted to the 
cassation division.  In absolute terms, the appellate division decided more cases after 
                                                 
8 These files are not necessarily opened during this period.   
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they have been in the queue for more than three years, 189 cases.   The number of 
cases on the first instance jurisdiction (four in number) was too small to have any 
impact on the performance of the court.   
 
The FHC on the other hand had a less impressive pace during the same period.  Only 
53.8% of the cases were decided within one year of their opening.  It is therefore not 
surprising to see that the average duration for civil cases in the FHC was longer than 
that of the FSC.  The performance of the FHC is relatively lower for cases under its 
first instance jurisdiction.  Civil cases that involve more than half a million Ethiopian 
Birr fall within the first instance jurisdiction of this court.  On the average, these cases 
take longer than any other class of civil cases considered in this sample.  One should 
note that these cases constitute relatively a smaller percentage of the workload in the 
court.  The 1719 cases that were decided in its first instance jurisdiction by the FHC 
constituted only 10.8 % of the total number of cases decided by the same court.  As 
was indicated on the previous table the number of files submitted to the court on its 
first instance jurisdiction are also very few in number.  The percentage of cases 
decided in less than 6 months (28%) is lower for the High Court compared with the 
FSC (70%) and FFICL (61.9%).   
 
Not only does the FFICL decide more cases in absolute terms, but it also decides them 
in a shorter average period of time than the FHC.  As could be observed from the 
table above, 75.1% of the cases decided in five years were decided within one year of 
opening.  As the FFIC does not handle cases on appeal, the average duration of 9.8 
months can therefore easily be compared with the average duration for first instance 
cases in the FHC (20.7 months).  Given the fact that both courts follow the same 
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procedure, one may ask why there is such a wide difference in duration time between 
these two courts.  One may also ask why the average duration of the appellate division 
of the FHC (which is 15.3 months) is longer than the average duration for the 
appellate division of the FSC (which is 9.9 months), although they follow the same 
procedure and the workload is not significantly different.   Some of the tables below 
will show us why, but more substantive reasons will be proposed when we discuss the 
reasons for delay in general. 
 
Table 15 Yearly Average Duration time (in months) of civil cases disposed in the 
Federal Courts 
 
Court Level Year 
02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 07-08 
FSC Appeal 7.9 3.06 4 3 5.45 6.97 
Cassation 2.9 3.5 3 3.1 4.07 3.61 
First instance 1 - - - - - 
FHC First instance 14.2 21.5 17.9 23.9 27 20 
Appeal 22.8 14.2 13.3 16.5 14 6 
FFICL 12.3 17 7 na na 3 
Source FSC 
 
The average duration time for civil cases shows a great variation between the courts.  
Duration time is generally higher for civil cases in the FHC.  Given that the cases in 
the FHC have higher stake and complexity, longer duration time may be expected.   It 
is not surprising that the waiting time for first instance cases in the FSC is longer than 
any group of cases in the federal courts.  In 2005-2006 the average duration time for 
first instance cases in the FHC was almost two years.  Though slightly lower, the 
average duration time for the appeal cases in the FHC is also high.  For the data 
included in this study the lowest average was 13 months while the longest was 22.3 





of the FHC.  The averages for the appellate and the cassation divisions, however, 
conceal the real average duration of cases, as this statistics includes that of cases 
which have been dismissed by the appellate court before the full hearing.  Those cases 
that have gone through the full appellate and cassation hearing are therefore very 
likely to take longer than the average mentioned here.  In the FSC for example, while 
the average duration time for all cases disposed of by the cassation division for 2005-
2006 is 3 months, the average for cases that have gone through the full hearing is 8 
months.  Likewise for the same year cases that have been disposed in the FHC had an 
average time of 16.5 months.  Cases that disposed after a hearing on the merits had a 
longer average duration, which is 24 months.   








Decided in Average 
Duration 




01-02 1400 934  
(66.7%) 
386 76 1 0 2 1 4.72 
02-03 1880  1386 
(73.7%) 
471 16 5 0 2 2.61 
03-04 2218   1610 
(72.6%) 
481 60 41 24 4.25 
04-05 2757    1855 
 (67.23% 
729 96 68 4.5 
05-06 3554     2241 
(63.1%) 
967 298 1..2 





07-08 4971       3673 
(73.89%) 
1.97 
FHC 01-02 2115 144  
(6.8%) 
1078 415 216 193 64 16 18.8 
02-03 3247  1034 
(31.8%) 
1235 433 395 138 29 12.5 
03-04 3957   1345 
(34%) 
1328 942 329 59 10.6 
04-05 3708    1177  
(31.7%) 
1731 654 104 7.9 
05-06      1431 
(41%) 
1717 326  
06-07 3753      2089 
(55.66%) 
1260 6 







FFICL 01-02 6381 3437 
(54.1%) 
1890 592 202 121 74 41 8.4 
02-03 5620  3171 
(56.9%) 
1693 324 223 115 67 7.4 
03-04 6115   3711 
(61.7%) 
1518 485 221 124 5 
04-05 8333    5097 
(62.5%) 
2160 731 262 4 
05-06 10640     6867 
(69.8%) 
2877 682 1.5 
06-07 11989      8450 
(70.48%) 
3093 3 
07-08 15765       11120 
(70.53%) 
1 
Sourse  FSC 
 
 
This table explains, in part, why the performance of some courts in civil litigation is 
better or worse, in terms of speed, than the others.  All other conditions remaining the 
same, a court that decides more cases within the calendar year of opening will be in a 
much better position to reduce duration time.   The percentage of cases decided within 
a year after filing is, on the whole,  inversely related to the duration time for all the 
files opened in that year.   
Table 17 :  Pattern of disposition and duration time 
 
Year FSC FHC First Instance 
01-02  66.7%      4.2 6.8% 18.8 54.1% 8.4 
02-03  73.7% 2.7 31.8% 12.5 56.9% 7.4 
03-04 72.6% 2.9 34% 10.6 61.7% 5 
04-05  67.2% 2.6 31.7% 7.9 62.5% 4 
05-06  63.1% 1.2 41% 2.6 69.8% 1.5 
06-07 70.7 3.97 55.66% 6 70.48 3 
07-08 73.9 1.97 56.99% 2 70.53 1 


















Key: Data for less than one year is scaled 1 to 5
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01‐02 02‐03 03‐04 04‐05 05‐06 06‐07 07‐08
Avg. Age
< 1 Year
Key: Data for less than one year is scaled 1 to 10 
With some exceptions the higher the number of cases decided  within the first 
calendar year, the lower the duration time gets for all the cases that have been filed in 
the same year although some of them may be decided in subsequent years, and vice 
versa.  Be that as it may, although one sees some improvements in all the courts, the 
statistics for the FHC obviously shows a lower performance, explaining in part the 





Table 18 : Age distribution of disposed civil cases in the Federal Courts 
 




1-3 yrs 3-6 yrs >6yrs Total Ave time 
(months) 
































































































































































































































































































































As shown earlier the number of cases flowing to the courts has increased over the 
years.  This, however, does not seem to have adversely affected the performance of 
the courts in civil litigation.  In fact when the overall workload increased, the annual 
performance of the courts also increased, although the number of judges decreased.  
Although there are some variations, not only did the number of annual dispositions in 
every court increase over the years, but the time it took to dispose of cases was also 
shortened.   This is seen from the increasing number of cases that were being decided 
within a few months of their opening.   
Table 19: Percentage of civil cases disposed in less than a year 
 
Court Year 
01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 07-08 
FSC 78.1 93.2 91.2 95.8 95.8 93.66 87.47 
FHC 33.8 48.4 62.6 62.2 47.7 62.45 81.38 
FFICL 74.1 62.7 68.3 83.5 82 na na 
Source FSC 
 














As indicated in the table above the percentage of cases that were decided in less than a 
year from the date of their opening has been increasing.  Also here, whereas the FSC 
and the FFIL branch have shown an improvement from 78.1% to 95.8% and from 
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74.1% to 82% respectively, the change in the FHC was not as high.  The clearance 
rate for the FHC reached the highest point of all the years, but still the court cleared 
only 47.7% of the new cases filed in 2006.  This shows that a higher clearance rate in 
a court is not necessarily an indication of a shorter duration time for cases.  To begin 
with, the fact that a court’s clearance rate is well over 100% is by itself an indication 
that the court is doing well in reducing backlog.  And depending on how far back the 
backlog reduction goes, the duration time of the court will be affected, at least for the 
time being.  Although the FHC decided more cases than were opened in 2005-6, as a 
consequence of which it has a high clearance rate, many of those which it decided 
were more than a year old and were already in the backlog. 
Table 20 : Pending civil cases based on the year of opening (On September 2006) 
 































FSC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 65 166 1156 700 
FHC 1 1 3 1 6 6 4 10 12 37 52 123 275 570 1826 602 
FFICL 1 0 7 2 10 6 2 6 11 17 46 75 156 648 1987  
 
This table reveals some facts which may not be obtained from the tables based on 
averages.  In September 2006, more than 140 files have been pending for more than 5 
years, some of them opened as far back as 1991, which is almost 16 years.   As will be 
shown later some of the cases that have been on line for so many years were not too 
complex to decide.  In fact some of them were simple debt recovery, or rent collection 









Year cases opened 
05-06 04-05 03-04 02-03 01-02 00-01 99-00 98-99 Up to 98 Total 
07-08 320 95 58 28 16 10 4 3 8 542 
06-07 1707 648 325 136 62 44 28 10 25 2985 
05-06 1464 1810 942 395 193 140 65 23 50 5082 
04-05 - 1177 1328 433 216 168 47 21 27 3417 
03-04 -  1345 1235 415 251 117 48 111 3522 
 
The figures on this table reinforce the previous findings.  Although the clearance rate 
of the FHC for 2005-6 is very high, one can see that a sizable number of cases were 
decided after they had been adjourned for more than five years.   
 
The figures shown above indicate that there are some improvements in the civil 
justice system when it comes to the speed of disposition of cases.  Compared with the 
statistics for the process of criminal justice the pace of litigation for civil cases is a lot 
better.  The question whether or not civil litigation is efficient enough, however, needs 
to be examined.   
 
4.4.2. Pace of Litigation in Criminal Cases 
 
In spite of the constitutional requirement to handle criminal cases within a reasonable 
period of time after the charge (Art. 20(1), Const.), the court process in the Ethiopian 
judicial system leaves much to be desired.  Although the standard of reasonable time 
may vary depending on the nature of the crime a defendant is charged of, the time to 
disposition in criminal cases was very long in many of the years for which data is 
provided.  The time to disposition has shown some improvement over the years in all 






The data in the following table reveals that criminal cases in the first instance 
jurisdiction of the FHC constitute the biggest part of the workload in criminal cases 
and any meaningful improvement in the overall performance of the court requires a 
thorough examination of the reasons for the delay and congestion of the same.  Of the 
criminal cases that were pending on the 13th of January 2006, 96.38% of them were 
filed in the FHC on its First Instance jurisdiction whereas the remaining 3.62% of 
them were submitted on appeal.  Of the first instance criminal cases pending only 
25% of them are less than one year.  The remaining  
Table 22 : Age of criminal cases in the FHC pending on January 13, 2006 

















No. 195 231 647 1222 4105 1590 919 8909 96.38 
% 2.19 2.59 7.26 13.72 46.08 17.85 10.31 100 
Appeal No. 48 28 87 64 99 8 1 335 3.62 
% 14.33 8.35 25.98 19.1 29.55 2.39 0.3 100 
Total No. 243 259 734 1286 4204 1598 920 9244 100 
% 2.63 2.8 7.94 13.91 45.48 17.29 9.95 100 
 
74.87% cases have been pending in the court for more than one year.  More than 10% 
of such cases have been there for more than six years and 17.85% three to six years.  
A detailed examination of the cases based on the year of filing indicates that as many 
as 146 files have been opened in or before the year 1996, thereby making them well 
over ten years old.  Some 398 cases are between 7 to 9 years old.  The age distribution 
of cases on appeal is different.  In the appellate cases, 67.76%of the cases are less 
than one year old and only 2.69% are more than 3 years old.  This does not however 
change the overall image of the court, as the cases on appeal constitute only 3.62% of 




As can be confirmed from the table below the FHC decides only a very small number 
of cases within the year of their opening.  In 2002-2003 and 2003-2004, only 6.6% 
and 5.4% of the cases were decided within the year of their filing respectively.  
Although the performance has improved a little in 2004-2005 and increased to 14%, it 
is not high enough to ensure speedy disposition of criminal cases. There is a 
difference in the time scale between the cases on the first instance jurisdiction and 
those on appeal.  The percentage of cases in first instance jurisdiction decided within 
the year of their filing is smaller than the percentage for the cases on appeal. With the 
exception of the year 2004-2005, the percentage for criminal cases of first instance 
jurisdiction decided within the year of filing remained less than 6%.  A big percentage 
of the cases was transferred to the following year.  The percentage for criminal 
appellate cases decided within the same year on the other hand rose from 20.55% in 
2002-2003 to 30.99% in the first half of 2005-2006. Due to the smaller number of 
cases decided in the first and the second year after the year of filing in criminal cases, 
the probability that a case would still be pending a number of years after its opening is 
higher for first instance criminal cases in the high court than it is for the cases on 
appeal.    
 
The statistical data for criminal proceedings in the FFICL gives a different picture.   
While the percentage of cases decided within the year of filing was 22.2% for the year 
2002-2003, the figure reached as high as 64.7% in 2003-2004 and 60.21% in 2004-
2005.  This means that the number of files carried over from the year of filing to the 
next is less than in the FHC.  The FHC disposes the smallest percentage of cases in 
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05-06 2962    723  
(24.4%) 
1335 676 
06-07 4220     1191 
(28.22%) 
2110 






























05-06 6757    3461  
(51.22%) 
3072 180 
06-07 7039     3539 
(50.27%) 
2926 
07-08 15091      6828 
(45.24%) 
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05-06 2434    488  
(20.94%) 
1051 669 
06-07 3773     826 
(21.89%) 
2029 































05-06 528    235  
(44.5%) 
284 7 
06-07 447     365 
(81.65%) 
81 
07-08 1053      756 
(71.79%) 


















Within the FHC, there is a difference between the pattern for first instance and 
appellate cases.  A small percentage of first instance criminal cases in the FHC is 
disposed of in the year of opening.  In 2002-3 the court decided only 5.53% of the 
first instance criminal cases opened in that year and adjourned the balance of 94.47% 
to the subsequent years.  The situation has shown some improvements but is lower 
than the cases on appeal.  As mentioned earlier in connection with civil cases, this 
affects and explains why the criminal cases in the High Court display longer average 
waiting time than the other courts, and why first instance cases take longer than cases 
on appeal in the same court. 
 



















     3  3 
Appeal 32 35 84 98 60 10  319 
Cassation 20 18 69 22 6  1 136 
Total 52 53 153 120 66 13 1 458 
FHC Appeal 48 28 87 64 99 8 1 335 
First 
instance 
195 231 647 1222 4105 1590 919 8909 
Total 243 259 734 1286 4204 1598 920 9244 
FFICL 517 674 1193 622 360 41 10 3417 
Total 814 986 2080 2028 4630 1652 931 13119 
 
One can see from this table that out of the 931 criminal cases which have been 
pending in the courts for more than six years, 919 of them are first instance criminal 
cases in the FHC.  Likewise, the proportion of cases that are between 1 to 3 years old 
as well as between 3-6 years old is higher in the first instance criminal cases in the 





The following table reveals that the backlog for the first instance criminal cases in the 
FHC is higher than the FSC and the FFIC.  This reveals that a big proportion of cases 
pending in the FHC in its first instance criminal jurisdiction are well over the average 
time for disposition that has been recorded in the court itself. 
Table 26 : Age of pending criminal cases based on the year of their opening as of 
13 January 2006 
 
Court Year of filing Total 
93-4 94-5 95-6 96-7 97-8 98-9 99-0 00-1 01-2 02-3 03-4 04-5 05-6  
FSC First I.        1 1 1    3 
Appeal          1 12 29 109 159 310 
Cassation 1         1 2 22 102 128 
FHC Appeal       1  5 9 43 112 165 335 
First I 18 26 102 164 150 244 419 388 474 1596 2202 1908 1218 8909 
Total 19 26 102 164 150 244 420 388 479 1605 2245 2020 1383 9244 
FFICL   1 2 1 3 8 8 11 43 114 751 2475 3417 
189 
 
One notices from this chart that the FHC had a bigger backlog of criminal cases int its 
first instance jurisdiction.   
 













> 6 years Total 
07-08 593 560 1121 1481 1799 991 325 6,870 
06-07 137 120 789 840 1748 1237 513 5,384 
05-06 144 115 418 657 3100 1386 713 6,,533 
04-05 94 73 192 653 2190 724 418 4,363 
03-04 85 36 102 347 749 528 209 2,056 
02-03 55 25 109 227 746 588 220 1,970 
 
The Average time for disposition in the FHC is quite high and shows a little 
improvement over the past few years.  It can also be seen from the table below that 
the average duration time for criminal appeals is relatively shorter than the average 
time for first instance criminal cases in the same court.  The average duration   
Table 28 : Average Duration time (in months) of disposed criminal cases in the 
Federal Courts 
Court Level Year 
2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 
FSC Appeal 7.1 5.2 2.6 4.7 7 2 
Cassation 2.9 3.2 2.51 3.3 5 3 
First instance 23 18 - - - 69 
FHC First instance 35.3 32.1 31.4 35.1 28 6 
Appeal 11 12.1 15.9 12.9 8 2 
FFICL 23.64 14.6 8.96 6.21 na Na 
 
time for the court has therefore been heavily influenced by criminal cases in its first 
instance jurisdiction.  The average duration time for the criminal cases in the FHC 
both on appeal and on first instance is higher than the average duration in the FSC and 




Table 29 : Average Duration time of disposed cases in the Federal Courts (in Months) 
Court 
 
Case Type Year 
2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 
FSC Civil 4.16 3.55 3.09 4.08 5 4 
Criminal 5.97 4.2 3.74 3.0 6 2 
Labour 3.44 3.89 6.6 4.98 6 5 
FHC Civil 16.2 16.8 13.8 17.6 14 6 
Criminal 33..4 30.6 29.2 32.1 9 2 
Labour 12.03 7.43 15.69 2.9 1 2 
FFICL Civil 21.77 17.46 8.06 7.52 na na 
Criminal 23.64 14.6 8.96 6.21 na na 
 
This chart shows that the average duration time for criminal cases in each court is 
usually higher than the average duration for other cases in the same court. The 
difference is particularly marked in the FHC than in the FSC and the FFICL.   
 
The data that has been collected from the federal courts indicates the problem areas 
that should be addressed to improve the administration of criminal justice in Ethiopia.  
Although there are some improvements in terms of increasing the number of 
dispositions given every year in some of the courts, the duration time for disposition 
of criminal cases is still very high.  The average duration time is even longer for some 
category of cases. The average duration time for the disposition of criminal cases on 
negligent homicide in the FHC, for example, has been 42, 47, 52 and 53 months for 
the years was 2002-3, 2003-4, 2004-5 and first half of 2005-6 respectively. An 
improvement in the administration of criminal justice presupposes that the reasons for 
these circumstances, which are evidenced by the data in the courts, be identified.   
This writer has identified some problems, which beset the justice system in Ethiopia 





4.5. Reasons for Delay in the Courts in Ethiopia 
 
In this section the main reasons for the problems that are observed in the judicial 
process in Ethiopia will be examined.  Why do the processes of criminal and civil 
justice in Ethiopia resemble, as was aptly described by Mauro Cappelletti in 
connection with other legal systems, “the efforts to start the broken mechanism of a 
clock which must be hit and shaken in order to be put in motion even for a brief 
moment”. (Cappelletti, 1970-1971:857)   The unfolding of litigation is influenced by 
many factors.  Some are internal and can be attributed to the court system itself.  
Others can be attributed to broader causes and need a different solution altogether. 
  
4.5.1. Non Compliance with Procedural Rules 
 
In attempts to modernize its legal system Ethiopia has enacted Procedural Codes 
which contain many of the principles supposed to ensure procedural as well as 
substantive justice.  These Procedural Codes, like the substantive Codes, were enacted 
in the 1960s and were as a result enlightened by the debate surrounding the issues of 
procedural justice.  Both procedural Codes contain the basic principles which could 
ensure fairness, speed and correct outcomes. Although both Codes are basically 
adversarial, they also contain procedural schemes which arm the judge with enough 
powers to control the process.  They contain procedural rules to avoid segmented 
unfolding of the process, which is believed to be one of the reasons for delay in other 




The Procedural Codes have some loopholes which can be used by litigants and their 
advocates to prolong litigation.  This problem can only be rectified by changing the 
rules.  Further amendment of the rules will however be contemplated if the law maker 
could rest assured that they will be implemented by the institutions once they are 
enacted.  In the Ethiopian context one of the basic problems is that the process is not 
fully governed by the rules in the Codes.  Given this situation one wonders if a reform 
process that aims at change of the rules will bring the required results.  This situation 
will be discussed in this part as it is believed that it is the major reason for the delay 
and inefficiency of the courts, both in civil and criminal proceedings.    
 
A. Appeals:  Law And Practice 
 
The Criminal and Civil Procedure Codes have many differences, but they do have 
some common features as regards the appellate processes.  In both cases the appellant 
is required to specifically mention the grounds for his objection on the decision of the 
lower court without arguments.  In both cases, the hearing of an appeal is supposed to 
be conducted through an oral presentation by both sides.  In both cases, the court can 
dismiss the appeal and dispense with the hearing if it is convinced that there is no 
sufficient ground to intervene into the decision of the lower courts.  In both cases 
lodging of an appeal does not necessarily result in a stay of execution of judgments of 
the lower courts.  The basic principle of both Codes is that the appellate court gets the 
whole record of the lower courts together with the memorandum of appeal of the 
appellant, hears the arguments of both parties on the hearing day and gives its 
decision.  The legal setting both in civil and criminal proceedings is discussed in the 
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previous section.  This section will only take the basic framework and compare it with 
the process on the ground and try to demonstrate how this affects the pace of litigation  
I.  Civil Appeals, 
The legal frame work 
 
Submission of documents              hearing of parties   judgment 
 
       
Exit-1            exit-2                                     exit-3 
   
In civil cases exits 1 and 2 represent situations where the court can dismiss the appeal 
without summoning or hearing, if already summoned, the respondent.  Exit 3 
represents the final disposition after the hearing of both parties.  As can be observed 
from the sketch the process is primarily oral supported by documents9 submitted to 
the court at the beginning of the process.  
 
The process on the ground 
 
Application         written response             re- reply                examination             judg-                               
 appelant       respondent                            appelant               of dossier               ment    
 
Exit-1                                        Exit-2 
There is a basic difference between the law in the books and the practice, a difference 
which affects the pace of litigation and some other procedural rights.  The concept of 
hearing in the appellate process is dispensed with and replaced by exchange of written 
documents.  Although the exchange of the documents is usually done by the judge in 
an open court, it is not in the strictest sense of the word a function which can replace 
the fundamental judicial responsibility of hearing both sides before the judgment.  
                                                 




The possibility of an immediate contact between the parties and the appellate judges 
is minimized which encourages the parties to make their arguments in the documents 
which are the only options available for doing so.  
  
II.  Criminal Appeals 
 The law in the books 
 
Submission of documents         hearing of parties                      judgment 
 
      Exit-1             last exit-2  
 
In criminal appeals exit-1 represents the power of the court to dismiss the appeal 
where there is no sufficient ground for interference” (Art. 195 (2), CrPC) and exit-2 
represents the final judgment of the court after hearing the parties. 
The practice on the ground     
 
Submission       written response             re-reply            examination             judgment 
Appelant           respondent                                              of dossier 
 
 
Exit-1                                                                                                                    exit-2 
A comparison of the sketches shows the following main differences between the rules 
in the books and the practice in the courts which affect the pace of the process in both 
civil and criminal appeals.  The effect of the discrepancy is not limited to the speed of 
the litigation process.  It also affects the capacity of the judicial process to arrive at 
the truth.  The impact on the cost dimension to the government, the public and the 
litigants is also huge.   
.  
1. Oral hearing on appeal, which is the central process in the law, has    been 
replaced by an exchange of written documents on both sides  
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2. The exchange of written documents requires the court to give additional 
adjournments which were not foreseen by the law. 
3. As parties do not have access to make an oral presentation of their cases, their 
pleaders include arguments in the documents, which the law specifically 
prohibits.   
4. The courts are forced to give a number of adjournments before they give their 
judgments. 
5. In a country where the illiteracy rate is high, and where there is scarcity of 
legal professionals, this forces the parties to ask for more time to have their 
cases put in writing. 
6. It deprives the court of an opportunity to understand the case first hand from 
the parties themselves or their advocates. 
 
The impact of the disparity between the law and the practice on the added time in the 













Civil  Cases Decided 504 439 445 456 682 920 
 
Appearances 
Avg. 6 3.51 3.47 3.10 3.06 3.92 
Total 3028 1545 1545 1416 2086.92 3606.4 
Duration  in 
months 
7.43 2.8 4.00 3.02 5.42 6.90 
Criminal Decided 904 529 461 592 738 1037 
Appearances Avg. 4.93 4.35 3.84 3.75 3.79 1.97 
Total 4459 2306 1771 2223 2797.02 2042.89 





Civil Decided  3111 3062 4368 4311 3886 
Appearances Avg.  7.25 11.32 5.63 4.00 3.03 
Total  22633 34662 24597 17244 11774.58 
Duration in months  14.16 13.32 16.61 11.58 6.89 
Criminal Decided  159 630 882 716 848 
Appearances Avg.  29.09 14.19 6.16 4.02 3.00 
Total  4626 8944 5437 2878.32 2544 
Duration in months  14.16 15.89 12.93 7.02 2.15 
 
Decisions in both civil and criminal appeals are given after many adjournments.  In 
the FHC a total of 24597 adjournments were given in 4368 civil appeals before they 
were disposed of in 2005-2006.  The figure is even higher for 2004-2005.  During this 
period the court granted 34662 adjournments before it disposed of 3062 civil appeals.  
In criminal appeals the average number of appearances for 2003- 2004 in the FHC 
was 29.09. The average number of appearances for the years 2004-5 and 2005-6 was 
14.19 and 6.16 respectively.    
 
The FSC has shown improvements in recent years, but the figures are revealing how 
the procedure that is now prevailing can prolong civil appeals.  In 2000-2001, 1225 
civil appeals in the FSC were adjourned a total of 23,246 times before they were 
finally disposed of.  It is not surprising to see that the average duration of civil appeals 
in this year was 58.21 months.  On the average, cases were adjourned 18.9 times. The 
previous year, 530 civil appeals were decided after a total of 10,029 adjournments, 
with an average of 18.9 adjournments and an average duration of 57.43 months before 
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a final decision was rendered.  The number of appearances in the FSC has improved 
over the last few years and has reached as low as 3.1 in 2005-2006.  The average 
number of appearances in criminal appeals in the FSC is however still longer than the 
maximum (Art. 194, CrPC) the law envisages.  The appearances normally envisaged 
by the law for criminal appeals are one for the hearing of the appeal and another for 
the judgment, if the judgment cannot be delivered on the same day.   
 
Generally the duration time for appeals is positively related to the number of 
adjournments granted before disposing of the case.  As a result the duration time for 
criminal and civil cases has improved with the decrease in the number of 
adjournments.  Any reason that increases the number of appearances in courts will 
eventually prolong the waiting time for the litigants.  In some cases repeated 
adjournments may be given within a short period of time in which case the average 
number of adjournments may not necessarily imply a longer duration time, as in the 
case of the FHC for civil appeals in 2005-2006.  In some other cases the interval 
between two appearances may be quite long, in which case the average duration may 
look too long for the number of appearances, as in civil appeals for the FHC in 03-04.   
 
That the number of adjournments prolongs the duration time in the appellate process 
can also be seen from the figures for the civil division of the FSC which show the 
actual number of adjournments that were given before final decisions were rendered 
(next table).    In those years where the duration time is longer a significant number of 
files were adjourned more than ten times.  In 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 where the 
appellate division had the highest duration time for civil appeals, the percentage of 
cases on appeal decided after 10 or more adjournments was 81.3 % and 76.3% 
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respectively.   In both years 22% of the files were decided after more than 26 
adjournments were given.  The situation has been reversed in 2001-2 since which the 
number of appearance kept getting lower year after year.  The number of judges 
throughout this period remained the same.  The only significant change that has been 
introduced in the FSC since 2001-2 is the determination of the bench to strictly follow 
the rules for appellate cases.  The appellate benches in the FSC have since this time 
changed the process from the old practice to the practice envisaged by the rules in the 
procedure.   











2-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 >26 
1998-9 53 122 107 79 46 22 32 36.2 408 
1999-0 5 57 42 122 121 68 120 57.43 530 
2000-1 7 78 220 226 271 182 278 58.21 1255 
2001-2 10 207 163 58 38 50 86 26.14 602 
2002-3 120 332 102 33 12 12 13 7.43 504 
2003-4 221 359 57 11 4 2 6 2.8 439 
2004-5 153 362 72 7 4 0 0 4.0 445 
2005-6 170 387 54 13 2 0 0 3.02 456 
2006-07 201 359 106 14 2 0 0 6 682 




















Given the nature of the rules for the appellate process in Ethiopia, one would expect 
that many of the appearances are made either to make an oral presentation by the 
parties or to deliver the judgment.  The figures in the following table however show 
that majority of the adjournments are given for administrative reasons which could be 
done better by the administrative arm of the court.  In the FHC, 44,996 adjournments 
were registered for civil appeals decided between July 18, 2002-July 17, 2006.  Of 
these adjournments 21042 were given to ‘examine’ the files, 15154 to receive a 
written reply from the respondent, and another 4646 to receive a written re-reply from 
the appellant.   19800 adjournments, which account to 44% of the total number of 
adjournments, were granted just to exchange written documents between the parties.10  
The immediate result of the substitution of the oral process by the exchange of 
documents is increase in the number of adjournments ‘to examine’ the files.  The 
courts do not give a definite date for delivery of judgment. Instead they tell the parties 
to comeback on a future date to examine the documents submitted by them.  The 
                                                 
10 This does not include the initial submission of the memorandum of appeal, because it is submitted to 
the Registrar and not to the judges directly. 
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bigger the documents get, the more time the judges take to examine the files.  A chain 
effect is created the end result of which is repeated appearances and longer duration 
time.  In civil appeals, 46.76% of the reason for adjournments was examination of the 
appeal.  The court has spent 90.76% of its time to examine the documents, and to 
receive written pleadings from the parties.   This leaves the court with very little time 
to conduct the hearing of the parties which the law demands from appellate judges. 
Table 32 : Reasons for adjournment of disposed Appellate cases in the FHC  
July 8, 2002-July 7, 2006 
 
Reason  for Adjournment Civil Criminal 
Examination of the dossier 21042 4321 
Reply 15154 1276 
Re-reply 4646 117 
Decision 1185 822 
Hear witnesses 469 92 
for additional evidence 541 241 
Forced production of the 
respondent by the police 
24 789 
Judges not available 144 417 
Other reasons 1791 1691 
Total number of adjournments 44,996 9766 
 
B. First Instance Proceedings:  Law and Practice 
In the Ethiopian context the discrepancy between the rules in the law books and the 
practice is not limited to appellate processes.  First instance proceedings, both civil 
and criminal, are marred by the existence of a judicial process which, in many of its 
features, is distinct from the basic procedural devices provided under the Codes.  The 
implications of these discrepancies for judicial efficiency, fairness of the process, 
rectitude of decision and accessibility of the justice system is immense.  Judicial 
reform in Ethiopia can only succeed if one takes this element into account.   
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I. Civil Proceedings 
 
The salient features of the first instance civil proceedings in Ethiopia are outlined in 
the previous sections.  A basic sketch will be presented here to help us see the 
difference between what the law says and how the process unfolds in reality.   
Track A- Ordinary Proceedings 
Figure 15: Track A- Ordinary Proceedings 
 
Stage one Stage two Stage three 
Preparatory stage Written Trial (Oral ) Judgment  
First hearing 
 
Hearing of suit and 
examination of witnesses 
- Exchange of written 
pleadings including 
-statement of claim 
-statement of defence 
(Art. 222, 229 & 238, 
CPC) 
-submission of the list of 
witnesses and other 
documents (Art. 137 & 
223, CPC) 
-collection of documents 
from other institutions by 
court order, if that has 
been asked by the parties 
-examining the parties 
(Art. 241, CPC) 
-Framing of issues (Art. 
246, CPC) 
-judgment on admissions 
(Art.242, CPC ) 
-Ruling of preliminary 
objections (Art. 245, 
CPC) 
Opening of hearing (Art. 
258, CPC) 
Statement and presentation 
of evidence by both parties. 
(Art. 259, CPC) 
Closing arguments by both 
parties (Art.259, CPC) 
 
In specific cases there may be other additional steps in the process which are not 
reflected in this scheme.  The details are left out on purpose so that the discrepancy 
will focus on the most important aspects of litigation.  As is evident from the table, 
the unfolding of civil litigation is divided into three main stages.  The first part is a 
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preparatory stage and that is supposed to focus mainly on exchange of written 
documents.  The main written documents are the statement of claim and the statement 
of defence.  Fact pleading is an important principle in the Code and the parties are not 
allowed to develop their arguments and analyze their evidence on the pleadings.(Art. 
80, CPC)  Pleadings of both parties have to include the list of witnesses and other 
evidence which each party intends to present during the trial. (Art. 223, CPC)  Unless 
there are specific matters that demand judicial intervention, the activities at this stage 
do not necessarily call for the involvement of judges.  Being a preparatory stage for 
the main trial, many of the functions at this stage could be conducted by the 
administrative staff of the court.  Once this stage is concluded the next stage, which is 
primarily oral, begins.  This stage is divided into two.  In the first part, which is called 
the first hearing the judge examines the parties and tries to understand the claims of 
the parties and the points of fact or law on which they differ.  Issues should be framed 
on points on which there are difference and judgments given on points where there are 
admissions. Rulings should likewise given on preliminary objections which the 
defendant might have raised in his statement of defence.  When the parties as well as 
the judge agree on the points that need judicial determination the trial date is fixed for 
the parties to present their witnesses and their arguments.  The CPC demands that 
“when the hearing of evidence has once begun the hearing of the suit shall, as far as 
possible, be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been 
examined” (Art. 197 (1), CPC).  This process ensures the orality, immediacy and 
concentration of the proceedings which are believed to be important developments in 
civil procedure which resulted in improving judicial efficiency in some other 
countries. (Cappelletti and Garth, 1974:70,)  The final stage is for the judges to 
deliver their judgment.  Judgment can be delivered on the date of the hearing but 
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another appointment can also be given as the judgment is required to be in writing and 
signed by the judges. (Art. 180, CPC)  
 
The process of civil litigation that was observed does not resemble the procedural 
scheme in the books.  Details aside, the basic pattern of actual civil litigation can be 
represented by the following diagram. As the distinction between the written and oral 
stage designed by the law is blurred in actual practice, the unfolding of civil litigation 
can be outlined better by successive presentation of the main events in the process. 
 
Claim            Defence            Reply for defence                   Calling plaintiff’s 
witnesses                Hearing of plaintiff’s witness                   Summoning defence 
witnesses                  Hearing of defence witness                              Examination of the 
dossier                         Judgment 
 
First let us outline the basic points of difference between these two schemes.   
1. The law allows the parties to present one document each, the statement of claim 
for the plaintiff and the statement of defence for the other party.  The practice 
has added a third stage by allowing the plaintiff to submit a written reply to the 
defence.11  
2. The exchange of the written documents is something that can be done by the 
administrative unit of the court.  In practice the judges sit in a court room to 
receive the documents from the parties 
3. The law requires that the judge examine the parties on the first hearing before 
going to trial.  In practice there is no such thing as a first hearing.  And all the 
steps which the judge is supposed to do at the first hearing like examining the 
                                                 
11 The plaintiff is allowed to submit a written reply only when the defendant comes up with a counter 
claim.  In such cases the reply is to the e new claims of the defendant against the plaintiff.   
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parties so as to understand the nature of the controversy between them, framing 
of the issues, giving judgment on admissions, ruling on preliminary objections 
etc is simply not done as required by law, or is postponed to a later stage.  
4. As a result when the exchange of the pleadings is finalized, the plaintiff is asked 
to present witnesses in the next date of adjournment.  Because the issues are not 
framed each party calls all witnesses and the court hears them whether or not 
their testimony will help to resolve the dispute.  Many a time the issue which is 
framed only when the judge writes the judgment (which the parties are left in 
the dark as to what point he will deciding on until delivery of judgment) turns 
out to be an issue of law, and the testimony of the witnesses will not be taken 
into account although it might have taken repeated adjournments to secure their 
attendance.   As the party is not made to cover the cost of the witnesses as 
required by law, the party does not have a real incentive to be careful about the 
number of witnesses.   
5. After hearing the testimony of the plaintiff the judge then asks the defendant to 
bring witnesses.  The time between adjournments is not normally short.  It 
therefore takes a long interval between the date of hearing of the witnesses for 
the plaintiff and the defendant.  The time when the defendant takes summonses 
to his/her witnesses can be many years after the event that gave rise to the 
dispute.  As a result getting the witnesses requires repeated adjournments. 
6. If the parties rely on written documents and there are no witnesses for either 
party, the second and the most important stage, the trial, is skipped altogether, 
and a date is given for the examination of the documents, which will be 
followed by another adjournment for delivery of the judgment by the judge 
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7. Even when there are witnesses for one or both parties no oral argument is 
conducted in the real sense of the term.  The parties or the attorneys examine the 
witnesses and that is the beginning and the end of the matter.  No opening 
statements or closing arguments are made by either of them.  As arguments are 
not made at this stage the practice tries to fill the gap by allowing the parties to 
include arguments in their pleadings. As a result not only are pleadings more in 
number as the plaintiff is allowed to reply to the defence, but they are also not 
limited to fact pleading.  Evidence is analyzed, arguments forwarded in the 
pleadings as a result of which written pleadings tend to be bigger in size than 
they would have been if they were limited to the material facts and material 
facts only. This forces judges to give more adjournments to examine the 
documents. 
8. Finally the court gives its judgment.  As mentioned earlier no issues have been 
framed, rulings on preliminary objections may not have been given and the 
judgment begins by addressing these things first.  Under the law, the issues are 
the parameters for determination of the relevance of evidence. In practice issues 
are framed after the evidence of both parties has already been heard.  The judge 
has to go through all the process backwards and try to frame an issue on the 
basis of which he/she will render a judgment.  So the judge tells the parties the 
issue that has been picked for determination at the time of the delivery of the 
judgment.  But, delivery of judgment may not even be necessary because the 
ruling on the preliminary objections could have made all the previous exercise 
worthless.  On a date fixed for delivery of judgment a judge could say that the 
action of the plaintiff was barred by limitation or that the court has no 
jurisdiction.  The issue framed by the judgment at the time of the hearing could 
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also make the testimony of many of the witnesses irrelevant and the decision 
may be based on legal issues or on a small part of the testimony of either party 
or both. 
 
The impact of these differences on the pace of civil litigation is immense.  It 
contributes to the rising cost and delay in the process. As rectitude of decision also 
depends on procedural design, the objective of arriving at the truth will also be 
affected if courts do not follow the rules.  .     
 
Track B- Summary Proceedings  
Summary proceedings are important devices that are used to ensure speedier 
disposition of some claims which by their very nature require a different arrangement. 
The Ethiopian Summary proceedings impose limitations on the defendant’s right to be 
heard, and entitle the plaintiff to a judgment unless the court gives the defendant leave 
to defend.  If the defendant’s request to defend is accepted then it follows the steps of 
the ordinary procedure.  The summary procedure as envisaged by the law books can 
be represented by the following sketch. 
Figure 16: Track B Summary Proceedings 
 
Statement of Claim                Leave to Defend                        Judgment 
 




This procedure is available for liquidated claims but is rarely used in actual process.  
This track was not available in many courts.  Even in cases where attempts were made 
to make it available, litigants are reluctant to use it because the decision on whether or 
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not the defendant should obtain leave to defend becomes an additional reason for 
repeated adjournments.   
 
Track C- Accelerated Procedure 
 
The gap between the legally prescribed procedure and the practice is the widest in 
relation to accelerated proceedings.  As regards some matters specifically provided, 
the law requires in principle that “the court shall make its decision on the basis of the 
application” (Art. 303(1), CPC) unless other legal provisions prescribe otherwise.  
This track is available mainly for declaratory judgments.  The main procedural device 
can be shown by the following diagram 
 
              Claim                         Order/Judgment 
 
This track has been practically non-existent in many of the Ethiopian courts. Many 
claims in connection with business organizations which were supposed to be handled 
by this process are made to run the full course like any other proceeding.   As a result 
matters which are expected by law to be handled within a short period of time stay in 
the process for a longer period of time.  Much as it may be frustrating to the plaintiffs, 
defendants may not suffer as much damage in the process.  The common complaint in 
Ethiopia, which in Amharic goes like “kesash kemehon tekesash mehon yishalal” (one 
would rather become a defendant than a plaintiff in Ethiopian Courts) is the 
immediate result of the discrepancy. 
 
II. Criminal Proceedings 
The situation in the criminal proceedings in the Ethiopian Courts was not different 
from the situation in the civil litigation.  Like in civil proceedings, there is a wide 
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discrepancy between the law and the practice in criminal proceedings.  To show this, 
a brief sketch of the law on the one hand and the practice on the other will be 
presented and the impact of this difference on the efficient administration of criminal 
justice will be discussed later.  The focus here will be the time between the institution 
of the charge by the prosecution and the delivery of judgment by the court. 
 
A. The law in the books 
 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
Preparatory Stage 




-filing of the charge (Art. 109, 
CrPC) 
-service on the defendant-
Submission of list of witnesses to 
the registrar (Art. 124, CrPC) 
- serving summonses to the 
witnesses  (Art 124 CrPC 
-reading the charge (Art. 129, 
CrPC) 
-taking down if there are 
objections to the charge and 
responses to them  (Art. 30, CrPC) 
-decide on objections (Art. 131, 
CrPC) 
-taking plea of the accused (Art. 
132, CrPC) 
-opening of the case by 
persecution and presentation of 
witnesses (Art 136 CrPC) 
-opening the defence and 
presentation of witnesses (Art 142 
CrPC) 
-final address on law and fact by 
both sides (Art. 148 CrPC) 
 
The procedural law divides the process into three main stages.  In the first stage 
preparations are made for the trial.  The charge, together with the list of witnesses and 
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any other evidence, is served on the defendant. The defendant also submits the list of 
witnesses and any other evidence at this stage.  The trial date is fixed and summonses 
served on the prosecution, the defence, and the witnesses of both sides to appear on 
that date.  It envisages a continuous trial which is primarily oral where both sides 
present their evidence and their arguments on facts and law.  So trial is in principle 
supposed to be done in one day and continue to the next if it is not over on that day. 
(Art. 94(2), CrPC) 
  
B. The process in realty 
 
The process of the criminal justice in many of the Courts in Ethiopia is in many 
respects different from this framework. It looks more or less like this. 
 
Filing of charge          summoning defendant                serving the charge 
reading charge         written submission of objections         written 
reply to objections                    ruling on objections          plea of the 
accused              summon prosecution witnesses                 hear witnesses              
ruling on whether defence should be entered( in writing)              hear defence 
witnesses            give judgment        
 
The difference between these two ‘systems’ is striking.  The basic scheme of the 
Procedure Code which could ensure speedier disposition of criminal cases is 
frustrated by the elaborate procedure which is put in its place.  
 
1. The law allows the defendant to get the charge and the list of witnesses at the 
beginning of the process.  In practice this comes at a later stage of the process. 
2.  The law envisages a preliminary stage where the ground for the trial would be 
put in place.  In practice this stage has substituted the main trial. 
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3. Many of the steps which were supposed to be conducted orally during the trial 
have been replaced by exchange of written documents. 
4. The law expects the defendant to produce the list of witnesses before the trial.  
In practice the defence produces its witnesses after the witnesses for the 
prosecution are heard, which may have already taken a long period of time.   
5.  The law envisages a continuous trial whereby both sides present their 
evidence and their arguments on questions of fact and on questions of law.  In 
practice the unfolding of criminal proceedings is fragmented with long 
intervals between the hearing of prosecution and defence witnesses.  In fact 
the witnesses of each side are not necessarily heard at the same time.  At times 
it takes a long time to hear the witnesses of the prosecution or the defence.   
6. The law makes a distinction between administrative and judicial functions.  In 
practice everything is handled by the judge.  In fact the judges spend too much 
of their time handling administrative matters, with the result that they have 
very little time left to do the most important part of their duty. 
 
The impact of this state of affairs on the administration of justice in Ethiopia, both in 
civil and criminal, is negative.  The replacement of the basic rules for first instance 
proceedings in civil and criminal proceedings by practices that are not in accordance 
with the law has an adverse effect on the pace of litigation.  The ‘system’ that is in 
place in the courts makes timely unfolding of processes impossible.  It has diverted 
the focus of the judges, thereby making improper utilization of resources.  It has 
created loopholes for litigants who wish to have the litigation drag on for a long 
period of time.   The empirical findings in the following tables show how the scheme 
of modernization that tried to speed up the judicial process by adopting new 
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procedural principles and rules has been subverted by practices that pre-dated the 
Codes.  A few case types were selected in the FHC to see how the discrepancy 
between the law and the practice affects the speed of the process.  These case types 
were selected based on the frequency they appear in the criminal justice system.   
 
Table 33 : First Instance Criminal Cases Pending on September 2006 at the FHC 
  
No  
Case type Article Cited Numb
er of 
cases  
% Average duration 




1.  Robbery 636 1059 16.7 30.23 31.98 
2.  Negligent homicide 526 1043 16.4 52.66 48.75 
3.  Fraudulent 
misrepresentation 
656 853 13.4 27.19 34 
4.  Cheque without 
cover 
657 791 12.5 28.3 35.9 




665 10.4 31.94 34.06 
6.  Homicide (first or 
second) 
522/523 504 8 40.38 41.87 
7.  Drugs  429 6.7 22.64 24.55 
8.  Others  1009 15.9   
Total  6353 100 31.48 31.94 
 
As this table reveals, the work load of criminal cases in the FHC is overwhelmed by a 
few category of cases; homicide, 34.8% (2, 5 and 6), fraud, 25.9 %( 3 and 4) and, 
robbery 16.7%.  These six types of cases constitute 77.4% of the total number of cases 
pending in the court.  Attempts to improve the efficiency of the court should begin by 
identifying the reasons for delay in these cases.   Not only do these cases constitute a 
big percentage of the workload, but some of them, take a long period to dispose of 









Table 34 : Reasons for adjournment in the FHC  July 7, 2003—July 8, 2006 
 







Examine files  807 1887 2313 1001 
Written reply 192 328 445 157 
Written reply2  9 8 17 12 
Give orders 43 148 120 51 
Witnesses 870 2693 2505 740 
Evidence 429 1178 1100 436 
No judges 194 315 673 185 
For the police to produce  
the defendant or witnesses 
1538 2087 6088 1671 
Other  280 611 670 229 
Total  number of 
adjournments 
4362 9255 13931 4482 
 
The highest number of adjournments was given in connection with an order for 
the police to bring the accused or the witnesses.  This is partly related to the way 
the process unfolds.  The defence witnesses are summoned after the prosecution 
witnesses are heard, which takes a long period of time.  Finding the witnesses at 
times becomes difficult as the witnesses could have changed addresses, left the 
country, died etc.  Repeated adjournments are usually given pending the 
production of such witnesses, adding to an already lengthy duration time.  
Although the non-appearance of parties cannot be fully avoided, it could be 
minimized if the list of witnesses for both sides is submitted at the beginning of 
the trial as the law demands; their presence secured both sides heard continuously.  
One also notices that many adjournments are given to ‘examine the files”.  This 
also is a result of the legally unwarranted procedure.  Many interlocutory orders 





requires, are in practice conducted through an exchange of written documents.  
Not only does the exchange need additional appearance by the parties, but it also 
demands additional time from the court to go through the documents and give a 
ruling.  As trials take longer, the possibility of judges changing during the course 
of the trial is also high, compounding the reason for examination of the files.  As 
the witnesses for both sides are heard over a long period of time, the judges who 
heard the witnesses will have to go through the transcript again to refresh their 
memories.  When one or more judges have been changed and the judgment is 
given by judges who did not hear some or all the witnesses the need for additional 
adjournments to examine the files gets higher.  Besides, the judges spend much of 
their time on files that are not yet ready for trial.  Submission of written 
documents or replies thereto, for example, is done in open court, thereby 
occupying the judiciary with matters that do not call for a judge’s time. Moreover 
every adjournment in a case is from the very beginning of the process up to the 
end given by the judges regardless of its nature.  This takes a lot of judicial time 
which could have been used to attend matters that are strictly judicial.  The 
practice in the courts has therefore created an inbuilt reason for repeated 
appearances and delays.  
 
 
Table 35 : Cases Pending on August 11 2006 in the FHC as of the year of filing 
 
Offence Charged  Year of filing of the charge in the FHC 
93-4 94-5 95-6 96-7 97-8 98-9 99-0 00-1 01-2 02-3 03-4 04-5 05-6 
Homicide (first or second) 0 0 0 3 5 3 8 20 28 64 88 144 127 
Attempted homicide 3 2 8 21 6 18 23 23 37 109 174 95 131 
Negligent homicide 1 0 4 8 10 17 24 28 41 265 188 176 257 
Fraudulent 
misrepresentation 
0 3 7 6 16 32 45 34 31 94 174 109 262 
Cheque without cover 0 0 0 5 2 6 11 21 18 83 61 218 316 
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The courts keep on giving additional adjournments take wait for the prosecution or 
defence witnesses, or to examine the files.  Cases like bounced checks which mainly 
rely on documentary evidence take a number of years but the system gets clogged 
with unnecessary adjournments which the practice has generated and which the 
judges are unwilling or unable to stop.  In situations where the defendant is denied 
bail by operation of law, every additional adjournment means prolonged deprivation 
of liberty pending trial.  For defendants who are on bail, it can have two possible 
effects.  It can either create an incentive to seek to prolong the trial, or can subject the 
defendant to an endless number of appearances failure in any one of which may cause 
denial of bail.   
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Table 36 : Criminal Cases in the FHC Disposed in 2005-6 as of the year of filing 
 
 
Offence Year of filing of the charge in the FHC 




1 0 2 1 2 6 5 12 28 33 34 13 1 
Attempted 
homicide 
 1 2 1 2 7 13 11 19 61 100 31 8 
Negligent 
homicide 








1 2 2 11 9 17 25 26 26 147 122 100 27 
 
Table 37 : Reasons for Disposition of criminal cases in Kera and Yeka branches of FFIC 2004-2005 
 









Acquittal Conviction others Total 
Kera 41 1698 63 488 720 112 368 286 3776 
Yeka 51 3996 38 678 692 174 425 306 6360 
total 92 5694 101 1166 1412 286 793 692 10136 
% 0.9 56.1 0.99 11.5 13.9 2.8 7.8 6.8  
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In spite of long adjournments the cases do not to reach even the trial stage in many of 
the cases. The table shows the high attrition rate in the judicial process.   In more than 
50% of the criminal cases the proceedings are terminated simply because the 
defendant cannot be found and brought to court.12 In the two branches of the Federal 
FFIC, (table above) the courts gave final decision on the merits only in 9.6 of the 
cases.  In the remaining 91.4% of the cases, the process had to be terminated for some 
other reasons.  This reveals the interrelationship between many of the factors that 
affect delay.  The process is on the one hand delayed because defendants and 
witnesses cannot be produced to court in time.  On the other hand the delay itself 
reduces the probability of the defendants and witnesses coming to court as they may 
have died or changed addresses during the process.  Many cases are therefore given 
indefinite adjournments only to be terminated without reaching trial.  This creates a 
disincentive for defendants who are on bail to speed up the process.  This also 
explains why litigants in Ethiopia do not practically plead guilty.  The delay in the 
process makes production of evidence against the defendant so difficult that there is 
not much a defendant would gain by pleading guilty at the beginning of the process.  
From the figures, one can see that the probability of conviction is so low, and the 
probability of any charge against a defendant being dropped so high, that a defendant 
would be better of if he pleads not guilty.  This also creates an incentive for 
defendants to ask for additional adjournments, as this increases the probability of the 
charge being terminated short of a judgment. Additional adjournments may mean 
additional cost to the defendant as he will have to appear in the process, but for a 
defendant who thinks that he has no sufficient evidence to rebut the case of the 
prosecution, the dilatory tactic can have a higher return. 
                                                 
12 The Ethiopian Law an accused cannot be tried in his absence unless the offence is punishable with 




At this stage one needs to explain why there is so much disparity between the laws 
and the practice in both civil and criminal proceedings in the courts.  Some studies 
conducted about a decade after the Codes were adopted have shown that there was a 
similar gap between the substantive provisions of the CC and the ComC and the 
practice in the community.  As these studies focused mainly on business and adoption 
practices they did not study the gap between the law and the practice within the court 
system.  Some of their conclusions, however, are relevant and can be taken as good 
reasons for the prevailing situation in Ethiopia.   
 
One of the main reasons for the gap is the process under which the Codes were 
adopted.  Many of the Codes, including the CPC were enacted without a proper 
assessment of the situation under which they operate.  In some cases it was clearly 
mentioned that some of the Codes were not supposed to be implemented by the 
majority of the population in Ethiopia.  Although the Codes were thought as good 
tools for transforming the country, that their implementation would be imperfect was 
anticipated from the beginning. (David, 1963:193-194)   Paul Brietzke argues that the 
“Procedure Codes are based on English models which are no more relevant to 
Ethiopia than French models, save that traditional litigation tends to be adversarial 
rather than inquisitorial”. (Brietzke, 1974:159)  Besides when the Codification 
process started the intention of the government was to modernize the country without 
radically altering the institutions.  Change of the laws was not accompanied by a 
radical change of the institutions. (Singer, 1970:97)  Another important factor in the 
effective implementation of rules is the level of communication with those who are 
expected to apply the rule.  During the process of codification no sufficient 
communication was conducted to show people the changes that have been introduced 
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and why they have been introduced. (Brietzke, 1974:157)  This situation was 
exacerbated by the absence of other professional publications through which this 
communication gap could be filled in and by the low level of training of judges who 
were in the courts until recently.   
 
 
4.5.2. Absence of Institutional basis for the proper application of the laws  
 
The discrepancy between the law and the practice aside, the pace of litigation in 
Ethiopian courts both in civil and criminal proceedings is affected by the absence of 
some basic institutions which are envisioned by the substantive laws.   This situation 
may be seen as another manifestation for a non-application of the law as shown in the 
previous section.  It however deserves to be treated separately as the causes are 
different, and the courts have no control over such factors even if they are willing to 
apply the law to the words.  Many studies indicate that one way of controlling delay is 
addressing the supply side of the litigation matrix, to ensure that non-meritorious 
cases do not clog the process. This approach tries to reduce free access to the courts 
by building disincentives to frivolous litigation. These measures try to narrow the 
entry point to litigation by changing the law or by introducing other mechanisms. 
(Sadek et al, 1996)  The Ethiopian experience shows that the low degree enforcement 
of substantive rules by institutions other than the courts contributes towards increment 
in the work load of the courts and average duration time for disposition of cases.  This 
requires an intervention other than narrowing the gate.   
 
Some studies conducted a few years after the adoption of the modern Codes in the 60s 
indicated that it will take years for the new principles in the new laws to be fully 
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understood and properly implemented by the citizens and other concerned institutions. 
(Beckstrom, 1973)  It is now close to half a century since the Codes were adopted. 
Their application is however still challenged by the sheer absence of some elements 
which are in some cases a sine-qua-non for the proper implementation of the 
substantive rules.  Our interest here is to see how this situation affects the pace of civil 
and criminal litigation in Ethiopia.  Examples abound to show the case in point. The 
following are some examples for the case in point.    
 
A. Absence Of A Registration System 
The CC of 1960 contains elaborate procedure for the registration of births (Art. 99-
103, CC), deaths (Art. 104-116, CC) and marriages (Art. 117-120, CC) in the law of 
persons.  It also has detailed provisions for the registration of immovable as part of 
the law of property. (Art. 1553-1646, CC)  The enforcement of these provisions has 
however been suspended pending the issuance of an Order to be published in the 
Gazette for the Publication of laws in Ethiopia.  Article 3361 which suspends the 
coming into force of the registers of civil status further provides that until the coming 
into force of such provisions, proof of birth, marriage and death shall be made by 
producing acts of notoriety drawn up in accordance with the provisions of the Code or 
by such other persons appointed for this purpose by the Minister of Interior.  Neither 
of these are however available to date.  The drawing of an act of notoriety cannot be 
done as the officer of civil status on whom this responsibility rests in accordance with 
the CC is not appointed.  Neither did the Ministry of the Interior appoint any other 
person to perform this duty in accordance with the provisions of the CC.   In effect no 




The effect of the absence of this system on litigation is manifested in a number of 
ways.  First of all as no pre-constituted proof exists as regards such basic things like 
birth, marriage, divorce and death, their existence or absence has to be established 
through the judicial process.  In marriage disputes anyone who claims that a marriage 
exists has to produce four witnesses to prove its existence.  In inheritance claims, any 
person claiming to be a legal heir of the deceased has to come up with four witnesses 
to so prove.  Thus disputes which could have been avoided by having some basic 
things recorded ahead of time are now inundating the Ethiopian courts.  This state of 
affairs is contributing towards judicial inefficiency by increasing the supply side of 
the litigation scenario and raising the work load of the courts.    As indicated earlier, 
the fact finding process is conducted in a fragmented fashion resulting in a prolonged 
process for the establishment of the basic facts on which the parties are at issue.   
 
The non-existence of an effective registration system for immovable property has 
simply become the breeding ground for disputes.  As no effective registration system 
exists as envisaged by the CC, many of the acts relating to immovable property are 
not necessarily registered.  Contracts of sale, mortgages and many other real rights are 
not registered in any systematic manner.  As a result every transaction has to be 
established by producing evidence to a court of law when a dispute arises between the 
parties. Under the Ethiopian legal system the only immovable property that can be 
privately owned is a house. The Ethiopian Constitution allows only the right of use on 
land, because land is declared to be the property of the public and the state. (Art. 
40(3), Const.)  Individuals can only have possession and use rights over land.  No 
registration system however exists as to who has use rights over which piece of land.  
The land use right of every individual is not registered.  Partly because of these, some 
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of the courts have as many as 30% of their work load relating to disputes on who has 
possession over a piece of land.13   
 
The absence of registration affects the pace of litigation in criminal proceedings as 
much as it does civil litigation, not to mention its impact on the quality of the justice 
rendered.  In criminal matters, where children are involved for example, the court 
relies on medical evidence to verify the age of the defendant as no record of birth is 
available to establish the age conclusively.  The report from the medicinal institutions 
not only comes to the courts after a long period of time, but also gives only an 
estimate of the age of the accused.  This situation generates another reason for 
granting additional adjournments on an already congested court calendar. 
 
B. Non-Authentication of Documents 
Non-authentication of documents as required by law is another reason for delay in the 
judicial process which, if not addressed will continue having an adverse effect on the 
speed of litigation in Ethiopian courts.  These issues are basically issues of the 
substantive law and their impact on the pace of litigation is usually underestimated.  
These issues however need to be properly addressed because they have a direct 
bearing on the supply side of the litigation.   Not only do they breed disputes but they 
also complicate the process of fact finding in the courts with the result of prolonging 
disputes on such matters.   
 
The law requires authentication of some juridical acts as a pre-requisite for their 
validity.  This is particularly true to contracts relating to immovable property.  The 
                                                 
13 In the Oromomiya Regional Supreme Court, 30% of the work load relates to dispute on who has the 
right to use a piece of land.   
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law explicitly requires that “a contract creating or signing rights in ownership or bare 
ownership on an immovable or an usufruct, servitude or mortgage of an immovable 
shall be in writing and registered with a court notary”. (Art. 1723 CC) Although no 
valid contract on immovable property can be formed unless this mandatory legal 
provision is satisfied, no notary services exist in many parts of the country.  Neither 
do the courts register the contracts at the time of their formation as required by law.  
As a result, many of the contracts relating to immovable property are done by an 
ordinary contract and the dates for their formation are not authenticated by any 
government institution.   Not only does this create insecurity in legal transactions 
relating to immovable property, but it has also become one of the reasons for an 
increase in disputes relating to immovable property and increase in work load in the 
courts.   
 
C. Shortage Of Institutions Which Provide Expert Evidence 
When expert evidence is needed to prove some facts in dispute, it takes a long time to 
get the expert, if it is feasible at all.  When mental health of the defendant becomes an 
issue in any court in the country, the defendant is sent to the only mental hospital in 
the country which is located in Addis Ababa.  This hospital not only conducts the day 
to day operation like any other hospital but also has to attend to the request of the 
courts to give expert evidence that is relevant to the issue of insanity.  The demands 
for the services of the hospital are a lot higher than it can possibly accommodate and 
it takes many adjournments to get the results.  Autopsy reports, audit reports and 
many other reports that rely on specialized institutions face similar problems and 
cases are adjourned because the reports do not come to court by the appropriate 




4.5.3. Professional Competence 
 
As indicated in chapter one many of the legal institutions in Ethiopia have been 
introduced into the system only after the second half of the 20th century.  This is 
particularly true of its legal education which has a direct bearing on the human 
resource component of judicial activities.  Studies conducted in 1970 indicated that 
the average education level of judges in Ethiopia was only grade 5. (Beckstrom, 1973)  
The first full fledged Law School in Ethiopia was inaugurated only in 1963.  There 
was a diploma program in law that started earlier, but it was very limited in its level of 
admission and scope of training.  When Ethiopia adopted its Codes in the 1960s it did 
not have a law school that could provide degree program studies yet.  The first 
graduates of the first law school were still doing their studies when the CPC was 
enacted in 1965.  When the CrPC was enacted in 1961, Ethiopia did not even have 
people who had graduated with law degrees on its own soil.  Statistics is not available 
as regards the number of people who studied law in other countries before the opening 
of the Law School in Addis Ababa, but it is indicated that the number was negligible. 
(Vanderlinden, 1966-1967:261)  
 
The qualification of judges in Ethiopia did not improve significantly because the 
supply of the law school was not as high as the demand of the legal institutions.  Until 
recently, the Law School was producing only 40-50 graduates a year and it was the 







Table 38 : Level of education of judges in 1989 and in 2006 
Level of education 1989 2006 (for 
Federal Courts 
only) 
PhD 0.1% 0% 
LLM 0.4% 6.5% 
LLB 7.3% 74.1% 
Diploma in law 7.9% 19.4% 
Certificate in law 5.7% 0% 
7th-12th grade 17.2% 0.9% 
1-6th grade 14.4% 0% 
No formal education 47% 0% 
 
Insufficient investment in human and institutional resources has many a time been 
mentioned as one important reason for delay in judicial processes in many 
countries.(Sadek et al, 1996) The impact of a shortage of sufficiently trained 
manpower is even more pronounced in Ethiopia.  Earlier, substantial percentage of the 
judges did not have any formal legal education.  78.6% of the judges had no legal 
training at all, and had to count on their experience to perform their judicial functions. 
After the introduction of the federal arrangement in Ethiopia, some States use their 
own local languages in the judicial process which has further complicated the demand 
for trained man power.  The States had to begin from the scratch.  All the States had 
to appoint judges for the first instance Courts by giving a six month training 
programs. Supreme and FHCs started by appointing new graduates from the Civil 
Service College or the Law School at Addis Ababa University.  Although there are 
more people with higher professional qualification on the bench some of them lack 
the experience which the post requires.   The number of law schools is rising rapidly, 
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Ethiopia has a long way to go to fulfil the demand for trained man power in the courts 
and any reform effort must in the meantime take note of this element.   
 
4.5.4. Absence of Proper Case Management  
The importance of managerial judging in reducing delay has been extensively studied 
and has become a focus of reform to reduce delay in many legal systems.  The reform 
programs introduced in England and Wales take managerial judging as one important 
direction to reduce delay in the courts.  Case flow management was introduced into 
many courts in the U.S. even earlier.  
 
In Ethiopia the process of litigation both in civil and criminal proceedings is not 
properly managed, contributing to the delay and creation of backlog in courts.  The 
absence of a proper case management manifests itself in a number of ways.  
Development of an effective reform strategy requires an appropriate identification of 
these problems at all stages.  In this section some of the most important aspects will 
be discussed briefly.   
 
The problem starts with the improper organization and management of the registrar’s 
office, an office which, when it exists, is responsible to provide important 
administrative support to the judges during the process.  Verification of pleadings’ 
compliance with procedural rules, keeping records, classification and tracking of 
cases, keeping of exhibits, service of notices and summonses on parties and witnesses 
are some of the responsibilities of the registrar’s office.   
 
As mentioned earlier many of the administrative responsibilities of the registrar are 
transferred to the judges thereby sharing a very scarce resource of the judges.  The 
227 
 
vetting of the written reply of the defendant in civil proceedings is an administrative 
matter which should be done in the registrar’s office.  This is however done by the 
judges themselves.  Not only are litigants made to wait for many hours in the courts 
just to submit a written response to the judge in an open court or in chambers, but the 
judge also spends a big part of the daily schedule in handling such administrative 
matters which were supposed to be conducted by the administrative arm of the court. 
 
The record keeping system in many of the courts leaves much to be desired. Files are 
easily misplaced and additional adjournments given as a result.  Systematic 
information about the progress of individual cases or the courts in general is not 
available.    Many of the registrars in the courts lack proper training in law or another 
field.  In many of the lower courts, the judge doubles as a registrar denying the judge 
of whatever services the registrars in other courts provide.  When judgments are 
rendered at long last, the registrars rarely process the services with adequate speed.  It 
takes time to type the hand written record of the dossier and give it to the parties who 
may wish to go on appeal.   
Discussion in previous sections shows that managerial judging though reflected in 
many rules of the Procedure Codes is not practiced in the courts.  The judges do not 
control the process.  Adjournments are granted whenever demanded by the litigants.  
Many a time the judges play a passive role in the unfolding of the process.  They do 
not use many of their powers to ensure that cases are disposed of in the shortest 
possible time.  And much of the time of the judges is spent on administrative matters.  
Many of the cases listed in a day relate to exchange of pleadings or to other matters 




4.5.5. Insufficient Resources 
Many of the Ethiopian courts do not have sufficient resources to cover even the basic 
facilities. Although the annual budget for the courts has shown significant 
improvement in absolute terms over the years, it still remains to be a very small 
percentage of the annual budget for the Federal Government.   
Table 39 : Annual budget of the Federal Courts 
Year Federal 
Government 
Federal Courts Percentage 
1996-7 4,959,258,800 4,321,800          0.08 
1997-8 3,752,370,700 11,857,100 0.315 
1998-9 4,047,647,100 14,429,400 0.356 
1999-0 8,238,615,900 14,851,300          0.18 
2000-1 8,583,800,000 13,765,500          0.16 
2001-2 11,892,422,000 17,891,200          0.15 
2002-3 13,347,300,000 17,447,200          0.13 
2003-4 13,855,300,000 15,632,300 0.112 
2004-5 14,504,200,000 20,265,700          0.14 
 
The budgetary constraint is in general a reflection the low level of development in 
which the country finds itself.  Not only did this constraint affect past performance of 
the courts, but future reform proposals must take this into account.   
 
4.6. Alternative Dispute Resolution 
4.6.1. ADR after Initiation of Formal Proceedings 
 
As noted earlier, TDR mechanisms are very common in many parts of Ethiopia.  The 
demand for juridical services from the ordinary courts is low compared with the 




Much as the traditional arrangements play an important role in dispute resolution 
before cases come to court, there is little indication that they continue to do so after 
cases are initiated in the ordinary courts. Once formal proceedings are started the 
parties to the dispute in civil litigation usually stay on course until a final ruling is 
given by the judges.  
 
As could be observed from the figures in the previous sections, criminal proceedings 
in many courts in Ethiopia constitute a bigger part of the workload of the judges.  Not 
only does this workload affect the waiting time for criminal proceedings, but it also 
adversely affects the situation in civil litigation.  Many judges in the lower courts 
handle civil and criminal cases at the same time.  Even in situations where there are 
distinct benches for civil and criminal cases, improving one would affect the other as 
it would make more judges available.   Therefore solving some of the problems in the 
criminal justice may have a positive impact on efficiency as it releases some of the 
judges’ time tied up in criminal proceedings.   This is particularly important as 
increasing the number of judges can solve the problems of efficiency only to a limited 
extent because of budgetary constraints and the limitations on the supply of trained 
manpower.   
 
Judicial efficiency and access to justice are highly interrelated.  A problem that causes 
delay may also be a barrier to justice.  In general, the problems which were raised and 
discussed in connection with judicial inefficiency need to be solved to make the 
judiciary more accessible.  Some particular points will be highlighted because of their 
particular impact on access to justice.    Two points will be raised in connection with 
the situations in the criminal justice, the incentive structure and delay.  In criminal 
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proceedings cases are congested because the legal system lacks an incentive for 
defendants in criminal proceedings.  The accused who pleads guilty on the first day of 
his appearance is not in any meaningful way treated differently from a person who 
fights tooth and nail and loses at the end of the process.  The criminal justice system 
has aggravating and extenuating circumstances but they are not necessarily related to 
the guilty plea of the accused.  It is possible that given the same criminal charge of a 
crime committed under similar circumstances, a person who pleads guilty may carry a 
longer prison term than a person who does not.  It all depends on how the judge 
weighs the aggravating circumstances that may be raised by the prosecution and the 
extenuating circumstances that may be raised by the accused, whether he pleads guilty 
or not.   
 
Given the higher probability that a case may be dropped because of some of the 
reasons mentioned earlier, the accused who does not plead guilty may actually be 
better of because he has a much higher probability of never reaching the trial stage or 
not being convicted at all even after the trial. Any accused person who makes rational 
calculations would, therefore, not plead guilty lest he carries a sentence which he, 
most likely would have avoided just by not saying anything at all.   Therefore, not 
only does the legal system deny incentives to those who plead guilty, but it gives an 
incentive to those who do not.  Addressing these incentive and disincentive structures 
would enhance access to justice by reducing the number of criminal cases that congest 
the process.   
 
One observes similar situations in the civil justice system as well.  Many of the 
reasons mentioned in connection with delay connive to make settlement very difficult 
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if not completely impossible.    Many of the reasons that cause delay also act as 
barriers to justice, directly or indirectly, but we will pick only two of them to show the 
interface between these factors, the structure of the proceedings and the cost factor.  
 
The CPC hints that a compromise agreement may be reached because of the initiative 
of the parties, or because of the court’s attempt to reconcile them. (Art. 274 (1), CPC) 
It is also provided that the “court may on the application of the parties, indicate to the 
[parties] the lines on which a compromise agreement may be made” (Art. 274 (2), 
CPC).   Obviously the law does not take a judgment as the only way to dispose of a 
civil case.  On the contrary, the law clearly expects the judge to encourage the parties 
to reach an agreement and terminate the case rather than conduct a full trial. (Art. 275 
CPC)  This takes place only rarely.  Here are some of the reasons.   
 
The mindset of the judges, the parties and the lawyers can be taken as one important 
explanation in this respect. The prevailing attitude among judges is that they are there 
to give decisions, to declare one a winner and the other a loser.  That is how those 
who have been to the law schools were trained.  Every discussion in the law schools 
whether in substantive law or procedural issues portrays the judge together with his 
judgments.   Training on ADR is only a recent development in the curriculum of the 
law schools.14  The lawyers’ mindset is not any different.  Many get suspicious when 
a judge, if ever, asks the parties to reach an agreement.15  
 
                                                 
14 At Addis Ababa University ADR is given only at a post graduate level.  The course on Civil 
Procedure focuses on the adversarial tradition of decision making and gives little attention to ADR. 
15 Interview with Members of the Bar think that a case comes to court because it could not be solved by 
agreement saying all they expect from a judge is a judgment. 
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But there are more important underlying problems which will persist even if this was 
surmounted. As things stand now, the litigation landscape is not conducive for the 
judge to persuade the parties to settle.  The problem starts from the way the pleadings 
are written.  Although the law requires the plaintiff to state the material facts, and 
only the material facts concisely, (Art. 80 (2), CPC)and the defendant to make a 
specific denial of any fact stated in the statement of claim which is not admitted, 
(Art.234(2), CPC) often times the pleadings are presented as long stories including 
arguments.  Besides, the first hearing in which the judge, amongst other things frames 
the issues on which both parties are in disagreement is not conducted.  Issues are not 
framed until a later stage in the process.  The issues are set, at times when the judge 
sits to write the judgment.  This has deprived the judge of the opportunity to intervene 
at an earlier stage, on which the law seems to be counting.  The judge can hint to the 
parties of the possibilities of settlement only if he is aware of the issues on which they 
are at variance.  The parties would also be in a better position to compromise if they 
are assured that the issue upon which the judge will give the judgment is the same as 
the one upon which they are negotiating.  If the first trial is conducted and issues 
framed with the participation of the parties, this could be achieved.  Without it, the 
probabilities of the parties reaching a compromise agreement would be less.   
 
The fact that issues are not framed partly means that the court will have difficulties 
controlling the relevance of the evidence which each party proposes to produce.   This 
gives the parties greater latitude to bring more witnesses or other evidence to the 
court, putting the economically powerful party or the party who benefits from delay, 
in a better position to dictate terms or to say no to ADR.  In Ethiopia, this is 
exacerbated by the fact that the parties are not made to cover the cost of the witnesses’ 
233 
 
expenses they call, as the law demands. (Art. 112(1), CPC) Thus there is no direct and 
immediate financial implication to the number of witnesses one calls in to the court 
room.  As both parties do not pay for the travelling costs and other expenses of the 
witnesses, the loser will have less to reimburse to the winner, if the judge decides that 
the loser should cover all the expenses.  This is, however, still complicated by the 
discretionary nature of the power of the courts in relation to costs and other incidental 
expenses.   As the court has “full power to decide by whom or out of what property 
and to what extent such costs are to be paid” (Art. 462, CPC), the parties may be 
made to cover their own costs, or the loser may cover the expenses of the other party 
only in part.  A party who knows that he will eventually lose when the judgment is 
given may not be willing to settle, as the benefits he gets from delay may outweigh 
the loss he incurs by early settlement.  A litigant or his advocate can use procedural 
matters to wear the other party out.  The plaintiff can request for the amendment of 
the pleadings, when the trial is about to be completed.  Such requests by litigants are 
usually accepted by the courts on the ground that the rules allow amendment of the 
same at any time before judgment (Art. 91(1), CPC).  Plaintiffs who obtain 
injunctions from the court usually use this procedure as a dilatory tactic.  Obtaining 
stay of execution in the appellate courts is another commonly used procedure which 
impedes the effective utilization of ADR.  As appellate processes take long to finalize, 
the party against whom a judgment is rendered asks for a stay of execution which the 
courts usually grant.  In the appellate courts, more than 80% of the judgments of the 
lower courts are confirmed. (FSC database).  A litigant with a frivolous claim can, 
however, easily cling to this procedure even though he may as well know that he will 
lose at the end of the process.    The court fee for the appellate courts is 50% of the fee 
for the trial courts.  The benefits one draws from the payment of the judgment money 
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during the period of appeal can easily be higher than the cost which may eventually 
be awarded, if at all, to the other party at the end of the process.   
 
The party who declines offers for settlement therefore has many strings which he can 
pull to frustrate the other party who may be willing to terminate the process by 
compromise.    
 
4.6.2. Small Claims Tribunals 
 
As explained in the previous parts of this thesis, the TDR mechanisms are vibrant in 
different parts of Ethiopia.  It should not, therefore, come as a surprise that in most of 
the Regional States where the TDR mechanisms are relatively stronger, no separate 
small claims tribunals exist.  Where the TDR system handles disputes including the 
ones which fall under the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, there seems to be no 
strong need for having these tribunals.  In these states, as the ordinary courts handle 
only a small segment of the disputes that arise in the communities, the problems of 
adjudication which call for a separate small claims tribunal are not that profound. 
 
In the other States16 small claims tribunals are established and operate at the lowest 
level of the state structure called the Kebeles.  In all the states where they are 
established, these tribunals have jurisdiction to handle civil claims below a certain 
value.  As jurisdiction of the social courts is based on the amount in controversy, the 
primary determinant for jurisdiction is not so much the nature of the dispute or the 
type of relationship that gave rise to the dispute but the monetary value of the claim 
by the plaintiff.   Their jurisdiction cannot exceed Birr 5000 in Addis Ababa social 
                                                 
16 These tribunals are established in the States of Tigrai, Amhara, Oromiya and SNNPR. 
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courts, (Proc. 31/ 2007 AA) Birr 1000 in Oromiya State, Proc. 66/2003 ORS)  Birr 
2500 in Tigrai State (Proc. 93/2005) and Birr 1500 in Amhara State.(Proc. 17/2007 
ARS)  In some States they also have the jurisdiction to handle disputes relating to 
land use right, marriage disputes and abuse of property regardless of the amount of 
money in controversy.  In Tigrai State the social courts have jurisdiction on matters 
relating to property in marriage, partition of common property, establishment of 
paternity and other related issues.  In Oromiya, the social courts have the jurisdiction 
on land use rights regardless of the amount of the claim.  Such issues are bound to 
raise complex legal issues which can be beyond the competence of the judges in the 
social courts.  
 
The jurisdiction of the social courts in criminal cases includes handling what are 
categorized as petty offences under the Penal Code.  In matters that fall under their 
jurisdiction, the Social Courts are allowed to impose a maximum arrest of one month 
if the accused is found guilty.    
  
The objectives of the social courts are not always articulated in the laws that bring 
them into existence.  Some common objectives can, however, be inferred from the 
details of the establishment proclamations, the most important of which are the 
following.   
1. Making efforts to maintain peace and good neighbourly relations among 
citizens of the Kebeles17 
2. Creating a forum for dispute resolution that is not bound by stringent 
procedural rules (Proc. 31/2007 AA) 
                                                 
17 This objective is stated in the Proclamations of Oromiya, Amhara and Tigrai Social Courts. 
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3. reducing the workload of the ordinary courts by diverting small claims to these 
tribunals (Proc. 31/2007 AA) 
4. settling conflicts through mediation or arbitration (Proc. 17/2007 ARS) 
 
These objectives indicate an interest on the part of the policy makers not only to 
divert cases from the ordinary courts to the social courts but also to organize the latter 
under a new thinking.  Achievement of the first and the fourth objectives clearly 
demand from the social courts pursuit of a method other than the adjudication model 
where the process involves binary oppositional presentation of facts in dispute 
(Menkel-Meadow, 1996:6).  Although the degree of simplicity depends on the nature 
of the rules, the declaration of intent to avoid the rigid rules of procedure in social 
courts and adopt a more simplified procedure that fits their purpose also reflects 
recognition that attainment of these objectives demands following a different method.  
 
The imported procedural laws of Ethiopia which are highly technical and formal have 
nothing in common with the highly informal and democratic traditional dispute 
settlement practices. In a country where the majority of the population is illiterate, the 
stringent technical requirements in pleadings, presentation of evidence, the process of 
trial and the possibility of losing a case for reasons of legal technicality constitute a 
nightmare for an average citizen. (Girma, 1982) Small claims tribunals have become 
instrumental in reducing delay and complexity in many other legal systems to the 
extent of having been praised as the "supermarket justice" because of the quick and 
inexpensive justice they provided. (William, 1972)  Their existence should be 




Reports in some States indicate that as many as 85% of the cases in the States are 
handled by the Social Courts. (Tigrai SC 2005)   As these tribunals are established at 
the lowest level of the state structure, they will create the advantage of proximity to 
their users.  Ethiopia’s population has exceeded 73 million and it covers an area of 
approximately 1,098,000squre kilometres.  For such a big population and geographic 
expanse there are only about 800 court sites in the whole country.  This inevitably 
means that people have to travel a long distance to get the regular first instance courts.  
Compounded by the low level of economic power of the majority of the population 
and bad infrastructure this would discourage many citizens from using the ordinary 
courts to vindicate rights. Under such circumstances the establishment of social courts 
can help citizens get a better access to justice.   The judges are drawn from the same 
community as a result of which they are very likely to speak the same language and 
share the same culture with the disputants.  The social courts generally render 
decisions faster than the ordinary courts.  All these elements combined together make 
the social courts less expensive compared to the ordinary courts.  As many of the 
disputes channelled to the social courts are of a small value, parties who would have 
been discouraged to go to the ordinary courts because of the disproportion of the cost 
may have more incentives to take their claims to these tribunals.    
 
To make these tribunals a more robust forum for effective use of rights there are a 
number of points which need thorough consideration under the Ethiopian small claims 
regime.  In the following paragraphs the basic points for concern in the legal regime 




Small claims tribunals are needed because of some of the problems that are inherent 
in the formal administration of justice, namely the procedural technicality and the 
disadvantage which people with small claims suffer as a result.  The way out of such 
anomaly is utilization of simplified procedural rules and adoption of methods that fit 
the nature of the disputes in the tribunals. (Kruse, 2004-2005:394) 
 
In spite of declarations to this effect in the legislations in Ethiopia, one notices that the 
mode of litigation in the social courts is not significantly different from that of the 
ordinary courts.  The social courts are by law bound to follow the rules provided in 
the CPC as much as the ordinary courts.  A social court is expected to "use the Civil 
Procedure Code, Criminal Procedure Code and other relevant laws in accomplishing 
its tasks and executing it decisions." (Art.7 (6), Pro. 31, 2007)  The requirement for 
pleading, the process of appeal, and the fee structure18 is the same as for the ordinary 
courts.  Representation by attorneys is encouraged by the legislation.  Once pleadings 
are concluded the courts are expected to give a judgment in writing and attach the 
dissenting opinion if there is one.19   The jurisdiction of the social courts is limited to 
small claims, but they are expected to handle the matters brought to them in more or 
less the same way as the regular courts.  It is provided that the judges should be 
guided by nothing else but the law20 in the same way as the ordinary courts.  This 
strengthens the combative mentality in the social courts and takes them further away 
from the possibilities of settlement which is one of the declared objectives.  Although 
some of the proclamations which establish the social courts mention that ensuring 
                                                 
18 A plaintiff in the social courts pays the same court fee as would have been paid if the case were 
submitted to the ordinary court. Article 16 of Addis Ababa Social Courts. 
19 In all social courts three judges sit for every case.  
20 Oromiya Social Courts Proclamation 66/2003, Article 7 provides that judges of the social courts 
‘shall be guided by no other authority than that of the law’.  Similar provisions are found in the social 
courts proclamations of the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Regional State ( 
Proclamation 65/2003 Article 7), Tigrai state (Proclamation 93/2005 Article 5. 
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peace and stability in their community is one of their purposes, none of the 
proclamations envisage settlement as a primary way to achieve these ends.  Implicit in 
these proclamations is therefore the understanding that the social courts can ensure 
harmony in their communities by using the adjudicative process like the ordinary 
courts. The basic ideas for the organization of the benches, place, time and manner of 
hearing are similar to that of the ordinary courts. The primary mode for dispute 
resolution is the binary mode where one would be declared a winner and the other a 
loser.  The combative adversarial mentality is carried over to the working 
environment of the social courts.  This situation defeats the purpose for which the 
social courts are established. 
 
Furthermore, the principle of judicial independence is spelt out in more or less the 
same way as it applies to the ordinary courts.21  The relevant provision of the 
SNNPRS for example provides that “judges of Social Courts shall exercise their 
functions in full independence and shall be directed solely by the law; they shall, 
however, be held legally responsible for deliberately breaching the law with a view to 
unjustly favour or disfavour a party”. (Art.7, Pro.65, 2003)  This situation is further 
compounded by the  training programs for the social court judges prepared on the 
implicit assumption that given the resources and the time, the social courts should be 
versed with the procedural rules as much as the judges in the ordinary courts.   
 
The social courts are established at the lowest hierarchy called Kebeles.  Much of the 
TDR is still vibrant and working well in many of the Kebeles.  Recent studies indicate 
that the TDR are the primary modes of dispute settlement in many parts of the 
                                                 
21 Social Courts Proclamations of the Oromiya, Amhara, Tigrai and SNNPRS are essentially the same 
as regards this point. 
240 
 
country. Many of the people involved in these TDR do not read and write but they do 
settle disputes that arise in their communities.   On the other hand reading and writing 
is a requirement to become a judge in the social courts.  By virtue of this requirement 
many of the traditional wise men who know the tradition and who are accepted by the 
community are excluded from such tribunals.  The ones who read and write and by 
virtue of which they become judges in the social courts are usually neither well versed 
with the TDR systems nor with the rules in the formal state laws.  In some traditions 
the people who are involved in the process of dispute settlement are believed to have 
the power to foresee events and to identify who did what in public gatherings 
encouraging the parties as well as the witnesses to tell the truth.(Tesfay, 2005)  
Taking these people out of the process because of their illiteracy raises the tendency 
of the parties and the witnesses not to tell the truth affecting the tribunals' capacity to 
arrive at the truth.  As the trend of such tribunals is to render binary decisions, the 
losing party tends to go to the next echelon on appeal either because he/she does not 
want to be seen to be losing or because he/she thinks that the outcome was unjust.22 
 
It is submitted that mediation rather than adjudication is more appropriate to achieve 
the goals set for the social courts.  In other systems, mediation was introduced in 
small claims tribunals because of the inadequacy of the trial process and the quality of 
justice attained through adjudication.  Adjudication is not appropriate for small claims 
because it narrows disputes arising from any incident to legally cognizable issues 
thereby leaving many underlying causes of the dispute untouched while resolving the 
legal case. (Wissler, 1995:351) Mediation is also likely to give wider remedies to the 
                                                 
22 The number of appeals coming to the Oromiya regular Courts from the Social Courts is increasing 
over the years.  The same pattern is observed in the Cassation Division of the FSC.  Many litigants that 
started their litigation in a Kebele in one of States reach up to the FSC alleging that the decision 
rendered by the lower courts, including the social court contains an error or law.   
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disputants in the social courts than the binary win/lose outcomes in adjudication 
(Menkel-Meadow, 1996:6) which are very likely to create the feeling of humiliation 
and vindication by one of the disputants. (Wissler, 1995:351) The number of appeals 
that are coming to the regular courts up to the highest court in the land is an indication 
of this sense of humiliation and vindication created by the binary adjudication in the 
social courts.23  This can be greatly reduced by introducing mediation in the social 
courts.  The mediation process allows the disputants to include in the discussion 
anything which they think is relevant to resolve their differences including broader 
contextual factors such as past relationships, their existing situations and future 
consequences that may result from the solutions. (Wissler, 1995:347) Introducing 
mediation in to the social courts will also have the advantage of enhancing the 
perception of fairness and satisfaction of the process by the disputants.  As mediation 
is more inclusive and participatory than adjudication, it is more likely to create better 
results by allowing examination of different perspectives of a problem.  Because of its 
participatory nature outcomes in mediation are also more likely to be perceived as 
legitimate by the participants in the process. (Kruse, 2004-2005:395)   
 
The stated objective of the social courts, achieving peace and good neighbourly 
relations, is very unlikely to be achieved through the adjudicative binary model which 
is unavoidable if the courts follow the rules in the Procedure Codes.   Given the level 
of training of the judges in the social courts, it is unlikely that the social courts will 
follow the Codes to resolve the disputes in practice.  As is observed in practice many 
of the social courts find adjudicating cases on the basis of the Codes problematic and 
resort to other methods quite often.  Given the fact that many of the regular courts 
                                                 
23  Data In Oromiya Supreme Court indicates that up to 30% of the cases that are opened to the court 
every year started in the Social Courts in the Regional State 
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also deviate from the rules in the Codes to a great extent, one should not expect the 
social courts to behave in a different way.  Thus even if the adjudicative process were 
considered more superior to achieve the objectives, it cannot be attained in the social 
courts in Ethiopia because of the overall situation under which they are operating.   
 
The initiative in the Amhara State to reorganize the social courts under new principles 
should be emulated by all the other States. The new legal regime for social courts 
which became effective beginning December 31, 2007 has changed the basic premises 
for the organization of and process in the social courts.  Unlike the previous laws, the 
new law makes mediation the primary mode for resolving disputes that are submitted 
to the social courts. A clear link is created between the objective of ensuring a 
peaceful neighbourly relations and the process of mediation by the social courts.  A 
relevant part of the legislation provides that the social courts should “enhance the 
culture of peaceful neighbourly relations by settling conflicts through arbitration, 
mediation and negotiation”. (Art. 4(1), Pro. 151, 2007ARS) The judges in social 
courts who are elected by the people serve primarily as mediators and decide cases 
only when the mediation fails. (Art 9, Pro. 151, 2007ARS) When mediation fails and 
cases are set for adjudication, the new law gives enough flexibility for the social 
courts to use their customs and traditions. Unlike the previous laws, the new law does 
not impose the rules of CPC and CrPC on the courts. (Art. 20 ibid)  On the contrary, it 
explicitly stipulates that the social courts are not bound by the details in these Codes. 
This arrangement for social courts is, therefore, a new model which aspires to 
integrate the local justice without necessarily eliminating customary rules of 
procedure.  These tribunals may earn greater legitimacy because of the level of 
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satisfaction which they are likely to provide as a result of the process they follow and 
the outcomes they attain. 
 
The grounds for appeal under the new legislation are more restrictive than the 
previous one.  Appeal to the ordinary courts is allowed only if the appellant can show 
that there were clear indications of partiality during the process, there was bribe or if 
the decision was rendered after hearing only one of the parties.  Now that the courts 
are focusing on mediation, it is unlikely that there will be as many appeals as in the 
previous arrangements because the process and the outcome will most likely be 
accepted by the disputants.  The only time when cases that are initiated in the social 
courts could go to the first instance courts is when the courts have acted beyond their 
jurisdiction and when the decision violates fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
disputants. (Art. 22 Proc. 15/2007 ARS)   
 
Neither are the new social courts bound by the previous rules about neutrality which 
are necessary to the ordinary procedure but may not be as helpful at the village level 
where closeness of the third party to the disputants may be an important factor in 
bringing disputes to an end.  
 
4.6.3. Ad-hoc ADR 
 
Formal institutional arrangements to provide forum for ADR are rare in Ethiopia.  
Currently there are only two institutions, both of which have been established 
recently, to provide forum for mediation and arbitration.  The first one is an arm of the 
Ethiopian Chamber of commerce and the other one is an NGO established with the 
aim of encouraging resolution of disputes through mediation and arbitration. Both 
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institutions are established to facilitate the resolution of disputes, particularly business 
disputes, without resorting to the formal court system. They have however so far 
handled a few cases by mediation and arbitration.  The Ethiopian Arbitration and 
Conciliation Center (EACC) has given a number of training programs on mediation to 
professionals in different fields including lawyers.  It is believed that this would 
eventually change the combative mentality particularly that of the lawyers and may 
create an interest in mediation and arbitration.   
 
The cost factor may be discouraging disputants from taking their cases to these 
centres.  When parties go to these centres for arbitration the fee they are charged by 
the arbitrators is exorbitant compared to what they would pay if they go to the courts.  
Apart from the amount that is paid, the modality for payment may also discourage 
particularly the defendants from consenting to go to these centres.  In the ordinary 
courts, fee is paid by the plaintiff with a possibility of reimbursement.  The defendant 
does not have to pay upfront and reimbursing is not automatic even when the decree 
is in favour of the plaintiff.  Going to theses centres, on the other hand, entails 
payment upfront which can discourage many a defendant from accepting ADR 
through these institutions.  The financial interest of lawyers also plays an important 
role.  A speedy disposition of cases in these centres may not be compatible with the 
financial interest of the lawyers who may earn more as the process drags longer in the 
courts.   Even where there are no lawyers, the widely held perception that court 
process can be dragged for too long can encourage parties whose prospect of winning 
is less from using these institutions. 




In this chapter an attempt was made to show the pace of litigation in and the factors 
that affect the efficiency of the courts in Ethiopia.  On the one hand Ethiopia has 
Procedural Codes that reflect the adversarial tradition.  These laws try to strike a good 
balance between the competing interests in the process of adjudication.  The interests 
of truth finding, cost minimization and speed are given relatively adequate attention in 
the procedural design of the Codes.  The Codes give wide power to judges to control 
the process and to minimize excesses of adversarial litigation at the trial as well as at 
the appellate level.   
 
On the other hand there is a practice which does not correspond to these fundamental 
principles. The rules in the Codes are not effectively implemented in the courts.  As a 
result of the gap between the law and the practice, the basic objectives which the law 
aspired to achieve are undermined.  One of the results is delay in the process and 
backlog in the courts, although there are encouraging improvements in the recent 
years.  As far as this writer is concerned the main reason for inefficiency in the courts 
is the failure of the actors to abide by the rules of procedure.  This situation is 
exacerbated by the absence of adequate institutional support in other sectors of the 
society.  This indicates that the gap between the law and the reality is not limited to 
the court as such but is a phenomenon observed in other institutions as well. 
 
This scenario determines the direction of reform programs to enhance efficiency in 
Ethiopia.  Ensuring efficiency in Ethiopia requires something more than changing the 
rules in the Codes.  Changes in the rules must be preceded by creation of an 
environment conducive for the proper implementation of those rules.  This includes 
assessment of both the internal and the external environment of the courts.  The 
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problems in the rules could be tested only when they are properly applied.  This 
should not imply that the Codes do not have problems at all.  On the contrary, the 
Codes do have some loopholes which could give people an incentive to prolong 
litigation.  At the end of the day, however, change of these rules could be fruitful if 
there is an assurance that they will be implemented.  The priorities for enhancing 
efficiency should therefore be changing the institutional framework, having more 
professional judges, training them on new modes of doing business, making those key 
institutions envisaged by the Codes (such as registration) work, revitalizing legal 
education, and  increasing the resources  for the judiciary.   
 
The legal regime on small claims tribunals moves into two directions.  On the one 
hand there is an apparent interest to have small claims tribunals handle disputes of 
small value through institutions which are established at the grass roots level.  The 
methods used to achieve these objective however, seem to be in direct conflict with 
the stated objectives.  The complex procedural rules which have proved difficult to 
properly apply in the ordinary courts are transferred to the small claims.  Under the 
Ethiopian context the combative adversarial spirit is not appropriate method for the 
small claims tribunals.  Ensuring access to justice would therefore require assessment 
of methods that would be more appropriate for these forums.  Recent attempts to 
make these tribunals focus on mediation and use customary substantive and 









This chapter will raise some issues which the judicial reform program in Ethiopia 
should address to ensure independence as well as accountability of the regular courts.  
In this connection the state of judicial independence and accountability will be 
examined.  The legal framework for judicial independence and accountability will be 
discussed separately from the actual level of judicial independence and accountability.  
This will show the achievements and problems in de jure independence and 
accountability separately from the problems in de facto independence and 
accountability which may come up with different indices.   In examining the degree of 
independence and accountability of the judiciary, a distinction will be made between 
the legal and factual situations that affect the personal or the decisional independence 
and accountability of the judges and those that affect the institutional independence 
and accountability of the courts.   
 
As was done in the previous chapters, discussion of issues that are particular to 
Ethiopia will be preceded by general theoretical discussion of judicial independence 
and accountability which highlight the basic points which deserve to be incorporated 






5.2. Independence of the Judiciary 
5.2.1. Nature of Judicial Independence 
 
Despite a growing consensus on the core values and the importance of judicial 
independence there is an ongoing debate on its exact meaning (Ferejhon and Kramer, 
2002: 965).  The meanings attached to the concept are as many as the people who 
write about it.  As such independence of the judiciary is one of the least understood 
concepts in the field of political science and law. (Larkins, 1996: 607) One can 
discern this from the myriad of definitions given to the concept by different authors at 
different times in many legal systems.  Even then much of the literature on judicial 
independence is based on the assumption that there is an agreement on the meaning of 
the concept.  In some cases definitions are offered which are ill-suited for the practical 
business of government functions and reform.  In others the multiplicity of meanings 
is exploited as a way out. (Burbank, 2003: 323) 
 
It is more or less accepted that the principle of judicial independence is central to the 
judicial process.  The meaning that may be attached to the concept may, however, 
vary in space and time.  Amongst many other things, factors like the form of 
government that is in place, the specific tradition and the prevailing political situation 
in any one country affect the understanding of the concept (Shetreet, 1994)  
 
The multiplicity of meanings can partly be attributed to the vantage point from which 
writers see judicial independence.  These differences are related to the concept of 
power and function of courts in a society.  The definition given to the concept by 
scholars and statesmen who follow the instrumentalist approach is understandably 
different from the one forwarded by those following the utilitarian approach.  The 
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instrumentalist approach to judicial independence takes the concept not as an end by 
itself but as a means to an end.  The utilitarian definition on the other hand takes 
judicial independence as a monolith which deserves protection on its own right. 
(Burbank, 2003:323) The points of departure of these and other theories affect the 
design for judicial independence, the degree of insulation of the judge and the courts 
from external influence, the relationship between the different branches of 
government and the modalities of court administration.  The most important thing in 
this regard is whether judicial independence is considered as a means to an end or an 
end by itself.  The traditional view takes judicial independence as a means to an end 
and accepts that the power vested in the judiciary is as limited as the powers of the 
other branches of government.  The contemporary view of judicial independence on 
the other hand attaches a very wide meaning to judicial independence.  The first 
model is commonly called judicial restraint while the second one is labelled as 
judicial activism. (Jipping, 2001:144)  For the judicial restraint model “judicial 
independence is judicial license or freedom to do as the judge chooses.  While the 
traditional view says judges are free to properly exercise judicial power, the 
contemporary view says judges are free from any restraint on judicial power.” 
(Jipping, 2001:150) 
 
Many of the traditional definitions which take judicial independence as a means to an 
end, use as their point of departure, the basic concept of conflict resolution by a 
“neutral third”, which implies settlement of controversies through the consideration of 
only the facts and the relevant laws. (Shapiro, 1981: 1-18) This is the central theme of 
the “social logic of courts” which is necessary to avoid dispute resolution under “two 
against one situation”. (Shapiro, 1981:1-18) the understanding of judicial 
250 
 
independence based on this premise conveys the idea that a dispute should be 
resolved by a judge who has neither a direct interest in the outcome of the dispute nor 
any relation to the litigants, which Fiss calls “party detachment”. (Fiss, 1993,) From 
this basic premise emanate two interrelated aspects of judicial independence, 
impartiality and insularity. (Larkins, 1996: 609) Impartiality implies that the decisions 
of judges will be based solely on the facts and law and not any bias or prejudice in 
favour of one or the other of the parties.  Insularity on the other hand conveys the idea 
that judges should neither be used as tools to further political aims nor punished for 
failing to further them, (Larkins, 1996:609) which, Fiss calls ‘political insularity.’ 
(Fiss, 1993) Many definitions thus reflect these twin concepts of impartiality and 
insularity.  Rosenn for example defines judicial independence as “the degree to which 
judges actually decide cases in accordance with their own determination of the 
evidence, the law and justice, free from the coercion, blandishment, interference, or 
threats from governmental authorities or private citizens”. (Rosenn, 1987) Brinks also 
uses more or less the same elements as he considers judges independent “when their 
appointment is not controlled by a party that has an interest in the outcome of a 
dispute and when they are not subject to unilateral interference in their decision-
making process by a party with an interest in the dispute”. (Brinks, 2004-2005: 600) 
 
The triad logic of a neutral third as articulated by Martin Shapiro helps one grasp the 
basic nature of judicial independence.  If judges are meant to supply the neutral third 
in modern politically organized systems two basic requirements must be satisfied.  
First, the judge should not be “identified with” anyone having an interest in the 
outcome of the dispute.  Second, the neutral third should not be “unilaterally 
influenced” by anyone having an interest in 
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 the outcome of the dispute. (Brinks, 2004-2005:598)  The first requirement demands 
that the decision maker should have a sufficiently distinct preference from that of the 
appointing authority.  Similarities between the preferences of the decision maker and 
the appointing authority cannot be avoided. This identity of the preferences should not 
however be a preordained phenomenon. It basically means that the preferences of the 
judges should be partly different from the preference of the party that makes the 
appointment.  In an independent judiciary where the decision maker is not identified 
with one of the parties the outcome of the process will not be predetermined by the 
preferences of one of the parties, but by the legally relevant features of the dispute.  If 
the outcome of the process is preordained and determined solely by one of the parties, 
the preference of the judge is not sufficiently independent and therefore there is no 
independence. Brinks calls this preference independence. (Brinks, 2004-2005: 599) 
 
An equally important element in judicial independence is the non-existence of undue 
influence by one of the parties in the process of decision making, which is called 
decisional independence (Brinks, 2004-2005:599) or party detachment. (Fiss, 1993) 
This element of judicial independence requires that the judge should not be controlled 
or influenced by the parties in litigation. 
 
The relative nature of judicial independence (Rosenn, 1987:3) brings with it some 
limitations on the content and scope of judicial independence.  While political 
insularity requires that the judiciary be independent from the political authorities and 
the public in general, this type of independence cannot be unlimited. (Fiss, 1993:59-
60)  The need to insulate the judiciary from political control is qualified by other 
equally important considerations some of which are connected with democratic 
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commitments to majority rule.  Although insularity of the judiciary is needed to 
ensure justice, complete removal of the judiciary from public control compromises the 
democratic values of majority rule. (Fiss, 1993:60) The limits on the insularity of the 
judiciary are reflected in different ways in different legal systems. The involvement of 
the political organs in the process of appointment, removal, budget allocation, law 
making powers are some of the processes used in various degrees to attenuate the 
insularity of the judiciary.   
 
Neither are judges completely insulated from other forms of influence.  “Judicial 
independence does not require that judges remain oblivious to all political 
considerations when deciding cases”. (Rosenn, 1987:3)   Decisions of judges are 
bound to be influenced by a number of factors and the presence of some sort of 
control or influence does not necessarily make the judiciary less independent.  It is 
rather the presence of unilateral interference by one of the parties that constitutes a 
treat to this decisional independence.  “The touchstone for independence is not the 
lack of control, but the lack of partisan control:  unilateral control by an identifiable 
faction with an interest in the outcome of the dispute.” (Brinks, 2004-2005:600)  
 
Limiting the concept of judicial independence to impartiality and insularity is, 
however, criticized as being too narrow to convey the core meaning of judicial 
independence.  Larkins argues that apart from impartiality and insularity, the 
definition of judicial independence must include the scope of authority of the 
judiciary as an institution which could show the relationship between the other 
branches of the political system and the courts.  He contends that while impartiality 
and insularity focus on the status of judges, the third element shows the place which 
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the judiciary should occupy in the political system and its relationship with the other 
branches of government.  He thus defines judicial independence as “the existence of 
judges who are not manipulated for political gain, who are impartial toward the 
parties of a dispute, and who form a judicial branch which has the power as an 
institution to regulate the legality of government behaviour, enact neutral justice and 
determine significant Constitutional and legal values. (Larkins, 1996:611)   
 
Brinks argues that the scope of authority of the judiciary should not be part of the 
definition of judicial independence.  In his view, taking some issues from the 
competence of the courts affects their power, but not necessarily their independence.  
Independence becomes a problem for the whole legal system not because power is 
withdrawn from the courts, but when it is “assigned to questionable, partisan bodies 
for decision”. (Brinks, 2004-2005:595) 
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5.2.2. Aspects of Judicial Independence 
A. Decisional Independence 
 
One of the fundamental elements of an independent judiciary is the recognition and 
the actual realization that the individual judge should be free from any undue 
influence in the process of making decisions.  This element is sometimes divided into 
two sub components, substantive and personal by some authors, but the end result is 
insulating the judge from external as well as internal influences which can adversely 
affect her autonomy to arrive at decisions which are based on the evidence and the 
relevant laws, (Shetreet 1976:77).  The main objective of this element is fulfilled in 
different ways and there is no universally accepted mechanism that can be used across 
systems. Nevertheless, there are some basic points which all legal systems should 
fulfil to have an independent judiciary. 
I. Selection 
The process of appointment of judges is one of the areas that is believed to have a 
potential effect on the decisional independence of judges and all legal systems have 
come up with a number of modalities to ensure the independence of their respective 
judges. (Madhuku, 2002: 234)  The most important issues in this regard are the 
distribution of power on the appointment of judges, the features of the process that is 
followed, and the requirements that are used to pick individuals for appointment.  
These elements affect the decisional independence negatively or positively by 
affecting the qualification of the people that come to the bench, the level of 
participation of the public and other political institutions as well as the level of control 
of the political or judicial institutions on decision making.  There are three prevalent 
methods for the selection of judges in different countries, namely; appointment, 
election and mixed methods. (Shetreet, 1976:259) Each method of selection may take 
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different forms depending on which organ has the power to appoint judges and to 
what extent the other branches of government participate in the process.   In some 
legal systems judges are selected by popular election. (Larkin, 2000); in others judges 
are selected by the executive organ with or without the consultation of either the 
legislative or the judicial (Madhuku, 2002) branch.  In still others the nomination may 
be done by judicial councils that are established for these purposes and the final 
appointments may be made either by the executive or the legislative organ of 
government.  The method of appointment also differs depending on the level of the 
court for which the appointment is made. (Rosenn, 1987:19) Regardless of variations, 
the head of the executive plays a critical role in the process of appointment of judges 
in many countries. (Madhuku, 2002:234) 
 
By and large the process of selection prevalent in the common law world gives more 
space for political consideration than the appointment process in the civil law system, 
which, because of the career structure of the judiciary, uses exams at the entry point. 
(Rosenn, 1987)  This situation at the entry level which gives the continental 
politicians less room for manoeuvring, is however, offset by the existence of wider 
opportunities for manipulation of the career structure through the system of 
promotion. (Cappelletti, 1983: 21)  
 
Although different systems of selection are followed, some of them are favoured than 
others as they ensure a higher level of judicial independence and are less manipulated 
by the government of the day.  Among the different methods of selection, the election 
method which is prevalent in many states of the United States seems to give the 
judges a lesser degree of protection in their decisional independence.  Amongst the 
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systems of appointment, the ones that give a wider spectrum for participation of the 
public and the different organs of government are preferred to the ones that 
exclusively give the power of appointment to one of the branches of government.   
 
II. Tenure 
The security of tenure of judges affects the independence of the judges to decide cases 
based on their own preferences rather than on the preferences of the government.  
Again there is no uniformity in the modalities for tenure of judges, as it is partly 
related to the method of selection discussed earlier.  Security of tenure of judges is 
maintained by those systems that give the judges longer terms than the others.  Life 
time appointments or tenure up to a retirement age give fewer opportunities for those 
in power to remove judges in reaction to their decisions and are therefore considered 
to be better arrangements for security of tenure. (Larkin, 2000:72)  Appointment of 
judges for a fixed term or contractual arrangements give the appointing authority the 
opportunity to extend the term of favourable judges and is by virtue of that not 
consistent with the principle of personal independence of judges. (Rosenn, 1987)  
 
Related to the tenure of judges are the issues of removal and the retirement age of 
judges.  Some systems provide for a mandatory age of retirement which is believed to 
deny the executive the power to grant favourable judges the opportunity to stay in 
office. (Madhuku, 2002:243) 
III. Immunity 
Many systems grant different degrees of immunity as a package to ensure their 
decisional independence.  The type and scope of the immunity is measured in light of 
other competing interests, mainly the interests of those that may have been victimized 
by the act of the judge and democratic principle of holding office holders answerable 
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for their acts.  The main rationale for immunity is the desire to insulate the judges 
from incessant actions that may harass and thus minimize the level of their decisional 
independence.  The degree of insulation accorded to judges is not however, uniform 
and there are variations across legal traditions.  The approach of the common law 
tradition has been to completely insulate judges from all civil actions (and to some 
extent also in criminal cases), thereby giving them absolute immunity.  This strict 
application of the principle of immunity in these systems, is however, compensated by 
the availability of processes of impeachment which can be used by the political 
organs to remove a judge on grounds of having violated the standard of good 
behaviour upon which the term of office of a judge is in principle based. (Cappelletti, 
1983)  The civil law legal tradition has followed a different approach which strikes a 
good balance between these conflicting interests.  In the civil law legal tradition the 
state is vicariously liable for the acts of the judges.  In some cases, the judge is also 
held responsible for his own acts.  As the purpose of the immunity is to minimize 
harassing actions against the judges, giving civil immunity to judges while at the same 
time holding the state vicariously liable for the actions of the judicial officers has been 
praised as compatible with the modern principles of good governance. (Cappelletti, 
1983)  In some legal systems judges are treated like any other citizen in this regard 
and subjected to the same rules on criminal and civil liability. (Rosenn, 1987:23) 
 
B. Institutional independence and court administration 
 
Much as insulating judges from undesirable influences from the parties to the 
litigation and the government is needed to foster judicial independence, its impact on 
the administration of justice will be limited if it is not accompanied by institutional as 
well as organizational design that ensures a desirable degree of independence to the 
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judiciary as an institution.  Thus even if one system adopts the best model for 
decisional independence which fits its objectives and other political, economic 
situations and legal traditions, it does not necessarily imply the existence of an 
independent judiciary unless some other mechanisms are put in place to protect the 
institution from equally undesirable external influences.  The institutional 
independence of judges concerns itself much with the nature of the relationship which 
the judiciary as an institution has with the other branches of government, particularly 
on issues that pertain to the overall administration of the judiciary including 
budgetary, organizational and administrative personnel issues.  The institutional 
independence of the judiciary can be discussed under the following basic headings 
based on the extent on the powers on administration of the judiciary. 
I. Exclusive Judicial Responsibility Model 
Under this model the power to administer the judiciary is vested in the judiciary and 
only in the judiciary.  This does not leave any room for the participation of the other 
branches of government in the administration of the courts. This may involve 
existence of a separate body which is entrusted with the power to appoint, promote 
and discipline judges. (Smith, 2008:88) 
  
II. Exclusive Executive Responsibility Model 
Under this model the power to administer the courts is vested in the executive, usually 
through the Ministry of Justice which exercises wide ranging powers.  The powers of 
the Minister may include among other things, the power to decide whether courts are 
needed, the power to initiative disciplinary proceedings against judges, and the power 
to issue rules on court administration or court procedure. In some instances this may 
include monitoring the performance of the judiciary, distribution of case-load, 
supervision of judge’s behaviour and keeping court records. (Smith, 2008) 
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III. Shared Executive-Judicial Model 
This scheme allows participation of the different branches of government in various 
degrees.  The power to administer the courts may be divided vertically whereby some 
specific matters fall under the responsibility of one branch and others are handled by 
the judiciary.  Or it may be divided horizontally and the power to administer the 
higher courts is vested in the judiciary and the lower courts fall under the 
responsibility of the executive.  The administration of the judiciary may also be 
conducted through the establishment of a collegial body which reflects some 
proportional representation of the judiciary and the other branches of government. 
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5.3. Legal Framework for Independence of the Judiciary  
5.3.1. Personal Independence of Judges 
 
The most important aspect of the independence of judges is that in the discharge of 
their functions they should not be subject to anything other than the law.  This 
dimension of judicial independence makes sure that the judges remain neutral, 
impartial and be released from unnecessary influence from any direction. In the 
Ethiopia, this principle is incorporated in the Constitution.  Article 79(3) of the 
Constitution provides that “judges should exercise their functions in full independence 
and shall be directed solely by the law”.  The Constitution also provides that “[c]ourts 
of any level shall be free from any interference or influence of any governmental 
body, government official or from any other source” (Art.79 (2), Const.) Although it 
is true that judicial independence does not depend on constitutional text only, giving 
judges’ independence a constitutional guarantee is one of the first big steps to ensure a 
real independence of the judiciary.  The recognition of personal independence in the 
Constitution as one of the values which deserve special protection is an important 
point of departure in the process of reform. Though not a sufficient condition for the 
full realization of judicial independence, giving the personal independence of judges a 
constitutional recognition and protection is an important prerequisite.   All federal as 
well as state courts at all levels are staffed by judges in Ethiopia. The declaration on 
judicial independence in the Constitution, therefore, covers judges who sit at all levels 
in the judicial hierarchy.   These constitutional provisions are designed to ensure the 
actual as well as the perceived neutrality and impartiality of judges, which is an 




Neutrality and impartiality of judges, perceived or real, however, need to be 
reinforced by other rules which insulate judges from unnecessary external influences.  
In Ethiopia, rules that prohibit judges from simultaneously becoming members of the 
legislative body, executive organ or a political party (Art.8 (2), Pro. 24, 1996), Codes 
of conduct  that, among other things proscribe behaviour for judges both in their 
official and non-official activity, procedure for removal of judges from cases where 
they have an interest (Art.27, Pro. 25, 1996) also exist to reinforce the impartiality and 
neutrality of judges and thereby strengthen their personal independence.   
 
As an important constitutional principle independence of judges is protected from 
some other encroachments through a variety of legal mechanisms.  The scope of 
protection accorded to impartiality and neutrality of judges varies from one system to 
another.  The level of protection of judges in Ethiopia can be examined from the point 




1.  Criminal Immunity 
 
Some legal systems give absolute immunity in criminal cases for judges as part of 
their protection schemes.24  Judges in Ethiopia do not have such a protection.  Judges 
are thus liable to criminal prosecution under the law like any other citizen without any 
exception.  In Ethiopia, only members of the House of People’s Representatives enjoy 
absolute immunity from criminal prosecution in connection with opinions expressed 
or votes cast during parliamentary deliberations. (Art. 54 (5), Const.)  Likewise the 
Constitution grants procedural immunity to the members of the House (Art. 54(6), 
Const.) but not to any other holder of office.  Procedural immunity was granted to 
judges by the transitional government when the proclamation for the independence of 
judges was issued. (Pro. 28, 1992) This protection was not included in the legislation 
for the establishment of the Federal Courts which was enacted in 1994.  As a result, 
the benefits of procedural immunity in criminal proceedings which judges enjoyed 
between 1992 and 1996 do not exist anymore.   The only state that grants procedural 
immunity to its judges in criminal proceedings is the state of Oromiya. (Pro.46, 2001)  
Except in Oromiya State, where permission is required from the JAC, any criminal 
investigation can be conducted against a judge by a police officer without any prior 
permission from the judicial authorities.  
 
2. Civil Immunity 
 
Unlike in criminal cases, the civil liability of judges in tort cases is limited by law if 
the action which is complained of is connected with their functions.  Thus “no action 
for liability may be brought as the result of an act connected with their functions 
                                                 
24 Israel gives such protection to its judges under section 23 of its Penal Law.  “The immunity Is 
granted to any “holder of judicial office” acts done in the course of discharging judicial duties.  
Shetreet p. 201 
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against a judge of the Ethiopian Courts”. Art. 2138 CC).  The bar for action against a 
judge is waived if the judge is sentenced by a criminal court for the acts connected to 
his office.  Judges enjoy immunity against actions from civil liability in tort cases, 
which cannot be lifted short of a conviction by a criminal court.  The ambit of this 
immunity is quite wide and covers all acts that are connected to the functions of a 
judge and such things like bad faith, negligence, acting in excess of jurisdiction, etc., 
are not grounds for removing the immunity.  Although the rule is silent as regards the 
nature of this immunity, one can understand from the wording that it is a procedural 
immunity.  What the law does not allow is an action against a judge in tort, and it does 
not deprive the victim of his right to be compensated.  The desire to protect the judge 
from tort actions on the one hand and the need to have citizens compensated for faulty 
acts of judges, on the other, is balanced under the Ethiopian Tort law through the 
vicarious liability of the state. (Art. 2138, CC)  Under the existing rules, any judge is 
not practically liable for the consequences of a judicial ruling.  The general principle 
which says that “any civil servant or government employee shall make good any 
damage he cause to another by his fault” (Art. 2126, CC) does not apply to judges’ 
faulty acts “connected with their functions” (Art. 2138, CC).  
 
B. Sub Judice Rule 
 
The sub judice rule is a rule that attempts to protect the independence of judges by 
putting some limits on equally important constitutional rights such as freedom of 
expression and the right to be informed.  The substance of this rule is reflected in a 
number of laws in Ethiopia.  The Constitution recognizes the ‘the right of thought, 
opinion and expression’ in Article 29 as one of the democratic rights.  This right 
includes the freedom of expression, which includes “the freedom to seek, receive and 
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impart information and ideas of all kinds”. Freedom of the press which is equally 
recognized as one fundamental right in the Constitution includes access to 
information of public interest. (Art. 29 (3), Const.) The Constitution envisages 
possibilities of putting a limit to the freedom of expression, but it also adds that “these 
rights can be limited only through laws which are guided by the principle that 
freedom of expression and information cannot be limited on account of the content or 
effect of the point of view expressed”. (Art. 29(6), Const.) 
 
The Press law of 1992 recognizes the right of the press to seek and obtain information 
from any source on the one hand and the right to disseminate news and information in 
its possession on the other. (Art. 8(1 & 2), Pro. 34, 1992) The same legislation, 
however, puts a limit to these rights by declaring that these rights do not apply as 
regards information relating to any case heard by any court in camera, unless the court 
decides otherwise (Art. 8(3(c)), Pro.34, 1992), and information relating to a case 
pending before any court. (Art. 8(3(d)), Pro.34, 1992).  This legislation forbids 
publication of anything about a case that is pending in court proceeding thereby 
blocking any flow of information from the courts to the public.  As this legislation 
puts a bar on publication about pending cases it can be said to have protected  the 
judges from unnecessary influence coming from the public though the press.  On the 
other hand, as reporting of accurate facts regarding the judicial process is not allowed 
by the press legislation, one doubts if this satisfies the conditions for limiting the 
elements of freedom of expression as enshrined in the Constitution.  The sub judice 
rule as reflected in this legislation protects personal independence of judges by putting 
unjustifiable limit on the freedom of expression. 
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The CRC on the other hand follows a different path from that of the press law.  The 
CRC punishes breach of secrecy of proceedings only if someone discloses facts which 
are secret or which are declared secret by the court hearing the case. (Art. 450, PC)  
Under the PC court reporting is punishable only if it involves inaccurate or distorted 
information, note, précis or a report about pending cases. (Art. 451, PC)  Thus 
although the Press law forbids publication of any report on pending cases, the PC 
does not have a criminal sanction against it.  On the other hand, in so far as the report 
about pending cases is accurate, it does not matter, as far as criminal liability is 
concerned, whether or not it is done with the intention of influencing the outcome of 
the proceeding.   
 
C. Appointment of Judges 
 
The basic principles for the appointment of judges are spelled out in the Federal as 
well as State Constitutions.   Generally all the judges in Ethiopia are appointed by the 
legislative organ.  No judge at whatever level is directly appointed by the executive 
organ, and particularly not by the prime minister.  The Constitution draws a 
distinction between the process for the appointment of the Presidents of the Federal 
and Regional Supreme Courts and for the other judges. The President and the Vice 
President of the FSC are nominated by the prime Minister and appointed by the 
Parliament. (Art. 78(1), Const.) Likewise the President and Vice President of the 
SSCs are nominated by the  respective heads of State and appointed by the State 
Parliament. (Art. 78(3), Const.) Thus, unlike all the Anglophone and Francophone 
African countries where the presidents of the courts are invariably appointed by the 
heads of  state, (Fombad, 2007 ) the executive branch in Ethiopia appoints neither the 
presidents nor the other judges of the ordinary courts.  Appointment of judges is a 
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domain of the parliament and the role of the executive is limited to the submission of 
candidates to the parliament.  On the other hand the JAC, which nominates the other 
judges for appointment, does not have any say on the nomination and appointment of 
the President and the Vice President.  The Judiciary is not thus involved in the process 
of having its own leaders appointed as the nomination and appointment of the 
President and the Vice president of the Supreme Courts is exclusively done by the 
executive and legislative organs of Government.  This scheme obviously gives 
enough room for political considerations and influence by the government of the day 
in the process of appointment.  It must be noted, however, that the head of the 
executive does not have a final word on the appointment of the heads of the judiciary.  
Besides, once the president and the vice-president are appointed, the executive does 
not have any say on their tenure, discipline or removal, thereby minimizing the effect 
which of political considerations by the executive at the time of appointment during 
their term in office.   
 
The nomination and appointment of other judges allows the involvement of the three 
branches of government in various degrees.    The nomination of judges is vested in 
the JAC whose existence is recognized by Federal and State Constitutions.  The 
power to nominate judges is exclusively vested in these commissions which, in spite 
of some differences, are primarily composed of judges25 and presided over by the 
Presidents of the Supreme Courts. At the federal level the list of names recommended 
by the FJAC is sent to the Prime Minister through the President of the FSC.  The 
judges are then presented for appointment to the parliament by the Prime Minister.  
The role of the Prime Minister in the process of appointment is not clear.  The main 
                                                 
25 In Oromiya State that the majority of members of the commission should be judges is determined by 
the State Constitution.  In the Federal and the other States, the majority of the commission members are 
judges by legislative enactments.  
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issue is as to how much weight the Prime Minister is bound to attach to the 
nominations of the JAC.  As the parliament is the final authority as regards the 
appointment of federal judges would the Prime Minster be obliged to pass the list to 
the Parliament with whatever comments on each, or would it be sufficient if he passes 
the list to the parliament after having deleted from the list names with which he is not 
comfortable?  As the Prime Minister is the leader of the party which has a majority in 
parliament, (Art. 73 Const.) one may say that this distinction does not have any 
practical significance as the judge who does not get the blessing of the Prime Minister 
may not get appointed by his party at the end of the process.  The whole question 
eventually boils down to whether or not the Prime Minister is required to give reasons 
if he does not accept the candidacy of some that have been nominated by the FJAC 
which has the power to nominate judges.  Apart from the point as to which branch has 
what power, it is also a matter of ensuring transparency in the process.  The 
nomination of judges can get the highest level of transparency only if it reaches the 
parliament.  Even if the ruling party would eventually have its way in having the list 
approved through its majority sitting in parliament, discussion of appointment of 
judges in parliament would play a vital role in making the process more transparent. 
 
The process for the appointment of judges in the States follows a slightly different 
procedure in that the executive branch of government is not involved except for the 
presidents and the vice presidents.  In the states, the list of names recommended by 
the SJAC is directly submitted to the state parliament.  The heads of government in 
the states do not get involved in the appointment of judges.  This, however, is in some  
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states compensated through the power of the president to nominate a majority of the 
members of the SJAC.26   
 
The process for the appointment of judges is the same regardless of the position for 
which a judge is nominated.  Judges in the FFIC are nominated and appointed in the 
same way as judges in the highest court, except the president and the vice president.  
Although judges sitting in the lower courts are appointed to the higher courts quite 
often, Ethiopia does not have the career type of judicial structure. Judges in the lower 
courts may be appointed for the higher courts but they have to pass through the same 
process of appointment as would a new judge. 
 
The requirement for the appointment of judges is outlined in the Proclamation for the 
establishment of the FJAC.  Article 8(1) of the proclamation provides that “any 
Ethiopian who is loyal to the Constitution, has a legal training or acquired adequate 
legal skill through experience, has a good reputation for his diligence, sense of justice 
and good conduct, consents to assuming judgeship and is more than 25 years of age 
may be appointed as a federal judge”.   One can gather from the reading of the 
requirements that Ethiopia does not follow the career path, as do many continental 
legal systems.  As the minimum age to be nominated as a judge is only 25, it is also 
apparent that long years of experience is not a requirement, as it is the case in many 
common law systems.  Neither is legal training a mandatory requirement, as some one 
who “acquired adequate legal skill through experience” is also equally eligible for 
nomination.   The impact of these requirements on the independence of judges will be 
discussed later.  
                                                 
26 In the Amhara State for example, 9 of the 15 members of the SJAC are nominated by the head of 
government and only 6 are nominated by the President of the Supreme Court. 
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D.  Tenure and removal from office 
 
The security of tenure of judges in Ethiopia is protected by constitutional provisions.  
The Constitution provides that no judge can be removed without his consent from 
office before the retirement age which is fixed by law, unless the conditions for 
removal specified in the Constitution itself are satisfied.  The retirement age of judges 
is fixed by statute at 60 (Art. 9(2), Pro.24, 1996) which cannot be extended because of 
a constitutional rule. (Art.79 (5), Const.) A judge can be removed before the 
retirement age against his will from office 
a. “when the Judicial Administration Council decides to remove him for 
violation of disciplinary rules or on grounds of gross incompetence or 
inefficiency 
b. when the Judicial Administration Council decides that a judge can no 
longer carry out his responsibilities on account of illness; and 
c. When the House of People’s Representatives or the concerned State 
Council approves by a majority vote the decisions of the Judicial 
Administration Council.” (Art. 79(4), Const.) 
 
This arrangement gives judges at all levels a secure tenure of office up to the 
retirement age.  The decision to have a judge removed from office must be made by 
the JAC and must have as its basis violation of disciplinary rules, gross incompetence 
or illness.  Although the decision of the JAC is a necessary condition for removal, it is 
not sufficient by itself.  The removal requires approval by the parliament for its 
effectiveness.  It must be noted that although the appointment of judges involves the 
three branches of government, the executive is not involved in the process of removal.  
Not only should the removal be initiated by the JAC, but the decision for removal of a 
270 
 
judge should also be submitted to the parliament by the commission.  It is therefore 
not possible for the parliament to initiate a disciplinary process against a judge as it is 
done in some systems by way of a direct impeachment. Neither can the executive or 
any of its organs direct the process, although they have the right to lodge complaints 
against a judge.  Considering that the majority of the members of the FJAC are from 
the judiciary itself, one can say that the legal scheme gives an ample room for the 
protection of the tenure of judges.  This is particularly an important improvement 
when one compares it with the legal framework that prevailed under the previous 
constitutional order.  During this time not only was the term of office of judges at all 
levels limited to the term of office of the parliament that appointed them, which was 
five years, but the head of state could also remove them and appoint some others 
pending a decision by parliament which was in session only twice a year. Under this 
arrangement the term of office of judges was too short and the executive branch of 
government was also given an unlimited power which could be used at leisure to 
dismiss judges when it was unhappy with their decisions. 
 
The current arrangement, however, lacks clarity as regards the removal of the 
Presidents of the Supreme Courts.  The Presidents of the supreme courts are the ones 
that preside over the JACs that consider cases for removal of judges.  Practical 
problems are bound to arise if the presidents are the ones that are subject to the 
disciplinary process.   Not only would potential complainants be deterred from 
complaining against the presidents, but it would also be practically impossible to have 
the complaints processed as the complaints are submitted to the office which is 
headed by the presidents (Art.10, Pro.24, 1996).  The legislation (Art.14 (2), Pro.28, 
1992 ) that was enacted during the transitional period had a special procedure for the 
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removal of the President and the Vice President of the then Central Courts.  Under 
this law the President of the Transitional government had the power to set up a special 
committee that could investigate alleged disciplinary matters by the President or Vice-
President of the Central Supreme Courts.  Based on the findings of the committee the 
President submits proposals or recommendations to the House of Representatives for 
a final decision.  No such procedure or its equivalent exists under the current legal 
framework in the Federal Courts or the State Courts.  There were, however, incidents 
where Presidents of the SSC were removed by the decision of the head of the 
government in the States27 and in some other cases by the decision of the 
Parliament.28  Given that no such procedure for removal of presidents is clearly 
articulated in the laws of the land, these decisions are not consistent with the law and 
constitute violation of the independence of the judiciary.   
  
5.3.2. Institutional Independence of the Judiciary 
 
The institutional independence of judges in Ethiopia can be examined in terms of the 
powers of the Presidents of the courts and the Judicial Administration Commissions 
which are established at the federal and state level and their relationships with the 
other organs of government.     The role which these organs played in the 
administration of the courts and the relationship they had with the other organs of 
government has not been the same over the years.  The dominant trends in the past, 
however, have been exclusive administration of the courts by the executive in earlier 
periods and shared administration by the executive and the judiciary at later stages.  
                                                 
27 In the Benshangul Gumuz Regional State 3 Presidents of the Supreme Court were removed by the 
President of the State. 
28 In the Somali and Gambella States a number of Presidents were removed by the Parliament but no 
reason was given for their removal.   
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Since 1993 this trend has even moved further and become more or less an exclusive 
administration of the courts by the judiciary itself. 
 
In 1993, the Central Courts establishment proclamation declared that ‘the President of 
the Central Supreme Court shall be responsible to administer the Supreme Court in 
accordance with the law”  (Proc 40/93 Art. 29(1)).  The power of the president 
included the power to hire necessary staff, prepare the plan for the courts to the 
parliament and implement them when approved, give assignment to and administer 
judges of the Supreme Court and cause the preparation of the activity reports of the 
courts.  The presidents of the Central High Court and Central First instance Court 
were given similar powers to administer their respective courts.(Art. 31) The power to 
administer courts was thus exclusively given to the presidents of those courts and the 
executive was not given any power in this regard.  Obviously this was a clean 
departure from the previous experience of court administration in Ethiopia, where the 
executive had the power to run the business of the courts. 
 
This was further strengthened when the Constitution came up with clear rules that 
highlighted the institutional independence of the courts in 1996.  Not only does the 
Constitution declare the establishment of an independent judiciary (Art. 78 (1) & 80 
(1), Const.), but it also vests the FSC with a supreme federal judicial authority (Art. 
78 (2), Const.). 
  
The Constitution also provides that ‘the Federal Supreme Court shall draw up and 
submit to the House of People’s Representatives for approval the budget of the 
Federal Courts, and upon approval administer the budget’. (Art. 79 (6), Const.) In 
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spite of the various models on court administration implemented in many other 
countries, the issue has finally been settled in favour of an exclusive administration of 
the court by the judiciary.  Not only does the Constitution empower the FSC to 
prepare the budget for all the federal courts, it also empowers it to implement the 
same once it is approved by parliament.  The Constitution has thus ruled out any 
involvement of the executive organ in the day to day administration of the courts.  
The Ministry of Justice  in particularly has no role whatsoever in the routine 
administration of the courts as is the case in some legal systems and as used to be the 
case in Ethiopia in earlier periods.   
 
The Federal Courts Establishment Proclamation which was issued after the adoption 
of the Constitution reinforced the exclusivity of court administration. The president of 
the FSC has the duty and the responsibility for the administration of all the federal 
Courts in accordance with the law. (Art. 16 25/96).   Under the current legislation all 
the federal courts fall under the administrative authority of the president of the FSC.  
This is consistent with the spirit and wording of the Constitution.  The administrative 
power of the president of the Supreme Court includes among other things the power 
to assign the judges in their respective courts, the power to hire the support staff of the 
courts, the power to prepare and implement plans and budget for all the federal courts.  
The administration of the courts is therefore the sole responsibility of the President of 
the FSC.  The legal framework leaves no room for the executive to intervene in the 
administrative arrangements of the courts and much less in the assignment of cases 
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and administration of judges.  The administrative powers of the Supreme Court 
presidents in the States are similar to those of the federal courts.29  
 
The Federal Constitution is less clear about the financial autonomy of the state courts.  
The Constitution only states that “budgets of the State Courts shall be determined by 
the respective State Council”. (Art. 79(7). Const.).  It does not state whether the SSCs 
have the power to prepare and implement their budget and plans, like the federal one, 
and directly submit them to the councils.  This gap is, however, filled in by the state 
Constitutions, as these give the supreme courts the power to submit their own plans to 
the state parliament and implement them when approved. Article 62(6) of the 
Constitution of the Amhara State, for example, states that the “supreme court shall 
submit the budget necessary for the administration of the judiciary and upon approval 
administer the same”. 
 
This arrangement on institutional independence is further strengthened by the 
composition and power of the JACs.  The following structural elements are designed 
to ensure the intuitional independence of the judiciary.  First, the existence, and in 
some states the composition, (Art. 65 Amhara Const.) of the JACs is determined by 
the Federal or State Constitutions.  Second, the majority of the members of the JAC in 
the federal courts and many States are drawn from the judiciary itself.  Third, in the 
FJAC and in many of the SJACs the commissions are chaired by the Presidents of the 
Supreme courts. Fourth, these commissions are given the power to nominate judges, 
issue codes of conduct, and decide on the transfer, salary, and other benefits as well as 
on the promotion and placement of judges.  These are powers, which, if given to other 
                                                 
29 The court establishment proclamations of Oromiya, Tigrai and Amhara States enumerate the powers 
of the President of the Supreme Court in exactly the same wording as the Federal One.  
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authorities, particularly the executive, can raise concerns that they might be used to 
stifle the judiciary if need be.   
5.4. Accountability of the Judiciary 
5.4.1. Nature of Judicial Accountability 
 
Like on judicial independence, there are different points of view on the nature of 
judicial accountability. (Zemans, 1999:625)As much as there are authors who think 
that judicial independence and judicial accountability are two conflicting, and as a 
result, mutually exclusive concepts (Wynn and Mazur, 2004:779), there are many 
others who strongly argue that judicial independence and judicial accountability are 
two sides of the same coin. (Handberg, 1994:134)  Some argue that the different 
aspects of accountability are dressed-up attacks on judicial independence, and the 
very idea of making the judiciary accountable is inimical to the valuable concept of 
judicial independence.  Many others think that in so far as the judiciary exercises 
power, it should be held accountable. (Fombad, 2007:252)  For many, unaccountable 
judiciary is not only unrealistic, but is also a danger to the public, whom it is 
established to serve. (Ferejhon and Kramer, 2002:973)  For theorists who accept 
judicial independence as a means to an end rather than an end by itself, judicial 
accountability is only another side of the same coin.  Some even take judicial 
accountability as an important dimension of judicial independence. “If the public is to 
continue to grant authority to the courts, it will on the basis of decisional 
independence accompanied by accountability.  First and foremost accountability is to 





This split of opinion can partly be attributed to the absence of clarity on the concepts 
of judicial independence and accountability.  Equally important, however, is the 
concern of maintaining a good balance between judicial independence and judicial 
accountability.   It is, therefore, inevitable that even where there is an agreement that 
the judiciary should be accountable, there would be arguments as to what 
accountability means, and to whom the judiciary would be accountable and how.   
 
The statement by Edmund Burke in 1775 tells much about the rationale for 
accountability in the judicial system. He said, “Abstract liberty, like other mere 
abstractions, is not to be famed.  Liberty inheres in some sensible object”. 
(Cappelletti, 1983:3) The accountability of the judiciary is connected with the fact 
that the courts exercise power. “Judges exercise power.  With power comes 
responsibility.  In a rationally organized society there will be a proportion between the 
two. The question of judicial responsibility accordingly becomes more or less 
significant, depending on the power of the judge in question.” (Cappelletti, 1983:4)  
In democratic systems there should be a sound proportion between power and 
accountability to ensure corresponding growth in control with increase in power. 
(Cappelletti, 1983) 
 
In any society based on the principles of democratic governance, every one that holds 
power is eventually accountable to the public. (Wynn and Mazur, 2004)  The 
legislature is directly accountable to the electorate.  The executive organ of 
government is accountable indirectly to the people through the legislature.  And there 
seems to be no reason why the judiciary should not be individually and collectively 
accountable for the performance of the responsibilities that are vested in it.  Any 
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power is basically exercised on trust and the judicial power is not an exception.  The 
issue is not therefore whether or not the judiciary should be accountable, but as to 
how to hold it to account in a manner that is consistent with the principles of 
impartiality and independence. (Jayawikrama, 2003:167-8) 
 
There are different mechanisms for holding the judiciary accountable.  Maria Some 
outline as many as seven methods to keep the judiciary accountable.  These are 
executive and legislative oversight and intervention, societal oversight, establishment 
of judicial councils, implementation of evaluation programs, development of internal 
audit, conducting investigations and putting sanctions against violation in place. 
(Dakolias and Thachuk, 2000)  Shimon Shetreet on the other hand argues that the 
models for judicial accountability can be classified into three models, namely, legal 
accountability, public accountability and informal and social controls.  According to 
Shetreet, legal accountability includes ‘supervision over judges, appellate review of 
their decisions and their civil and criminal liability’. (Shetreet, 1994:289)  Control 
over judges that is exercised by the legislative body, the executive, pressure groups 
and the press fall under the second category of public accountability.  The third form 
of accountability refers to the brand of accountability that is informally made by 
professionals in private away from the public gaze. (Shetreet, 1994:289)  
 
Professor Mauro Cappelletti (Cappelletti, 1983) on the other hand classifies the 
models of accountability into repressive (dependency), autonomous corporative and 
responsive consumer oriented models.  According to him the first model vests the 
power to control the judiciary in the political branches of government and the second 
model gives an exclusive control over judges to the judiciary.  The third one, which 
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he says, is a mixed model distributes control of the judiciary between the different 
organs of state power.  
 
The realization that the judiciary works within a democratic framework also gives rise 
to the need for accountability.  A judiciary which is completely insulated from 
legislative and executive organs which are popularly controlled can frustrate the will 
of the people by curbing the actions of those institutions.  Although an independent 
judiciary is needed to act as an effective watchdog in the political process, there is no 
guarantee that the judiciary will use its power not to constrict but to enhance the 
power of political freedom of the electorate. “Thus, although independence is 
assumed to be one of the cardinal virtues of the judiciary, it is also true that too much 
independence may be a bad thing.  We want to insulate the judiciary from the more 
popularly controlled institutions, but at the same time recognize that some elements of 




5.4.2. Aspects of Judicial Accountability 
A. Political Accountability 
In many legal systems judges are held politically accountable in various ways.  
Accountability of the judges becomes political accountability when one; judges have 
to account to the executive or legislative branches of government and two, when the 
judges have to account to these organs not primarily for “legal” violations, but for 
other behaviour which is measured on the basis of political criteria. (Cappelletti, 
1983:18)  Political accountability of judges so described is observed in various legal 
systems.  The commonest form of political accountability is found in the common law 
countries in the form of impeachment. (Cross, 2003)  Germany also has a similar 
system called Richteranklage, which allows the Budestag to initiate proceedings 
against a judge who is said to have violated the basic principles of the Constitution in 
official duties or out of the office. (Cappelletti, 1983) Unlike in this United States 
where this highly politicized accountability is decided by the Senate and the House, in 
Germany the power to decide on such matters is given to the Constitutional Court. 
Although the process of impeachment is rarely used in these counties, it is used to 
deter judges from involving in any behaviour that can potentially bring the office 
which they hold into disrepute.  It is also believed to have the effect of attenuating the 
risk of the separateness of the judiciary from the legislative organs, an impression 
which, one is very likely to get from the concept of judicial independence. 
(Cappelletti, 1983:25) 
 
B. Legal Accountability 
In almost all legal systems there are many devices that ensure what Cappelletti calls 
the legal accountability of the judiciary. (Cappelletti, 1983)  This relates to the 
criminal civil and disciplinary liability of judges. Legal accountability refers to 
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accountability of judges based on violation of law rather than violation of politically 
or socially acceptable behaviour, as determined by juridical rather than by political 
bodies. (Cappelletti, 1983)  
 
C. Public Accountability 
Apart from political and legal accountability, the judiciary has public accountability.  
This is different from the other two because of its manifestations and also because the 
judiciary is made to account “to less precisely determined societal bodies or groups, 
and ultimately, to the general public (Cappelletti, 1983).  The commonest form of 
public accountability manifests itself through public criticism of court decisions 
through different media outlets or professional means.  Public criticism of the 
judiciary has a great potential of making the judicial branch stay within the bounds of 
the law and forms an integral part of the freedom of expression in many democracies.  
This mode of accountability, however, has an obvious danger in the judicial process, 
in terms of both creating undue influence on the judges, and adversely affecting the 
rights of the parties in the litigation, particularly the defendants in criminal 
proceedings.  Different balancing methods are thus employed to ensure the proper 
implementation of both rights.  The requirement to conduct trials in public and the 
procedural rules that allow publicity of dissenting opinions also fall under this 
category. (Cappelletti, 1983) 
“Those institutions that tend to subject the judiciary to public control and 
scrutiny have proved themselves effective in this respect.  They appear under 
the threefold aspect of publicity of judicial proceedings, of judicial decisions 
and of the law itself…. 
The decision which does not express the people’s inarticulate conceptions of 
right and wrong lacks that public approval without which it cannot be 
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effective. … Of all the controls of judicial activity, that by public opinion is 
among the effective. (Rheinstein, 1947:595) 
Not only can the press help in making the judicial conduct known to the public 
through its publications, but it can also convey to the courts the feelings of the public 
to the court (Shetreet, 1994) 
 
Peer pressure and professional criticism of judges by other judges and members of the 
legal profession plays an important role in controlling behaviour of judges on the 
bench.  Bar Associations, individual lawyers and other judges have ample information 
about the behaviour and the predilections of the judges and are by virtue of those 
important instrumentalities in controlling judicial behaviour. (Shetreet, 1984) 
5.5. Legal Framework for Accountability of the Judiciary 
 
The basic legal framework for judicial accountability in Ethiopia emanates from 
Article 12(2) of the Constitution which declares that “any public official or an elected 
representative is accountable for any failure in official duties”.  Thus, accountability is 
as important a constitutional principle as independence of the judiciary.   
 
5.5.1. Political Accountability 
 
Like in many other legal systems in the world the judiciary in Ethiopia has political 
accountability to the political bodies, namely, the parliament and the executive organs 
of government.  The nature of their accountability, however, has its own peculiar 
features which emanate from the constitutional and legal framework.  The political 
accountability of judges is manifested in a variety of ways.   
 
Although the legislature in Ethiopia does not have the impeachment powers which are 
exercised in many legal systems, it is the only branch of government that can finally 
282 
 
decide upon the removal of judges from office.  As the process of removal of judges 
has to be initiated by JAC, however, the degree to which this process makes the 
judiciary subservient to other political organs is very little.  Moreover the grounds for 
removal articulated in the Constitution are related to disciplinary, inefficiency or 
health issues which are usually considered as legal rather than political grounds for 
removal. (Cappelletti, 1983)   
 
Besides, although the parliament and the executive can be said to have the standing to 
initiate a disciplinary procedure against a judge, as any one has the right to lodge the 
complaint to the JACs, the complaint must be brought to and decided by the 
commission and not by parliament or its standing committees.   
 
Although Ethiopia is mainly a member of the civil law legal family, it does not follow 
the career type for judicial staffing as it is the case in many countries following the 
civil law legal tradition.  As a result the process of initial appointment is not 
completely insulated from political influence.  The political influence is, however, 
attenuated as the initial nomination for appointment for judges at all levels can only 
start from the JAC, the majority of whose members come from the judiciary itself.  
Thus although the Parliament appoints judges from a list submitted to it by the Prime 
Minister, the latter is bound by the list of candidates that are submitted to it by the 
JAC, at least in the sense that he cannot add a name not recommended by the 
Commission.   
 
The role of parliament in making the judiciary accountable is more visible in 
connection with budgetary issues.  The budget is allocated to the courts by the 
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parliament and this has been taken in many systems to have a potentially chilling 
effect on the independence of the judiciary.  The federal Constitution allows the FSC 
to submit its budget directly to the parliament, unlike other organs of state power 
which submit their budget to the Ministry of Finance. The power to decide on 
budgetary matters is that of the parliament which can increase or decrease the budget 
of the courts as it deems fit.   
 
The power of the parliament to change the jurisdiction of the courts has been treated 
in many legal systems as a tool to keep the courts politically accountable, which if not 
used in the right proportion, can easily endanger the independence of the judiciary.  It 
must be noted in this connection that, unlike the state courts which have been 
established by the Constitution, the FHC and the FFIC are established only by 
legislation as required by the Constitution. (Nahum, 1997)  The parliament can 
change the structure and jurisdiction of the FHC and the FFIC, if it finds it so fit.  
Although the Constitution requires a two-thirds majority to establish the Federal High 
and First Instance Courts (Art 78(2), Const.), it is not clear if this qualified majority is 
needed to have them changed.  Where no federal courts are established by parliament, 
the Constitution has delegated the federal jurisdiction to the State Courts. (Art. 78 
Const.)  Based on the constitutional provision the Federal parliament has established 
FHCs in five states, stripping the state courts of their delegated federal jurisdiction.  
The parliament retains the same power to abolish these federal courts and give back 
the delegated jurisdiction to the state courts. 
 
Changing the jurisdiction of the courts can be used as a political tool for keeping the 
courts accountable. The legislatures have wide powers to change the jurisdiction of 
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the federal courts as they deem fit.  This power has actually been used in a number of 
occasions.  Important matters, which the law maker rightly or wrongly thought were 
not handled speedily enough by the judiciary, were transferred to some authorities 
that are within the ambit of the executive organ.  The foreclosure legislations (Pro. 97, 
98, 1998) have empowered the banks to directly sell mortgaged or pledged property if 
the debtor defaults, by repealing Article 306030 of the CC which demanded judicial 
oversight.   The reason that is provided in the preambles of these laws to strip the 
courts of their jurisdiction was that there was delay in obtaining a judgement and 
having them enforced. The proclamation on lease holding likewise transferred the first 
instance jurisdiction of the courts to a tribunal that entertains complaints relating to 
such disputes.  The courts were given an appellate jurisdiction only as regards the 
amount of compensation in relation to the measures of expropriation.  Another 
proclamation that was recently issued by the Federal Parliament gave the 
Governmental Rental Housing Agency the power to evict tenants without any court 
order.  The justification for the issuance of this legislation was again that the court 
process to recover rent takes too long.  These measures indicate that the legislative 
organ has tools within its power that can be used to make the judiciary accountable.   
 
That all the courts are required by law to report to the parliament about their annual 
performance can also be taken as a modality for political accountability of the 
judiciary.  Through this process matters relating to the judiciary are discussed except 
individual cases.  The proclamation for the establishment of the state courts in the 
SNNPRS (Art. 8, Pro. 43, 2002) particularly mentions that the president of the 
Supreme Court is accountable to the parliament.   
                                                 
30 The CC prohibited any provision in the contract which entitles the creditor to sell or appropriate the 




5.5.2. Public Accountability 
 
In the Ethiopian legal system one finds different legal rules that ensure public 
accountability of the judiciary.  Public trial by impartial courts is a constitutional right 
of the defendants enshrined in the Constitutions and the international instruments to 
which Ethiopia is a party with which all courts must comply.  This allows the public 
to follow the trials and criticize the process as it sees fit.  Although the Press Law 
forbids publication of pending cases, the media can also play an important role in 
ensuring public accountability of the courts.   
 
The requirement for publication of judgements can also be seen as an important 
aspect of ensuring public accountability.  The publication of judgments is considered 
so important that the court establishment proclamation mentions it as one of the 
obligations of the President of the FSC. (Art. 16 (2 (i)), Pro. 25, 1996)  Although 
many first instance benches in Ethiopia are composed of one judge, the legal 
framework which allows dissenting opinions to be included as part of the judgment 
can also be viewed as an important mechanisms to ensure accountability.  
 
 
5.5.3. Legal Accountability 
 
In addition to political as well as public accountability, the judiciary and judges 
should also be legally accountable.  Legal accountability refers to accountability of 
judges based on violation of law rather than violation of politically or socially 
acceptable behaviour, as determined by juridical rather than by political bodies. 




1. Appellate Review 
 
Appellate review is one of the mechanisms that is legally available to make the judges 
accountable.  The court of appeal is “the only institution which officially and openly 
passes judgment upon judicial misconduct, and when warranted, has the power to take 
disciplinary action ranging from mere censure or criticism of the judge’s misconduct 
to a reversal of his judgment or setting aside a conviction coupled with severe 
condemnation”. (Shetreet, 1976)  As elaborated in the previous chapters, the Supreme 
and the High Courts at the Federal and State level ensure accountability of the judges 
through appellate control.  In criminal as well as in civil cases any party aggrieved by 
a judgment can lodge an appeal at least once to the next higher court.  In addition to 
appellate review of lower court judgments, the FSC and SSC do have a power of 
cassation which allows them to quash any final judgment containing a fundamental 
error of law. (Art. 78, Const.)  Through this power, not only do judges reverse 
judgments of lower courts, but they also do criticize judges for improper behaviour 
during the proceedings in the lower courts.  
 
This control of accountability is somehow dependent on the courts’ obligation to give 
reasoned judgment.  The Ethiopian law makes an important distinction in this regard.  
Courts of first instance have the obligation to give a reasoned judgment, together with 
a summary of the facts, the evidence, and the relevant law on which their judgment is 
based.  (Art. 182, CPC) The appellate court is bound to give reasons in its judgment 
only when it reverses or varies the judgment.  If the appellate court feels that there is 
no sufficient ground for intervention in the judgment of the lower court, it can dismiss 
the case, without necessarily giving reasons for its action. (Art. 337, CPC) Based on 
this procedural rule all appellate courts as well as cassation divisions of the Supreme 
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Courts have developed a template to dismiss cases which they think do not merit 
review by the higher court.  This may raise some concerns that it undermines the 





2. Penal Liability 
 
As mentioned earlier in connection with judicial independence, judges in Ethiopia, 
both at federal and state level are held accountable for criminal acts like any other 
office holder.  All the crimes which are proscribed in connection with the exercise of 
official duties are applicable to judges.  The PC does not have specific penal 
provisions that are applicable to judges.  Thus such crimes like abuse of power, 
extortion, corruption, etc, apply to judges to the same extent as they do to other public 
servants.   
 
If a criminal case is pressed against judges, the process follows the same procedure as 
it does in any other criminal case.  Except for the judges in Oromiya State, judges do 
not have procedural immunity as a result of which criminal investigation is conducted 
by the police officers like other criminal investigations.       
 
3.  Civil Liability 
 
In contrast with criminal liability, judges in Ethiopia are exonerated from action for 
civil liability in torts in connection with their official activities.  Judges are, therefore, 
shielded from civil suits which could otherwise have had a negative influence on their 
independent performance of judicial functions.  This immunity is quite broad and 
extends to “an act connected with their functions”. (Art. 2138, CC) For purposes of 
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this article it does not matter whether the act is intentional or grossly negligent. In 
some systems, although the principle of civil immunity is accepted it is readily lifted 
if one can prove an intentional or negligent act on the part of the defendant.  In still 
other legal systems, although the judges are immune from civil action in connection 
with their judicial functions, the state remains vicariously liable for their actions and 
the state pays compensation to the victims.  This experience is said to have struck a 
good balance between the need to insulate judges from civil actions and the desire to 
compensate citizens for faulty acts of government officials.   
 
The concept of vicarious liability of the state for a professional fault of civil servants 
and government employees is accepted in the Ethiopian system.  One may, therefore, 
argue that although judges are immune from tort action in connection with their 
functions, the victim would still get compensated by the state.  A closer reading of the 
text, however, discloses that the state becomes vicariously liable, when the civil 
servant or the government employee is duty bound to compensate the damage caused 
by his own fault.  In such cases the state pays the compensation to the victim but can 
‘subsequently claim it from the servant or employee at fault’. (Art. 2126, CC)   One 
may argue that the state’s obligation to pay compensation is only concurrent, and 
therefore, exists if the public servant has the obligation to pay compensation in the 
first place.  As judges are declared immune from any civil action in tort, one may 
argue that the victim cannot claim compensation from the state on behalf of the judges 
and neither can the state demand payment from the judges as envisaged by the rules 
mentioned earlier.  To ensure greater accountability this rule needs to be clarified.   
There is also no proportion between the degree of immunity and the need to shield 
judges from harassing actions. is Judges are not liable in cases of deceit, extortion, 
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fraud or other malicious acts which are accepted as legitimate grounds for holding 
judges civilly accountable in some legal systems.  The immunity of judges from tort 
liability can only be lifted if the judge is convicted by a criminal court. (Art. 2139, 
CC) Proof of criminal behaviour by the degree of proof requisite for civil litigation is 
not, therefore, enough to sue a judge in a civil claim for compensation.  This should 
also be reconsidered. 
 
4. Disciplinary Liability 
 
Rendering the judiciary accountable requires putting a well functioning disciplinary 
system for judges in place. The judiciary cannot deliver high quality services in the 
absence of a system that evaluates their performance, or where the evaluation system, 
if there is one, does not function properly. (Dakolias and Ratliff, 1995) 
 
In Ethiopia disciplinary matters of judges are within the jurisdiction of the JAC, 
which is composed primarily of judges.  The power of the executive to discipline 
judges has thus been transferred to the judicial body.  This body which nominates 
judges is the very organ that issues the codes of conduct and takes disciplinary action 
other than removal.  Complaints against judges are submitted to this organ, are 
primarily investigated and decided by it.  With the exception of the three members 
selected from the members of the House of People’s representatives no other member 
of the legal profession or the community is involved in the process of disciplining 
judges at the federal level.  Once a complaint is initiated against a judge the process is 
basically not conducted in public unless the process involves removal of the judge 
which then becomes public as it is debated in the parliament.  This may be a ground 
for complaints that the body is not representative and the process not transparent 




The Commission has formulated standards for acceptable ethical behaviour, but there 
are no appropriate mechanisms for their enforcement.  The Code of Conduct is not 
well known by the general public, and partly because of this not so many people lodge 
complaints to the commission for disciplinary measures against judges.  It is clearly 
specified in the legislation for the establishment of the FJAC that undue delay in the 
disposition of cases by a judge is deemed to be a manifest incompetence and 
inefficiency. No judge has been held accountable on such grounds.  Implementation 
of this legal standard obviously requires determination of reasonably acceptable time 
for disposition of cases, and reasonable grounds for extension beyond the standards. 
Even where there is undue delay in the process, that undue delay must be attributable 
to the judge as opposed to other external factors.  Although the judges have their own 
contribution to delays, they are not the only reasons.  Undue delay in criminal 
proceedings is bound to adversely affect the public confidence on the courts, but 
taking disciplinary measures over judges anytime there is undue delay in such 
proceedings does not necessarily cure this problem as the root causes for the delay 
may at times be exterior to the court.   
 
Since 1996   many complaints have been submitted to the FJAC.  Amongst these only 
6 judges have been removed as a result of the disciplinary sanction by the commission 
and approved by parliament. Many of the complaints have been dismissed by the 
commission as not having sufficient ground or enough evidence to support the 
allegations.  In very few cases the commission asked the judges to answer against the 
complaints.  Apart from giving the judges the opportunity to submit a written reply to 
the complaints, the commission also allows judges to orally present their version to 
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the commission. Once the commission gives a decision, other than removal of judges, 
the decision is final and not subject to revision by any other authority.  There is any 
appeal mechanism to challenge the decision of the commission.   
 
The current disciplinary system for judges allows almost everything to be conducted 
within the judiciary.  As the process itself is not transparent, and the outcome of the 
processes is not made available to the public, it can easily give the impression that it 
is not functioning well in the light of widely held public view that there is a high level 
of corruption and violation of other disciplinary standards by judges.  Changing the 
composition of the Commission and allowing participation of the government as well 
members of the legal profession and the general public may be considered as an 
important measure to enhance accountability and boost the public confidence of the 
judiciary.  
 
5.6. Judicial Independence and Accountability in Action 
 
Studies conducted in other legal systems show that real independence and 
accountability of the judiciary is not a result of the legal framework alone.  In a recent 
study, Lars P. Feld and Stefan Voigt have found out that while de facto judicial 
independence influences economic growth positively, de jure judicial independence 
does not have any impact.   Judicial reform programs should give as much attention to 
the level of independence and accountability as manifests itself in actual operation of 
the judiciary as it does to the legal framework that exists in the law books.  In the 
following sections this paper will highlight three basic situations which affect the 




5.6.1. Non Observance of the Rules 
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, one of the basic problems faced by the justice 
system in Ethiopia is sheer non-observance of the substantive and procedural rules by 
members of the legal profession.  This shatters the basic premises of both judicial 
independence and judicial accountably.  Both principles are anchored on the 
fundamental premise that judges would follow the law and only the law.  In a system 
where the basic procedural rules which are designed to ensure the neutrality, 
impartiality and accountability of the judiciary are neglected, the principles and rules 
about judicial independence and accountability would remain paper tigers.  The basic 
scenario that shows the departure of the practice from the legal rules is depicted in 
previous chapters.  But a few more deserve to be mentioned here to show how they 
affect the reform efforts on accountability and independence.   
 
In spite of clear rules outlining the procedures for removal of judges, there have been 
incidents which show that the rules of the game have not been respected.  The 
incident in the Gambella State is the worst example.  Judges of the Supreme Court 
were arrested immediately after giving a ruling on an application for bail in favour of 
an applicant.  The judges were not charged of any offence, but it took 75 days to have 
them released from police custody.    Judges should remain accountable for their acts 
and be criminally responsible if they transgress the criminal law of the land.  The case 
in Gambella however, does not show violation of any law of the land.  It was taken 
only to show that the then executive was not happy with the decision of the court. 
 
The constitution empowers both the Federal and the State judiciary to submit their 
annual plans and budget to the legislative organs.  This constitutional rule is not 
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however respected in the day to day operation.  The courts are required to submit their 
annual budget to the Ministry of Finance which against the words of the constitution.  
The budget of the courts is submitted to the parliament as an integral part of the 
overall budget of all the other organs of government.  This arrangement has deprived 
the courts of the opportunity to directly submit, explain and defend their plans and 
budget before the parliament as envisaged by the constitution. 
 
5.6.2. Contextual Factors 
 
The level of independence and accountability of judges must also be seen within the 
context under which the legal system operates.  A few contextual factors which affect 
the independence as well as the accountability of the judiciary in Ethiopia will be 
discussed here.   
 
One of the factors that affect the point under discussion is the professional 
competence of judges.  The professional competence is affected partly by factors that 
are external to the judicial process.  As mentioned earlier, Ethiopia had only one law 
school for more than 40 years which was producing only less than 50 graduates a 
year.  Under such circumstances all courts cannot have qualified judges, and resorting 
to people who do not even have the basic legal training to fill some of the vacancies 
becomes imperative.  Many civil law countries give exams to recruit judges for their 
first instance courts; others pick only the ones with many years of experience.  In 
Ethiopia, neither of these is an option.  Exams become irrelevant because the market 
does not have enough number of professionals.  If exams are conducted and many of 
them do not make it, the courts will not have sitting judges. The choice is, therefore, 
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not between having the best and the less so judges, but between having a judge and 
not having one at all.   
 
This affects the rate at which judges leave the bench to join the private bar.  Many 
judges leave the bench after having served a few years as the demand for lawyers in 
the market is very high and the supply very low.  The government cannot pay them as 
much as the market does, and the judiciary becomes a learning ground for newly 
recruited judges.   This situation affects the accountability aspect of the judiciary.  In a 
court that is staffed by young lawyers with little or no experience and no previously 
accumulated assets, the temptation for corrupt practice is higher.  On the positive side, 
as the judges have no previous experience as practitioners the possibility for conflict 
of interest, which troubles many legal systems, becomes less problematic.     
 
Conducting trials in public is undeniably an important safeguard for individual rights 
and a tool for accountability.  Trials are, however, sometimes not conducted in public 
by some courts.  This happens either because the judge does not want to follow the 
rules, which is a breach of the rules, or the government does not allocate enough 
funds.   In many of the states the courts have been established since 1991.  In many 
cases there was no court worthy the name in the states previously or whatever court 
existed earlier was replaced by the new ones because of the dictates of the new federal 
arrangement.  This means the basic infrastructure for conducting public trials did not 
exist in the past. The government has the obligation to allocate sufficient funds for the 
courts.  The level of economic development, however, puts an outer limit to the 




5.6.3. Defective Legal Regime 
 
Regardless of the level of its implementation appropriate legal framework for judicial 
independence and accountability must be in place.  Thus the legal regime in Ethiopia 
which adversely affects the independence and accountability of the judiciary must be 
identified and rectified.   
 
This writer believes that the legal regime in Ethiopia for the independence of the 
judiciary can be classified as one of the good legal regimes.  That said there are some 
areas which, if examined further, can strengthen judicial independence, and create a 
good atmosphere for accountability.  The main areas are listed below, not necessarily 
in order of their importance. 
 
1. Some level of procedural immunity in criminal proceedings should be 
introduced to strengthen judicial independence of judges 
2. The degree of civil immunity should be reduced to make it compatible with 
basic principles of accountability 
3. Participation of lay people should be allowed in criminal proceedings to raise 
the level of accountability 
4. The media should be allowed to report about pending cases, and the bar 
against reporting should be the exception. 
5. Registration of property of judges should be introduced 
6. The arrangement for court administration should provide more room for 







In the preceding chapters the thesis has raised basic issues which should be taken in to 
account by the CJSRP that is under way in Ethiopia.  The thesis has put the theoretical 
framework to identify the main problems in the judicial process and to propose 
solutions which should be picked up by the reform program. 
 
The decision by the government to reform the judiciary together with other 
institutions would lay down the basic foundations that are needed for a vibrant market 
economy and strengthening of rule of law.   One of the aspirations stipulated in the 
Constitution of the FDRE is the desire to ensure lasting peace, economic development 
which is based on rule of law.  These aspirations can be attained if the judiciary in 
Ethiopia meets the threshold of a strong judiciary. 
 
Identifying the judicial problems and addressing them through reform efforts has a 
direct impact on Ethiopia’s endeavour to achieve economic growth.  As propounded 
by many scholars and proved by the experiences of many countries, the capacity of 
the judiciary to enforce contracts and to have property rights protected will affect the 
rate at which Ethiopia will potentially register economic growth.  Being a poor 
country Ethiopia needs to attract private capital to boost its economic growth in 
addition to making proper use of its ample labour and land resources.   Ethiopia needs 
long term investments to fill in a long felt gap in many of its sectors.  Such long term 
investments, however, require existence of a judiciary that has the capability to have 
terms of contract enforced properly in case a dispute arises in the process of the 
execution.   The reform programs in Ethiopia should therefore aim at developing the 
capabilities of the judiciary to reduce contractual hazards which are likely to arise 
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when parties to a long term contract resort to self help as result of their inability to 
force all the possible contingencies at the time the contract was formed.  
 
Economic agents in specific investment need to be stimulated to increase their market 
in number as well as in geographical spread, which in turn will have a market 
enlargement effect followed by technological spillovers and diffusion of knowledge 
through the transmission of sound marketing, financing and managing practices.  
These economic agents which Ethiopia should attract to boost investment operate 
under situations that are different from traditional contractual arrangements in 
Ethiopia which are primarily based on personal relationships and repeat dealings.  
Investment in Ethiopia is bound to be affected by the changed nature of self-seeking 
economic agents which act based on innumerable complex, impersonal and 
cooperative interactions based on incomplete information about each other.  This 
further strengthens the need to have the judiciary reformed as these situations force 
people to rely more on institutional strength and third party enforcement of contracts. 
Without an effective judicial sector Ethiopia cannot secure a high performance 
economy that relies heavily on long term contracts.  Research findings which indicate 
that a country without a sound judicial system raises the transaction cost by creating a 
network of traders who act as go betweens, looses the trust of the economic agents for 
fear of breach of terms of contract thereby creating insecurity are instructive for the 






The rationale for having the Ethiopian judiciary reformed is not based on economic 
explanations alone.  The establishment of a governance system that is based on rule of 
law also requires the existence of an impartial, independent and accountable judiciary 
which Ethiopia did not have in its recent past.  In addition to the timely enforcement 
of contracts the judiciary plays an irreplaceable role in protecting rights and making 
the other organs of government operate within a predictable framework of rules.  The 
credibility of the overall business and political environment can be sustained if the 
judiciary can support sustainable development by holding the other branches of 
government accountable.  
 
Ethiopia needs an effective judicial organ to ensure economic growth, rule of law and 
protection of individual and group rights.  This thesis has examined three aspects of 
the judiciary which help Ethiopia achieve this end.    Ethiopia’s reform program 
should ensure efficiency, enhance accessibility and maintain a good balance between 
independence and accountability of its judges and judicial organs.   These can be 
attained only through a thorough examination of the main problems which beset the 
justice system.   
 
The progress of the reform program in Ethiopia will, however, be affected by the 
overall historical development of its legal system and institutions.  Three aspects of 
the context within which the reform program operates particularly deserve attention in 
designing as well as implementing reform programs. 
 
The first feature relates to the pluralist nature of the Ethiopian legal system. Like 
many African countries the traditional systems in Ethiopia have been competing with 
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the state law throughout history.  Not only were they competing, but they also 
prevailed over the state law in many cases.  It is important to note that this happens in 
spite of their non-recognition by state law in a number of areas.  Customary systems 
and TDRs operate although there are state enacted rules which abrogate them.  This 
shows that the earlier attempts to do away with legal pluralisms in Ethiopia either by 
doing away with the customary laws or by incorporating some of them in to the state 
law have not fully succeeded.  Recognition of the pluralist nature of the Ethiopian 
system is instructive for the current reform efforts because it helps it to look for 
pluralist solutions to the pluralist societal needs. It also helps it look for home-grown 
solutions to some of the problems observed in the administration of justice.  
 
Another important feature is the fact that many of its formal institutions are of a 
recent development.  In spite of its long history, the formal legal institutions 
particularly the courts started to emerge only at the beginning of the 19th century.  The 
formal courts were established in 1942 and the first law school in 1963.  The other 
agencies in the administration of justice likewise came in to the picture only after 
1943.  The first judicial administration commission was established as recently as 
1973.  Before the emergence of these institutions, the system heavily depended on 
traditional arrangements and a few imperial decrees.  The attempt to modernize the 
Ethiopian legal system through essentially imported Codes from the western systems 
in the 1960s was imposed on this background.  This background affects the current 
efforts of reform as it adversely affected the Emperor’s modernization efforts.  
 
Thirdly, the fusion of the judicial organs with the other arms of government in the 
greater part of Ethiopian history is important to understand the context under which 
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the judiciary in Ethiopia operates.  This historical background affects the prevailing 
understanding of the concept of judicial independence and people’s perception about 
the judiciary.  Current efforts to increase efficiency enhance accessibility and 
strengthen the independence and accountability of the judiciary must be understood in 
the light of the overall background of the Ethiopian legal tradition.  
 
The reform component on efficiency of the judiciary is bound to face the difficulty of 
striking a good balance between rectitude of decisions, timely disposition of cases and 
the cost of litigation.  Rectitude of decisions should be one of the objectives of the 
reform in Ethiopia as it is one of the hallmarks of a good legal system.   Rectitude of 
decisions signifies the correct application of the law to facts that are established as 
true.  As determining whether any specific decision fulfils this requirement is not 
easy, the reform should rely on putting a procedural design in place and ensuring its 
proper implementation to guarantee rectitude of decisions. This thesis has indicated 
the twin problems that are observed in the process in Ethiopia both in civil litigation 
and in criminal proceedings in this regard. 
 
On the one hand the procedural rules in Ethiopia have many of the procedural designs 
which try to strike a good balance between the competing interests mentioned above 
although the rules may need some updating to reflect current needs and recent 
developments.  On the other hand there is a serious deviation of the actual process 
from the rules in the law books. As shown in the preceding chapters the procedural 
rules designed to guarantee rectitude of decision were either ignored or replaced by 
another set of rules that prevailed long before the adoption of the Codes.  The 
variance between the rules and the practice can partly be explained by the historical 
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background mentioned earlier.  As a result the reform program should not only 
identify the rules which hamper the unfolding of the process, but it must also have a 
package that ensures their proper application. The priority should be to make the 
institutions comply with the rules first as only then can one tell the point where the 
procedural rules have become bottlenecks in the process. 
 
As rectitude of decisions is intimately related to the temporal aspect of the process the 
reform program should also take inventory of the basic problems which hinder timely 
unfolding of the process. The delay that was observed in the process not only 
adversely affects the courts capability to give accurate decisions but it also erodes the 
confidence of its users. The adverse affect of delay in the process is particularly 
visible in the criminal justice process which had a very low conviction rate.  The 
delay in the process has undermined the accuracy of the results by increasing the risk 
of error.  Besides, the effect of delay has resulted in a high attrition rate in criminal 
proceedings.  Only a small percentage of cases initiated by the prosecution reached 
the final stage as many of the cases are dropped for different reasons including the 
non-availability of witnesses, the disappearance of defendants and the deterioration of 
other forms evidence.  
 
The reform program in Ethiopia needs to consider a number of elements which 
potentially affect the time to disposition.  It is clear from the data that the demand for 
judicial services is raising at an increasing rate.  Increase in demand can result in 
greater accumulation of backlog unless the courts raise their productivity to dispose at 
least as many cases as the incoming ones every year.  As shown in this thesis many of 
the federal courts have managed to have a clearance rate of more than 100% for 
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consecutive years thereby lowering their backlog. Achieving this requires adoption of 
a sound case flow management system which helps them shape the process of 
litigation.  The discussion in this thesis has also demonstrated that some level of 
efficiency can be attained in the judiciary without necessarily changing the rules or 
raising the number of judges.  Over the years for which data is provided in this thesis 
the courts have shown significant improvement in reducing time to disposition.   The 
number of cases disposed within a year has improved without necessarily increasing 
the number of judges.  
 
The main focus of access to justice in Ethiopia should be ensuring effective 
enjoyment of rights. This demands identifying the main barriers of access to justice in 
the country.  Initiatives on access to justice should begin from an appropriate 
understanding of the context under which the Ethiopian legal system operates.  
Recognition of the pluralist nature of the system in Ethiopia is an important point of 
departure for access to justice initiatives.  Attempts to make the system more 
accessible will not work without due consideration of this fundamental fact.  Current 
initiatives should learn from earlier failures to involve the customary arrangements as 
important institutions for development.  The Constitution explicitly recognizes the 
role of these institutions in some disputes but further possibilities should be explored 
to give them more space in the administration of justice.   Studies have shown that a 
significant percentage of disputes are submitted and resolved by these institutions.  
This is not surprising given the simplicity, low cost, speed and participatory nature of 
these institutions. The access to justice initiative in Ethiopia should take these 




Linking the TDR with the formal justice system through the small claims tribunals 
could be a good beginning.  Many of the tribunals operate in rural areas where the tie 
between members of the community is stronger and functional literacy is lower. 
Allowing justice at the grassroots level to be administered by local custom could 
enhance the participation of the citizens in the administration of justice.  It will make 
the dispute resolution less adjudicative and more mediatory. The disputes will also be 
administered by rules that are better known by the fact finders and the litigants. This 
will raise the level of satisfaction of the public and the legitimacy of the 
administration of justice.  It will also make the process less expensive to its users. To 
make the small claim tribunals real alternatives to dispute resolution they should be 
organized under a new thinking.   The binary thinking of adjudication must be 
minimized in these tribunals. They should not legally be bound to follow the strict 
procedural rules like the ordinary courts.  Neither should they have decision making 
as their primary objective.  Instead they should be given wider latitude to use local 
custom and should have mediation and reconciliation as their primary objectives.  The 
grounds for nomination, removal and tenure of their members should also be changed 
from the current system to reflect their objectives and mandate.   
 
Giving more space to the TDR and revitalizing small claims tribunals will ease the 
burden of the ordinary courts further ensuring greater access.  Further the judges must 
try to persuade the parties to settle their case without necessarily going to the full trial.  
This requires a change of mindset of all actors and changing the incentives structure 




The role of the other barriers of access to justice should also be placed in a proper 
perspective.  The number and proportion of judges and lawyers in the country is very 
low.  To ensure greater access there should be more judges and lawyers at a closer 
distance to the population.  Achieving this requires increasing their number faster than 
the population growth.  Under the current context this can only be achieved through 
production of more graduates from the law schools. But this will also mean that the 
judiciary will have no better option than to recruit young lawyers to fill in the posts 
for the newly opened courts. In the meantime training programs are being given to 
bring more judges to the scene.  Without a proportional increment in the number of 
lawyers, the impact of these initiatives will be limited, particularly in those areas 
where private lawyers are not willing to serve. The main problem of access to justice 
in Ethiopia is not that lawyers are too expensive as is the case in many systems.  The 
problem is that there are not enough of them to provide their services even to those 
who can afford to cover the fees.  Under such circumstances one may be tempted to 
suggest strengthening publicly funded legal aid as a way out.  But this will be 
constrained by the supply of professionals in the market apart from the resource 
limitations which are likely to remain for some time to come. Shifting to contingency 
fees would likewise have a limited impact as the private market is already constrained 
by the factors mentioned above. Given the increasing number of law schools that are 
offering legal education in different parts of the country, the main way out of such a 
dilemma may be involving the faculty members and students in this process.  
Participation of civil societies in this process should also be encouraged, although 




Non-availability of lawyers means that the cost incurred in this regard is low.  Neither 
is the court fee that high.  In any case many people get a document certifying that they 
are poor and get waiver from paying the fees. Litigation in Ethiopia does not involve 
experts many a time as a result of which their cost is not a concern for many.  As 
indicated in the thesis parties do not even cover the expenses of their own witnesses 
enabling the former to shift some of the costs to people who do not have the 
obligation to cover them.  
 
The main barrier of access to justice in Ethiopia is the expense which people incur to 
travel to the court site and related opportunity cost.  Under the current legal regime 
the smallest of claims is allowed to reach the highest court of the land.  This must be 
discouraged.  Some sense of proportionality between the claim and the resources 
spent by the parties and the public to process them must be introduced into the 
system. Delay reduction and introduction of ICT must also be taken as important 
component of access to justice apart from their role on efficiency.  Repeated 
appearances not only increase the duration time and become a cause of delay, they 
also raise the cost for people who travel from other areas especially for those with 
small claims.  Making courts more efficient would therefore minimize the cost barrier 
of access to justice.  Using ICT can minimize the impact of distance on litigation, the 
cost and related inconveniences. Physical appearance in courts has been minimized by 
introducing e-filing and video sessions in some pilot courts. Introduction of this 
technology reduces the psychological barrier which people from the rural areas are 




The concept of judicial independence is not known in Ethiopian history.  Since their 
establishment the formal courts in Ethiopia were under the direct control of the 
executive. Doubling of the heads of the executive institutions at all levels as judges 
was a common practice until recently.  Such institutions like judicial administration 
commission came in to the picture only since 1973.  Even then the model which was 
adopted when introducing theses institutions gave wide powers to the executive in the 
day to day administration of justice.  The majority of the members of the commission 
were from the executive arm of government.  Besides, the powers of these institutions 
were limited.   During the military regime the legal framework for judicial 
independence became even worse.  The PDRE Constitution as well as the other laws 
put the judiciary under the direct authority of the head of state who could remove 
judges and put new ones in their place if he deemed it fit.  Besides, the term of office 
of the judiciary was reduced to only five years.  Side by side with this legal 
framework the judiciary was staffed by judges who lacked the minimum professional 
requirements for the duty.  Many of them were church educated as only law school 
was producing only a handful of graduates every year.   
 
The shift in the model of judicial administration in Ethiopia since 1991 has created a 
better legal framework for judicial independence and accountability.  The FSC has 
taken over the previous responsibilities of the MoJ.  Administrative matters that affect 
the court are fully within the competence of the president of FSC.  The JAC, unlike in 
the past, is not only chaired by the President of FSC, but is also composed of a 
majority of judges.  The, nomination, discipline and removal of judges are within the 
power of JAC insulating the judiciary from possible interference from the executive.  
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The legal scheme has therefore avoided the areas which potentially put the 
independence of the judiciary in danger 
 
The basic challenge and direction of the reform should be ensuring the independence 
of the judiciary in their day to day operations.  This would be affected more by other 
factors than by the legal framework.  Many factors that happened in the past will 
affect the level of actual independence of judges. As there was not enough supply of 
judges in the past, the massive recruitment of judges for the newly established courts 
both at the federal and state level will affect the actual realization of independence.  
Partly compelled by the short supply of lawyers, the minimum age to become a judge 
is fixed at the age of 25.  The number of legally trained attorneys in the market is very 
small. Thus even if they are willing to join the judiciary, which they are not, the 
demand cannot be satisfied.  This means that the Ethiopian judiciary has no better 
option than to recruit young graduates to the judiciary for some years to come.  This 
will definitely affect the level of professional competence and therefore the practical 
level of independence of the judiciary. The reform program must address this 
dimension to ensure greater competence in the judiciary.  Having younger judges on 
the bench is not inherently bad but it needs to be supported by strong judicial training 
which has already begun.  The root cause to the problem however can only be 
addressed by strengthening legal education and increasing the supply of legally 
trained lawyers through expansion of law schools.  
 
Given the historical background that courts were for a long period of time under the 
executive, efforts must be made to clarify the nature of judicial independence and the 
legal framework that currently exists.   Because of the past arrangements many 
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members of the executive and citizens may nature and magnitude of the personal and 
institutional independence of the judges and the courts.   Such perceptions can only be 
minimized through training programs not only to the members of the judiciary but to 
the members of the executive as well.  
 
Ensuring the independence and accountability of the judiciary requires provision of 
basic resources by the government.  Conducting trials in public is one of the duties of 
the judiciary as a mechanism for making it accountable.  This, however, presupposes 
sufficient court rooms which are not available for many courts in Ethiopia. Such 
facilities should be seen as basic inputs for strengthening judicial independence and 
accountability. 
 
The reform efforts should also look for institutional arrangements to make the 
judiciary as well as every judge accountable.  The efforts to ensure the existence of an 
impartial third party in cases of dispute cannot be achieved without schemes to make 
the judiciary accountable.  In this regard although some of the modalities for making 
the judiciary accountable are incorporated in the legal framework, solutions should be 
sought to ensure their proper implementation.   Side by side, amendment of current 
legislation which could enhance the accountability of the judiciary should be perused.  
The composition of the JAC should be reconsidered to ensure greater participation of 
other stakeholders including the bar, legal education, and the executive and other 
members of society.  With the increase of the number of graduates in the country, 
some more things should be done to ensure that the best people are attracted to 
become judges.  This may include introducing examination of the candidates and  
raising the minimum age requirement.  The current legislation which allows people 
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without any legal education to become judges needs also to be changed so that the 
bench would have only people with appropriate legal training.  This should however 
be introduced to the regional states with some caution as the supply of professionals 
who speak their official languages may not be in adequate supply for some time to 
come.   
 
The role of the public at large in ensuring accountability of the judiciary must be 
enhanced through a number of measures.  This should begin from providing the 
public with information about the performance of the courts at all levels.  It should 
also be supported by measures to publish the judgments of the courts particularly 
those at the highest level. The media should be given wider freedom than it currently 
has to report on matters transpiring in the courts with some limits only when this 
freedom endangers the right of individuals in the process or when it threatens the 
impartiality of the courts.  Participation of the public in the trial process through 
involvement of lay judges should also be pursued.  
 
The legal framework that affects the criminal and civil liability of the judges should 
also be revisited.  Procedural immunity of judges in criminal cases which is enjoyed 
by the judges in the Oromiya State should be extended to the federal judiciary and 
other states.  This will not only avoid repetition of some of the incidents that 
happened in the past, it will also insulate judges from unnecessary influences from the 
executive.  On the other hand, the current regime for civil liability should be revised 






Appendix A: Table of Laws 
 
 
A Proclamation to Establish Kadis Courts No. 12 of 1942, Negarit Gazeta, 1st year 
No. 2. 
 
A Proclamation to Provide for the Establishment of Local Judges No. 90 of 1947, 
Negarit Gazeta, 6th year No. 10. 
 
A Proclamation to Provide for Business for Business Mortgage Proclamation No. 98 
of 1998, Negarit Gazeta 4th year No.17 
 
Addis Ababa City Government Charter No.87 of 1997, Negarit Gazeta 3rd year No. 52 
Administration of Justice Proclamation No. 2 of 1942, Negarit Gazeta 1st year No. 1.  
 
Agency for the Administration of Rented Houses Establishment Proclamation No. 
133 of 1998 Negarit Gazeta 5th year No. 10 
 
Amhara Social Courts Establishment Proclamation No. 17 of 2007 
 
Civil Code Proclamation of 1960, Negarit Gazeta 19th year No. 2. 
 
Civil Procedure Code, Decree No. 52 of 1965, Negarit Gazeta, 25th year No. 3 
 
Commercial Code Proclamation No    of 1960, Negarit Gazeta 19th year No. 3. 
 
Criminal Procedure Code Proclamation No. 185 of 1961,Negarit Gazeta, Gazeta 
extraordinary,  21st Year No. 7. 
 
Election Law Proclamation No 438 of 2005, Negarit Gazeta, 11th year No. 56 
 
Federal Civil Servants Proclamation No. 262 of 2002 Negarit Gazeta 8th year No. 8 
 
Federal Court Advocates Licensing and Registration Proclamation No. 199 of 2000, 
Negarit Gazeta 6th year No. 27 
 
Federal Courts Proclamation No. 25 of 1996, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 2nd year no. 13. 
 
Federal Courts (Amendment) Proclamation No. 138 of 1998, Negarit Gazeta 5th year 
No. 15 
 
Federal Court of Sharia consolidation Proclamation No. 188 of 1999Negarit Gazeta 
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